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RÉSUMÉ 
Les entreprises de haute technologie ont tendance à se regrouper autour des 
institutions productrices des connaissances. L'industrie aérospatiale n'échappe pas à 
ce phénomène, et il y a des exemples bien connus des grappes aérospatiales autour 
des avionneurs d'ordre mondial. Récemment, des entreprises renommées dans cette 
industrie ont établi des usines de production au Mexique. Les objectifs de cette thèse 
sont de distinguer les types d'activités menées au sein de ces entreprises au Mexique, 
ainsi que d'analyser les forces qui attirent ce mêmes entreprises à des villes 
mexicaines, et d'examiner si les mesures de politique publique mises en place par le 
gouvernement mexicain sont adéquates pour encourager la réalisation d'activités à 
fort contenu de connaissances. Pour comprendre quelles seraient les activités les plus 
probables d'être transférées dans un pays en voie de développement comme le 
Mexique, nous utilisons des concepts tels que la modularité du produit, la théorie du 
cycle de vie du produit et de la industrie, et les grappes industrielles le tout dans une 
approche évolutive. Nous comptons trouver des entreprises dédiées notamment à des 
activités de manufacture, et du côté institutionnel peu d'incitatifs de politique 
publique. 
Les sources d'information de cette thèse sont une enquête menée auprès d'une 
trentaine d'entreprises aérospatiales distribuées dans cinq villes mexicaines, et des 
entrevues avec des bureaux de promotion économique de quatre états du Mexique. 
Les résultats montrent que les forces d'agglomérations au Mexique sont reliées à des 
avantages de coût de manufacture, et les mesures de politique publique semblent être 
insuffisantes pour encourager les entreprises à se doter d'activités avec un plus grand 
contenu technologique. Nous pensons que les autorités mexicaines devraient 
reconnaître que la production d'avions représente un défi tout nouveau et pour cela 
les mesures devraient être plus ambitieuses et concentrées dans un petit nombre de 
villes. Même si des avantages autres que l'innovation sont les responsables de la 
présence des entreprises aérospatiales dans les grappes mexicaines, leur installation 
au Mexique représente un mérite étant donné les hauts standards de qualité qui 
caractérisent l'industrie. Une gestion adéquate de ces avantages peut représenter la 
base d'un futur développement dans le secteur. 
Mots clés: industrie aérospatiale, grappes industrielles, pays émergents, transfert de 
technologie, politique d'innovation et de technologie. 
ABSTRACT 
High technology companies tend to cluster around knowledge-producing institutions. 
Aerospace follows this pattern, and there are well-known examples of aerospace 
clusters located around large prime contracting aerospace producers. A recent trend 
that is taking momentum is the setting up of manufacturing facilities by leading 
aerospace companies in Mexico. The goals of this thesis are to investigate the type of 
activities these firms are conducting, as weil as the factors that attracted them to the 
specifie Mexican cities where they are located, and to examine if national or regional 
policy measures are framed in a strategy to encourage those firms to carry on 
knowledge-intensive activities. To understand what types of activities were more 
likeiy to be transferred to a developing country like Mexico, we use the concept of 
modularity, the PLC-ILC theory, and the cluster concept, ail of these framed in an 
evolutionary approach. We expected to find agglomerations of firms carrying out 
manufacturing activities with little support from public policy. 
The main sources of information of this thesis are a survey applied to 30 aerospace 
firms in Mexico distributed in five Mexican cities, and interviews with four state 
economic development offices. The results of this thesis show that agglomeration 
forces in Mexican aerospace clusters are strongly related with cost-reducing 
manufacturing advantages and policy measures seem insufficient to encourage firms 
to undertake more complex activities. Mexican authorities should acknowledge that 
aircraft production presents new challenges due to their particular modular 
characteristics, and therefore, policy measures should be more ambitious and 
concentrate public resources in just a few locations. Even though advantages not 
related with innovation may explain the presence of firms in Mexico's aerospace 
clusters, these advantages should not be minimized given the high quality standards 
of the industry and, if properly managed, they may form the base for future 
development. 
Key words: aerospace industry, industrial clusters, emerging countries, technology 
transfer, innovation and technology policy. 
--------------_._---------------------- ­
INTRODUCTION 
High technology industries are often associated with economic success. Particularly, 
a common daim IS that high-technology sectors are the main driving force of 
industrial growth ln an advanced economy. These are thought to be economic 
engines, able to positively impact other more traditional technology sectors. Thus, the 
importance of a high technology sector is not just its own contribution to GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product), employment, revenue or exports, but the way it impacts other 
industries in the economy. These industries attract specialized suppliers thanks to 
their sophisticated demands, they also are a magnet for ski lied personnel that may 
eventually work in related industries, and they may create new ideas and solutions 
with potential applications in other industries. Given the importance of high­
technology sectors, scholars are interested in uncovering the economic, institutional 
and social dynamics that characterize their functioning, while policy makers are eager 
to obtain practical knowledge related to these dynamics in order to set policy 
measures able to foster the creation and growth of this kind of activity. 
The opening of a manufacturing plant by the Canadian aerospace firm Bombardier at 
Querétaro, Mexico, was a highly publicized event by Mexican goverrunent officiaIs. 
National and regional politicians announced the entry of Mexico into the world 
aircraft manufacturing industry. The fact is that Bombardier took a step that had 
already been taken by sorne other foreign aerospace firms: namely, transferring part 
of their activities to Mexican soil. It seems that this delocalization trend is gaining 
momentum. Apparently, Mexico can take advantage of this trend by developing a 
high technology industry and enjoy the benefits of that kind of sector. To adopt 
policy measures that could encourage this trend is important to know the 
requirements of the aerospace industry. In this sense, the first objective of this thesis 
is to understand the technology transfer cycle of a high technology industry, with a 
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substantial codijied knowledge and scale economies, to a developing country with 
limited specijic skills in thatfleld. 
One key phenomenon related to high technology sectors is that sorne of them tend to 
agglomerate in more or less clearly circumscribed geographical areas; in other words, 
they tend to cluster. This has lead to the conclusion that sorne places provide regional 
advantages for the functioning of high technology sectors. The aerospace industry is 
no exception to the high-tech agglomeration trend. There are well-known examples of 
aerospace clusters like Montreal in Canada, Toulouse in France, and Everett (WA) in 
the US. Aerospace agglomerations in particular exhibit a very particular set of 
economic, social and technological conditions. These conditions have a great effect 
on the way knowledge is created, diffused and exploited. Accordingly, is important to 
know the type of clustering that is taking place in Mexico. Therefore, the second 
objective of this thesis is to understand why this industry tends to elusters in a host 
country, as it is the case in their home countries, even if the activities carried out in 
the host country are expected to be less knowledge intensive than in their home 
countries. 
From the Wright brothers' landmark flight in 1903 to present-day jet-powered 
airliners, and from the complete dominance of the American manufacturer Boeing not 
so long aga to tierce oligopoly competition today, the aircraft industry has 
experimented important changes. The evolution of the technology knowledge base of 
the industry, and the political and economic conditions that sUiTound the industry are 
crucial elements to understand possible future venues. For this reason, an illustration 
of the main techno-economic dimensions of the products of this industry is presented. 
Ali countries that have developed a successful aerospace industry have put in place 
costly and permanent policy measures to support its development. These measures 
are needed to nurture the set of relevant regional (and national) organizations that 
participate in this high teclmology industry, as weil as to put in place the necessary 
3 
institutions for their weil functioning. The ability for a country to develop these 
organizations and institutions will strongly depend on the degree of development of 
the overail innovation system, and the maturity of its public administration to design, 
implement, evaluate and fine-tune technology and innovation policies. The third 
objective of this thesis is to point out policy measures that can encourage the 
transfer of more complex activities and the trigger of local learning processes in a 
country that starts almost from scratch in the aerospace industry. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. PART 1 of this work comprises the 
theoretical framework and context: Chapter 1 is the theoretical framework. The first 
section is a revision of concepts like industrial districts, growth poles, anchor tenants 
and innovation systems, which aims at explaining why economic and/or innovative 
activity concentrate only in sorne places. An assessment of these concepts will reveal 
which of them are more pertinent to explain aerospace agglomerations. The second 
section of this chapter presents the main tenets of the industry life cycle and the 
product life cycle (ILC-PLC), and the technological dimensions of the aircraft as a 
modular product. Then, these two approaches are integrated to understand likely ways 
in which leading aerospace firms may delocalize their activities to new-corner 
countries. The last section of this chapter discusses the bases of a technology and 
innovation policy in evolutionary terms. Chapter II puts in context the aerospace 
sector in Mexico in particular and its innovation system in general. The first section is 
an overview of the aerospace industry in Mexico, and presents information about 
main indicators and the type of products produced in the country. The second section 
illustrates the Mexican context in terms of the economic policy followed by the 
government on recent decades and its effects on the development of the institutions 
that are supposed to support technology and innovation. Chapter III presents the 
hypotheses of this work. On PART II the empirical research is presented: Chapter 
IV contains the data and methodology. Chapter V details the results of this research. 
Chapter VI is a return to theory, in which conceptual contributions are laid out. 
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Then, the overall conclusions of the study, Iimits and further research, and a general 
policy proposaI are presented. BibIiographicaI references and annexes,are at the end 
of this document. 
PART 1: THEORY AND CONTEXT
 
CHAPTER l
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 
1.1 Agglomeration forces in aerospace 
Introduction 
In places where aerospace firms establish, it is common to find out that regional 
development offices promote the growth of these firms. On the academic side, sorne 
authors like Beaudry (2001), Niosi et al (2005), and Smith and Ibrahim (2006) also 
make explicit use of the term aerospace cluster, to refer to aerospace firms located in 
a specifie geographic region. Given those commonalities, it may appear that an 
aerospace cluster is easily identifiable in practice and has a more or less uniform set 
of analytical dimensions that makes it a clear concept. However, the aerospace 
cluster concept is far from being unambiguous, and thus the practical identification of 
clusters is not a straightforward exercise. This conceptual ambiguity may prove to be 
misleading in policy terms when it cornes to foster and support so-called aerospace 
clusters. This is particularly important in the case of newcomer countries like Mexico, 
which are allegedly developing aerospace clusters. 
Sorne authors mentioned above have not accepted the cluster concept uncritically; on 
the contrary, sorne of them use the cluster label while providing other analytical 
dimensions more appropriate to the understanding of the aerospace sector. Others, 
like Niosi et al (2005), explicitly challenge the concept and instead use terms like 
productive cluster and regional innovation system to better describe aerospace 
agglomerations. By the same token, Cooke and Ehret (2009) openly prefer the terms 
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aerospace agglomerations or regions, and only use the word cluster when making 
reference to studies that do so. Although the studies mentioned so far analyse 
aerospace clusters in a meaningful way, they do it with different purposes and using 
different analytical frameworks. Given the central importance of knowledge creation, 
use, and diffusion in the economy in generaJ and in aerospace in particular as a high 
technology activity, an aerospace cluster concept will be better served by the 
inclusion of categories that examine the role of technological knowledge and 
innovation in the development of such clusters. In this sense, the works ofNiosi et al 
(2005), Niosi and Zhegu (2005) and Cooke and Ehret (2009) are an adequate starting 
point for such a quest, since knowledge and innovation are the central concern in 
those works. 
As stated in the previous paragraph, the main objective of section 1.1 is to examine 
the concepts that describe industrial agglomerations, and to propose relevant 
analytical dimensions for assessing the technological strengths and weaknesses of 
aerospace clusters or agglomerations. In order to do that, section 1.1.1 is a theoretical 
discussion of the main concepts: agglomeration economies, industrial district, growth 
pole, anchor tenant, innovation system and cluster, which have been central in the 
analysis of the agglomeration of economic activity in general. With the aid of works 
that have studied aerospace clusters, section 1.1.2 analyses the relevance of these 
agglomeration concepts ta the study of the aerospace sector. Ultimately, section 1.1 
will lay the conceptual foundation that will allow us to identify what kind of 
aerospace agglomerations (if any) exist in Mexico. This is the first step towards the 
assessment of the potential of Mexico's aerospace sector to become a serious player 
in the world aerospace industry. 
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1.1 J Clusters, industrial districts, innovation system and other agglomerations of 
innovative firms 
In recent years the work of Michael Porter has popularized the cluster concept in 
reference to the agglomeration of economic activity. The word cluster has been used 
extensively even if sorne authors depart in significant ways from Porter's 
formulation. It can be said that the word cluster has been chosen as a fancy 
replacement for agglomeration, but there is not an intrinsic set of analytical 
dimensions shared by ail authors or regional development offices for using the word. 
Given the ubiquity of the word cluster, the approach taken here is to use it to make 
reference to any kind of economic agglomeration, while using the term "Porter 
cluster" to make reference to the concept introduced by Michael Porter. Thus, later in 
section 1.2, when referring to aerospace clusters we will refer to agglomerations of 
firms dedicated to aerospace, but not in the sense of Porter' s formulation. 
The idea that sorne economic activities derive a number of benefits from being 
geographically concentrated is not new. A pioneering formulation of the phenomenon 
was made by the British economist Alfred Marshall. According to Marshall (1890), 
there are three main agglomeration economies that firms operating in one sector 
achieve by locating together: the first is the pull of specialized suppliers; the second is 
the attraction of specialized workers; and the third is the creation of an "industrial 
atmosphere" in which innovative ideas are easily transmitted among local agents. 
Implicit in the argument is that these economies would not be attained if firms were 
geographically scattered. 
Marshall (1890) based his explanation on what he called "industrial districts" located 
in England, dedicated mainly to the textile industry. After the work of Marshall, 
other influential concepts relating economy and geography have appeared. Among 
the most influential are the "growth pole" developed by François Perroux; Marshall's 
"industrial district" as adopted and developed by Italian academics; Michael Porter's 
"innovative cluster"; and the "national innovation system" (put forward by 
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Christopher Freeman, B-A. Lundvall and Richard R. Nelson), in its "regional" variety 
pioneered by Cooke and Morgan (1998) and its "sectoral" approach developed by 
Malerba (2002); and the "anchor tenant" put forward by Agrawal and Cockburn 
(2003), as wel1 as Feldman (2003). 
In their deconstruction of the cluster concept, Mmiin and Sunley (2003) argue that 
any concept that attempts to understand the agglomeration of economic activity 
should include at least three relevant dimensions: industrial boundaries, geographical 
scope, and the socio-economic dynamics that takes place in the agglomeration. The 
first dimension is important because it clarifies what kinds of industries are more 
likely to benefit from being concentrated in one place. The second dimension, simply 
put, examines the geographical extension of the cluster effect: cities, metropolitan 
areas, provinces, states, or even less precisely defined geographical areas such as 
Silicon Valley or Route 128. The third dimension is critical because it seeks to 
uncover the series of relationships and economic effects that ultimately give clustered 
firms an advantage over non clustered firms, such as knowledge externalities. Given 
the pertinence of these three dimensions, the approach taken here is to evaluate the 
agglomeration concepts previously mentioned using the framework proposed by 
Martin and Sunley. 
Industrial District 
There is not a single definition for the 'industrial district' concept or a comprehensive 
one among Italian scholars, and even scholars like Rabellotti (1995) question the 
analytical quality of the concept, emphasizing instead that it is more like a set of 
stylized facts than a theoretical mode!. To appreciate this, we present three definitions 
of the' industrial district' based on the Italian experience: 
"The districts are geographically defined productive systems, 
characterised by a large number of firms that are involved at various 
stages, and in various ways, in the production of a homogeneous product. 
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A significant feature is that a very high proportion of these firms are small 
or very small."(Pyke and Sengenberger, 1990: 2) 
"Thus an industrial district is a small area in which, (if we include both
 
dependent and independent workers), there are perhaps 10,000 to 20,000
 
workers, and around 1,000 to 3,000 firms with fewer than 20 employees.
 
Many of these firms have a direct connection with the final market, others
 
are "stage firms" and, still others, firms of the vertically integrated sector.
 
A district comprises a c1uster of firms producing something which is
 
homogeneous in one way or another, positioning themselves differently
 
on the market. Thus, the district could be defined as being a cluster, plus a
 
peculiar relationship amongst firms. One thing that must, of course, be
 
stressed is that this cluster does not have a centre for strategie decision­

making. The fact that the firms connected to the final markets are
 
numerous, and independent of one another, prevents the district from
 
having one single head. The market is clearly national and international
 
although the "stage-firms" work only indirectly for the international
 
market."(Brusco, 1990: 14-15)
 
"From the ideal type arising from the Italian experience four key factors
 
characterizing industrial districts emerge:
 
-clusters of mainly small and medium-sized enterprises spatially
 
concentrated and sectorally specialized;
 
-a set of forward and backward linkages, based both on market and
 
nonmarket exchanges of goods, information and people;
 
-a common cultural and social background linking economic agents and
 
creating a behavioural code, sometimes explicit but often implicit;
 
-a network of public and private local institutions supporting the
 
economic agents acting within the cluster." (Rabellotti, 1995: 29-30)
 
Paradoxically, in terms of its activity's boundaries, the 'industrial district' concept is 
not defined in terms of an industry, as classified by its Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. Instead, the unifying economic dimension of the district is 
a "homogeneous product" as the two first definitions point out. This means that in the 
districts there are firms from different industries, as long as they contribute to a 
particular stage of production of a specifie product. Implicit in all, but explicit in the 
second definition, is the fact that ail manufacturing stages leading to that 
"homogeneous product" are actually carried out within the district. In fact, Brusco 
(1990) acknowledges Becattini's contribution of redirecting the unit of analysis from 
la 
traditional industry boundaries to ail relevant activities leading to the final product. 
Regarding the links between the firms, the last two definitions among those presented 
in the previous paragraph stress the informai ties among these firms, as an extra 
component, in addition to formai ties; however, they do not explain exactly how these 
informai ties work. An aspect on which aIl authors agree is that the districts are made 
up of small, highly specialized firms. Therefore, in terms of industrial boundaries, the 
'industrial district' is defined around a "homogeneous product", in which numerous 
small, highly specialized firms carry on al1 the relevant activities pertaining to 
different industries, but leading to the final product. This decentralized network of 
smail firms is possible thanks to the collaboration between them, which is based on 
informai ties among participants. 
The spatial scale of the district is not much developed in the definitions presented 
above. The first definition talks about geographical1y productive systems, the second 
about small area, while the third talks about spatially concentrated enterprises. 
Although not explicitly, it seems that the 'industrial district' is confined to a city-like 
region, on the model of the districts identified by Marshall, or to metropolitan areas, 
or even to larger areas such as Mexican or US states, German lander or Canadian 
prOVInces. 
Regarding the socio-economic dynamics that characterize the 'industrial district', 
Becattini (1990) stresses the existence of a shared system of values, institutions and 
rules. In this sense, this author daims that "community and firms tends to merge". 
Summarizing the view of sorne authors about the Italian districts, Asheim (2000) 
mentions the district is usual1y portrayed as a shared system of values that allows for 
creating an industrial atmosphere that facilitates the flow of tacit knowledge between 
firms, and that trust was a crucial factor that allowed that flow. Nevertheless, authors 
like Lissoni and Pagani (2003) stress that even if networking is indeed important to 
share knowledge; there are often several networks in each district, each network with 
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its own codes and epistemic community. Moreover, these authors found that in the 
Brescia (Italy) district of hosiery machinery, the knowh:~dge exchanges were based 
more on stable user-producer relationships than in an allegedly trust shared by the 
whole community 1. 
With the decline of the fordist mass-production organization era, that was 
characterized by the existence of big vertically integrated firms internalizing 
economies of scale, and long life-cycle products, new ways of organizing production 
were put in place in the economic landscape. The work of Piore and Sabel (1984) 
advocàted that small specialized-flexible organizations were to take a more prominent 
role in the economic landscape, given the decline of mass-production. One of the 
cases of flexible specialization these authors use as an illustration is precisely the 
Italian industrial districts. This revival by Piore and Sabel (1984) led other authors, 
like the ones already seen, to focus their attention on the Italian industrial districts. 
However, it should be said that the industrial district was just one of the several 
flexible specialization organization types that Piore and Sabel (1984: 265-268) 
identified, and indeed a very peculiar one. The account ofPiore and Sabel and the 
other authors reviewed so far shows that the districts are very dependent on context 
specific circumstances. First, the Italian experience is particular in that there were 
strong links between the productive sectors and the socialist party in Emilia Romagna 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984: 266). Second, as we have seen, the products are mainly 
traditional craft-type, with a high tacit component. Third, sorne authors question the 
ability of the industrial district to generate radical irmovation. This assertion is based 
1 Other authors challenge this idea of trust as the only way in which cooperation can take place. For 
instance, Semlinger (2008) argues that if cooperation is confined to relationships based on trust it 
would be rather restrictive, because generally trust is limited to close social partners; thus, this will 
limit cooperation with strangers, which may lead to lock-in situations in which firms are unable to find 
new routines and ways to compete in a changing world (p. 552). Instead of considering trust as the 
only element which brings cooperation, Semlinger (2008) stresses out that symmetric mutua 1 
dependency can warrant a reliable collaboration, which makes the management of this symmetric 
dependency an important asset that firms involved in network arrangements shoüld constantly 
maintain (p. 557). 
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in the tight co-operative customer-buyer relationship characteristic of the district. 
Critics say that this kind of relationship can lead to incremental iIU1ovation, but 
radical iIU1ovation often requires finding other sources of ideas, suppliers (Asheim, 
2000), universities, research laboratories, and fine tuned iIU1ovation policy (Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998). Fourth, another critique points out that the industrial district is 
just a temporary arrangement of firms, that eventually will have to evolve into a 
different arrangement with more hierarchical features (Rabelloti, 1995; Asheim, 
2000). In fact, Boschma and Lamboy (2002) find that markets in the Italian districts 
have became more concentrated with fewer firms and fewer local inter-firm 
relationships; moreover, powerfulleader firms and business groups have emerged (p. 
301). These authors explain that firms in Italian districts have evolved in a way in 
which sorne have acquired predominance over others and which external agents have 
emerged. Thus, there is a knowledge-asymmetry situation in which now large firms 
are reluctant to share their core competences (Boschma and Lamboy 2002: 301). The 
view in which districts are a collection of homogeneous firms that collaborate based 
on trust has been put in question for its recent depaliures of that homogeneity 
(Rabelloti, 1995; Asheim, 2000; Boschma and Lamboy, 2002) and because trust is 
not the only (perhaps not even necessary) element to allow collaboration in these 
networks. AlI these characteristics make difficult both the transferability of the 
model to other places, and the capacity of the industrial district organization to 
nurture more high technology activities. 
Growth Pole 
The 'growth pole' is the only one based completely on an explicit industrial 
terminology. Perroux asserts that for a region to qualify as an "engine region" (it 
seems that he equates this term with 'growth pole'), it has to exert driving 
(entraînement) or blocking (stoppage) effects over industries located in other regions 
(Perroux, 1955). Perroux (1982) mentions three main ways in which this engine 
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region exerts the so-called driving effect over others: urban agglomerations, engine 
industries, and new industries (p. 200). 
Following the above assertion, the industrial boundaries of the growth pole are 
determined by the engine company and the new industry. Nevertheless, even if these 
terms are based on industrial terminology, the industry boundaries are not weil 
defined. For an engine industry to be qualified as such, it should also have driving or 
blocking effects over other industries, in the same way as the engine region. For this 
reason, it is not clear how Perroux differentiates an engine region from an engine 
industry. lt seems that he treats them as different levels of the same phenomenon. 
This vision is reinforced by his treatment of big (usually multinational) firm that for 
Perroux (1982) is the economic agent with greater capacity to influence the economic 
landscape (p. 134-152). Therefore, it can be argued that the big firm is the lower level 
of analysis, while the engine industry is in the middle level, and the engine region is 
at the upper level. Thus, as long as a big firm, industry or region is capable of having 
driving effects over others, it is an engine firm, industry or region. The issue of new 
industries poses another difficulty because Perroux (1982) does not make any claim 
about the nature of firms that usually make up the dynamic industries. Therefore, 
drawing the industrial boundaries of the growth pole has to take into account the 
relationships between different industries and the capacity of the engine industry to 
influence others. 
When Perroux (1982: 201) speaks of urban agglomerations effects that are manifested 
in the imitation of the city way of life by other regions, thus creating a flow of goods, 
services and investment, he seems to suggest that a city is the spatial scope for the 
growth pole. However, he also recognizes that concentration of engine industries (the 
main cause of growth) can occur in places with not too much urban development. 
Thus, it is not clear what the spatial boundaries for the growth pole are. Nevertheless, 
given that Perroux pays attention to the driving effects of big multinational firms, and 
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that usually these multinationals are located in urban city-like areas, it can be argued 
that a city-like region is the spatial scope of the 'growth pole' concept. 
The growth pole does not explain the effects of geographical economlc 
concentrations in terms of explicit socio-economic terminology. Instead, Perroux uses 
the terminology that we have already seen. The engine industries and the new 
industries are the main drivers of growth in the economy as a who le. The engine 
industry exerts its effects mainly by means of its buying of inputs, selling of outputs, 
and investment, while the new industry exerts its driving effects by means of its 
initial high growth, with its consequent perturbing effects on existing industries 
(Perroux, 1982: 201). Thomas (1975: 22) adds to the new industry effects, explaining 
that new products or processes can enhance the efficiency of their respective 
industries, while at the same time, depending on the specific applicability of such 
new products to other industries, can also affect the efficiency of other industries' 
inputs or outputs. Thus, in Perroux there is the notion of technological innovation in 
the Schumpeterian sense, nevertheless as Thomas (1975) mentions, Perroux does not 
go into the micro perspective of innovation. Therefore, the internai socio-economic 
dynamics that create the concentration of economic growth in the growth pole is 
explained by Perroux from a macro perspective. 
In the 'growth pole' current, what matters most is the existence of an engine industry 
and engine firm, and the channels by which this firm and industry affect other 
industries. The way in which these engines affect the rest of the economy is modeled 
in an input-output fashion. Thus, the strength of the linkages between propeller and 
propelled industries is a matter of degree. The question of specialization is not 
addressed by Perroux, perhaps because he treats the issue from a meso-economic 
perspective. Nevertheless, he clearly sees the big firm (sometimes multinational) as 
the one with the capacity to exert this engine quality. Thus, it can be argued that 
Perroux was thinking in terms of large vertical-integrated firm, whose activity will 
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attract several others seeking complementarities. These ideas were very popular in the 
1960s and 1970s in Europe, Latin America, and even North America, were 
governments tried to create agglomerations by attracting or establishing large firms 
(e.g. automobile pole in the Southern Italy; Brazil petrochemical poles; Quebec steal 
pole) (Niosi, 2002b: 40). In this sense, it is important to stress that the growth pole 
makes reference to a strategic decision of a big corporation motivated by the intention 
of public policy to develop a specific region, while the industrialdistrict makes 
reference to a more or less spontaneous gathering of several small firms in which 
policy was not much involved. This last scenario was perhaps more pertinent to early 
stages of an industry, while the latter is more pertinent to a developed stage of an 
industry. This means that the growth pole idea has more modern elements than the 
marshallian industrial districts. 
Anchor Tenant 
Markusen (1996) makes the claim that the Marshallian industrial districts, like the 
ones described above, are just but one form of industrial organization among others. 
In fact, this author asserts that that industrial organization form is not as prevalent as 
others had suggested. Moreover, contrary to sorne daims in the sense that "flexible 
specialization" with its decentralization features will become ubiquitous with the fall 
ofvertically integrated companies (Piore and Sabel, 1984), Markusen (1996) does not 
predict the replacement of ail hierarchical forms of regional industrial organization in 
the future. Quite the contrary, Markusen (1996) recognizes the power of certain 
actors, like large firms and state laboratories, to shape the regions in which they are 
established. Among the types of industrial organizations described by Markusen 
(1996), the hub-and-spoke and the state-anchored districts are characterized by 
having key firms or laboratories that act as anchor tenants. In a sense, Markusen and 
other authors in this CUITent rediscover and develop Penoux ideas about the magnetic 
effect of large firms. However, while Perroux was thinking in supply effects from the 
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large corporation, Markusen and others in the anchor tenant concept put forward 
knowledge externalities emanating from the large firm, although there is also the 
recognition that in sorne cases, the anchor tenant can be research labs and not big 
firms, like in the case of the state-anchored model put forward by Markusen. Usually 
this last model makes reference to important state run research laboratories able to 
exert influence in the region they are established. 
Recognizing the l'ole that anchor tenants play in shaping the economic landscape, 
other authors have sought to explain why these anchors exert such an agglomeration 
force. Feldman (2003) recognizes the importance of technological innovation for 
economic growth and seeks to understand how anchor tenants affect the knowledge 
generation and specialization patterns of certain regions. Thus, research interest is 
now centered on how anchor tenants affect innovation in particular. It is important to 
note that Feldman (2003) studies the anchor tenant in the context of biotechnology 
activities, and as such this author proposes that universities research units may be the 
ones that act as anchor in this sector. Thus, in the same line as Markusen, Feldman, 
also recognizes that sometimes the anchor tenant could be a research laboratory and 
not just a big firm, but different from Markusen, Feldman points out that the 
laboratory does not necessarily have to be state-owned (Markusen is thinking mainly 
in military examples), but instead it could belong to a university. 
The anchor tenant idea was first developed in the context of shopping malis (Agrawal 
and Cockburn, 2002). In more organizational and technology approaches, authors like 
Lowe (1997) adopted the anchor tenant notion to explain the way in which an eco­
industrial park should be designed. Briefly stated, the eco-industrial park seeks to 
better manage and utilize common inputs and slack resources that are common to a 
determined group of business (p. 58). Defining the anchor tenant of the park will 
influence the rest of the membership because the rest should benefit from inputs, 
customers, and slack resources generated by the anchor. Thus, the anchor in this 
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context is a firm that generates an important volume of inputs and outputs, and at the 
same time these by-products should be practical for the development of other firms. 
Thus, the anchor tenant notion of the eco-industrial park (Lowe, 1997) is similar to 
the growth pole of Perroux in which the anchor tenant affects other firms by means of 
inputs and outputs. However, the engine firm of Perroux generates agglomeration 
through its provision of either demand for products (i.e. components) or supply of 
key materials (i.e. special steel). The anchor tenant, instead, generates ideas that spill 
over the frontiers of the firm or research institution. 
Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) define the anchor tenant as "a large, locally present 
firm that is: (1) heavily engaged in R&D in general and (2) has at least minor 
absorptive capacity in a particular technological area" (p. 1229). The hypothesis the 
authors advance is that "the presence of an anchor tenant firm enhances the regional 
innovation system such that local university research is more likely to be absorbed by 
and to stimulate local industrial R&D."(p. 1229). In the same vein, Feldman (2003) 
argues that the presence of an anchor tenant organization may provide a means to 
further the translation of general-purpose technologies developed at universities and 
research institutes into commercial products (p. 324). Philips (2002) also puts the 
accent on the technology transfer issue when discussing anchor tenants. In the context 
of technology business incubators, this author stresses the role of incubators in 
transferring research and technology created in universities. 
Instead of defining the anchor tenant on the basis of industrial boundaries, Agrawal 
and Cockburn (2003) focus on technological areas. What matters is the technological 
area in which the anchor tenant firm manifests an important R&D competence. 
Therefore, the knowledge externalities this anchor tenant firm creates can benefit 
only those universities and firms that are involved in the technological area in which 
the anchor tenant has R&D competence. For Philips (2002), the anchor tenant of a 
technology business incubator is precisely the firm that by means of its technology 
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characteristics can attract other firms to the incubator (p. 305). Therefore, the 
boundaries of the anchor tenant concept are set in terms oftechnological area, and the 
concept tries to explain concentration of university research and industrial R&D 
activities and not so much the concentration of production. In a more dynamic 
context, Feldman (2003) explains that the anchor tenant may generate various veins 
of possible research and commercial applications. This will determine to a great 
extent the technological specialization of start-up firms that develop around the 
anchor. Thus, even if Philips (2002) and Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) set the 
boundaries according to the R&D competence of the anchor tenant, it should be kept 
in mind that further development of technology can lead to different specialization 
paths on the part of start-ups. 
With the aim of setting the geographical scope boundaries of the anchor tenant, 
Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) argue that the anchor tenant must have local presence. 
The main reason for this is the tacit nature of much of the knowledge involved in 
university research and industrial R&D. The geographical scope of the agglomeration 
is not weIl defined. Following the condition that the transfer of tacit knowledge 
requires recurrent face to face contact (as argued by Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003), it 
means that human daily transportation time sets up the geographical influence of the 
anchor tenant firm. 
The condition that the anchor tenant firm be large and competent in R&D has several 
implications for the socio-economic dynamics that characterize the knowledge flow 
in the influence area of the anchor tenant. Two main implications are the volume of 
transactions, and the sophisticated demand in terms of university research and 
industrial R&D inputs, as well as the industrial R&D outputs it deploys. For instance, 
absent the concentration of volume, it would be difficult for universities to set up big 
laboratories and technology transfer offices. These university facilities will serve not 
just to satisfy the demand of the anchor tenant firm, but also the demand of smaller 
19 
R&D-oriented firms in the area. The small volume of transactions of even a handful 
of small R&D firms is needed; it is not enough for universities to set up big facilities. 
Indeed, authors like Hanel and St-Pierre (2006) in the context of a developed country 
like Canada, found that large firms are more likely to col1aborate with universities 
than small firms do. The more developed absorptive capacity (see below) due to their 
own internai R&D activity (which is a very complex and resource-consuming activity 
not suitable for sorne small firms) is among the factors that explain why large firms 
tend to collaborate with universities more intensely than small firms do (Hanel and 
St-Pierre, 2006). 
Three main socio-economic processes characterize the anchor tenant hypothesis: 
absorptive capacity, geographical localization of knowledge spillovers, and the role 
of tacit knowledge in knowledge transfer (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003: 1231). 
Regarding the first process, the authors use the definition given by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) in which absorptive capacity is a condition that al10ws a firm to 
benefit from external sources of knowledge. The main input for developing that 
absorptive capacity is the firm's own R&D activity, because it implies a learning 
process that eventually can help the firm to decipher the R&D advances of other 
firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). This absorptive capacity is crucial to absorb 
much of the technological knowledge that competitors and related firms possess, but 
also the knowledge spillovers generated by the anchor. Even if much of that 
knowledge is codified in patents, there remain important aspects that are difficult to 
codify and remain tacit2. Since that "tacit knowledge" requires recurrent face to face 
contact, the most viable beneficiaries from that knowledge are the firms and people 
who work nearby the anchor tenant firm (in the case that this firm generates 
2 Breschi and Lissoni (2001) criticize the sharp distinction of knowledge into codified and tacit. They 
argue that tacitness is a matter ofdegree, and even if certain knowledge has a high degree oftacitness, 
it does not mean that il will lead to geographical concentration per se. These authors observe that most 
research agreements and license sales are made in a market framework that does not have much to do 
with spatial proximity. In sorne way, this idea weakens the 'anchor tenant' argument. 
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spillovers) if the latter has the knowledge-generating capacity required. For this 
reason there are "localized spillovers". 
The anchor tenant concept is formulated in terms of technological areas, and not so 
much in terrns of traditional industry boundaries. When the anchor is a big firm, it 
stimulates those firms and universities that could eventually benefit from the specifie 
technological areas in which the anchor is competent (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003). 
When the anchor tenant is a research laboratory, as Markusen (1996) and Feldman 
(2003) point out, new start-ups may be in fact related to the anchor's technological 
field, but they can depart in significant ways once they evolve. Moreover, start-ups 
are not the only firms that can grow up out of the anchor, established firms can seek 
the expertise of the research lab and establish close to it, like the example of the 
Strathclyde University tells. In the same line, it is very revealing that Feldman (2003) 
studies biotechnology, which is a group of different technologies that can be applied 
to several industries. Also, as Pavitt et al (1997) have shown, large firms are rnulti­
technology organizations. Thus, the anchor tenant organization favours the local 
concentration of technologically-related firms and research, and eventually other 
organizations that could take advantage of the anchor's diversified technology 
knowledge. 
Innovation System 
The concept of innovation system has been put forward more or less simultaneously 
by Christopher Freeman Cl 987), Bengt-A. Lundvall (1988) and Richard R. Nelson 
(1993). Derived from the concept of National System of Innovation (NSI), other 
approaches have emerged like the Regional Innovation System and the Sectoral 
Innovation System. In sorne way these three approaches are useful to understand the 
aerospace sector. They go beyond the traditional definition of industry and consider 
not only firms, but also other organizations like universities, research centres, and 
government agencies. The national character of the NSI is crucial for different 
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reasons. First, military aerospace is an obvious national concern for security reasons, 
and since civil and military aerospace technologies are closely related, national 
governrnents have always been vigilant about the way technology evolves and about 
avoiding leakages to potential enemy countries. Second, the ever increasing and huge 
costs involved in the design and production of aircrafi makes imperative the 
involvement of governrnent financial support. These financial needs are so big that 
regional governrnents cannot fulfill them alone and should resort to national 
governrnents. Third, in terms of industrial development, the aircrafi sector is seen as a 
high technology sector able to generate high revenues and technological externalities, 
thus it becornes a syrnbol of economic pride. Although this last situation can also be 
applied to the regional level, in general terms the techno-economic significance is sa 
high that usual1y goes beyond the regions. AIso, countries active in the aircrafi 
industry usual1y involve more than one region on it, even if the level of activity is not 
levelled among them. 
The tendency of aerospace activity to cluster is the malll reason the regional 
dimension is important. Given this geographic concentration of the activity, national 
and regional governrnents usual1y deploy all relevant institutional support (like 
national research labs, universities, and incentives) in those specifie areas. This 
creates a positive feedback effect because specialized workers gather in those areas 
creating a labour pool, which is one of the main attractor to aerospace clusters. Thus, 
even if national-created institutions are relevant, the concentration in specifie areas 
and their subsequent reinforc.ement makes the regional dimension a pertinent analysis 
level. 
The sectoral approach is relevant in the sense that different sectors exhibit differences 
1 
in the way in which organizations interact. This is because these organizations have 
to master different technologies and face different market needs. 
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Given that the RIS and the SIS capture most of the insights of the NIS, we are going 
to concentrate in the first two. It is important to stress that these innovation system 
perspectives cao be better understood by adding that actual ones can be either x­
efficient or x-inefficient (Niosi, 2üü2a). First we are going to present the concepts of 
Regional Innovation System and Sectoral Innovation System and at the end a note 
about x-efficiency. 
Regional Innovation System (RIS) 
Cooke and Morgan (1998) assert that: 
"Regions which possess the full panoply of innovation organizations set 
in an institutional milieu where systemic linkage and interactive 
communication among the innovation actors is normal, approach the 
designation of regional innovation systems. These organizations cao be 
expected to consist of universities, basic research laboratories, applied 
research laboratories, technology transfer agencies, regional public and 
private (e.g. trade associations, chambers of commerce) governance 
organizations, vocational training organizations, banks, venture 
capitalists, and interacting large and smail firms. Moreover, they should 
demonstrate systemic linkages through concertation programmes, 
research partnerships, value-adding information flows, and policy action 
lines from the governance organizations. These systems combine learning 
with upstream and downstream innovation capability, and thus warrant 
the designation regional innovation systems."(p. 71) 
This definition is much in the line of the National Innovation System concept 
developed by Freeman, Lundvall, and Nelson; and it stresses the process of learning, 
innovation, networks, and interaction among institutions. The emphasis is put in how 
those processes can affect the regional dimension. 
The RIS is not defined in terms of industrial boundaries, in part because the concept 
itself does not explicitly explain concentration of certain activities, as the other 
concepts do. Thus, instead of 100king at the aggregation industry level or associated 
industries, the question should be what kind of economic agents are included in the 
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RIS. As the definition suggests, there are clearly identified organizations (e.g. 
universities) that play a precise role in the innovation process (basic research in the 
case of universities). This absence of any element related to industrial boundaries 
deserves examination. For instance, is it possible for a RIS to foster innovation in 
several technological areas or just in one? Should these areas be related? Can the RIS 
specialize only in research and development activities and leave production to other 
regions? Sorne empirical evidence sheds light on these questions. Cooke et al (2004) 
use examples such as Catalonia in Spain, and Ontario in Canada. In these regional 
innovation systems, there are innovation institutions supporting several unrelated 
industries. In the same line, Niosi and Bourassa (2008) show how the larger 
metropolitan areas in Canada, Toronto and Montreal, were more industrially 
diversified than smaller ones, and were hosts to industries as diverse as 
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and software, in the former and aerospace, 
pharmaceuticals, health sector, and architecture services in the latter (p. 65). Thus, it 
seems that an RIS can nurture more than one industry, and that these industries do not 
have to be necessarily related. This view is reinforced by the assertion (Cooke et al, 
2004: 8) that "regional, sec/oral innovation systems are powerful forces in the new 
economic geography." The sectoral adjective is what makes the quote important. 
Other authors who reinforce this sectoral view are Niosi et al (2005), when they talk 
about Montreal as having regional systems of innovation in the aerospace industry as 
weil as in the biotechnology sector. 
Nevertheless one question arises from that sectoral perspective: can the RIS nurture 
different unrelated sectors? Or does each sector represent an independent RIS that 
coexists geographically with others? Trying to answer this question in a broad form is 
beyond the scope of this work, however, it seems that the latter is more plausible 
since, as we are going to see next, the supporting organizations and the learning that 
takes place in one sector are very specifie to that sector. In this sense it is important to 
introduce the concept of sectoral system of innovation proposed by Malerba (2002). 
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Sectoral System ofInnovation (SS1) 
The concept of sectoral system goes beyond the traditional concept of industry and 
builds upon other industry-based approaches such as product life cycle and industry 
life cycle. A key difference is that sectors are framed by institutions (policies, 
regulations, incentives and supporting organizations). 
Malerba (2002) defines: 
"A sectoral system of innovation and production is a set of new and 
established products for specifie uses and the set of agents carrying out 
market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale 
of those products. [H] has a knowledge base, technologies, inputs and an 
existing, emergent and potential demand. The agents composing the 
system the sectoral system are organizations and individuals...Agents are 
characterized by specifie learning processes, competencies, beliefs, 
objectives, organizational structures and behaviours. They interact 
through processes of communications, exchange, co-operation, 
competition and command, and their interactions are shaped by 
institutions..."(p. 250) 
Similar to the RIS, the SSI stresses the role of firms but also the role of other non­
firm organizations like universities, as weil as the policy environment. The 
importance of this sectoral approach is that ail these firm and non-firm organizations 
are collaborating to nurture a specifie product or family of products. How these 
products are defined, is not much developed in Malerba (2002). He asserts that 
interdependencies and complementarities define the real boundaries of a sectoral 
system, and that these may be present at the input, technology or demand (p. 250­
251). He does not go in depth about how strong these interdependencies and 
complementarities should be in order to structure a system. This is in part because he 
recognizes that the system may evolve and with that, the different actors may also 
change. lndeed, Malerba (2002) talks about a sectoral system of innovation and 
production. lmplicit is the idea that a production system may eventually become an 
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innovation system, or a situation in which research organizations may give rise to 
production. 
Regarding the geographical limits of an innovation system, the RIS is the one that 
puts more emphasis in this issue. Indeed, defining the "region" in the RIS context is a 
crucial issue in order for this concept to differentiate itself from the NIS, and to be 
considered more than just a lower analytical level. Cooke et al (1997) and Cooke and 
Morgan (1998) talk about two dynamic forces that shape the region: regionalisation 
and regionalism. The first "is the delimitation of a supralocal territory by a super­
ordinate politico-administrative body, normally the state... [while the second] 
involves sorne form of devolved administration through, for example, a prefecture or 
delegated authority,... [it] involves political demands, 'from below', for often 
culturaUy defined territorial autonomy."(p. 64). Therefore, the spatial boundaries of 
the RIS are constantly developing, since these two forces are continuous socio­
political processes. However it is to be noted that in Cooke the region is a province or 
a similarly large geographical and administrative area, while in Niosi et al (2005) the 
region is a metropolitan area. This may be explained by the fact that Europe has a 
bigger population density compared to the United States or Canada; moreover, in 
these last two countries people tend to concentrate in big metropolitan areas. Since 
the Mexican reality in terms of population density and human agglomeration is doser 
to that of the United States and Canada, the metropolitan area is going to be taken as 
the geographical unit of analysis. 
In terms of the socio-economic dynamics characterizing the innovation system, 
Malerba (2002) stresses the fact that heterogeneous agents usual1y form 
communication networks precisely because by being different they can be 
complementary in terms of knowledge (p. 256). These interactions are shaped by 
institutions. A major point is that these institutions can be the result of both, the 
specifie dynamics of the knowledge base of the sector, and/or the specifie national 
26 
institutions that apply for ail type of activity (Malerba, 2002: 257). In more regional 
terms, both regionalisation and regionalism create a negotiated collective social order; 
which is the base for an institutional regulation framework that sets the routines, 
norms, and values that governs the relations between the different organizations 
involved in the RIS (Cooke and Morgan, 1998: 64) 
Henceforth we are going to use the term innovation system (IS) when referring to one 
of these two concepts, and when specifie reference to one of the concepts is needed 
we will indicate ifwe are talking about the RIS or the SS!. 
It was Leibenstein (1966) who first put forward the idea that x-efficiency was a much 
greater responsible of output growth than allocative efficiency. This author mentions 
that "the simple fact is that neither individuals nor firms work as hard, nor do they 
search for information as effectively, as they could."(p. 407). Thus, this author 
explains that even if the firm (or for that matter a country) has the "right" resources 
(human and capital), it is not a guarantee that it will attain an "optimal" level of 
output. Among other elements, this is explained by the fact that not ail factors of 
production are marketed, the production function is not completely specified of 
known (which eliminates the notion of "optimal"), and interdependence and 
uncertainty lead competing firms to cooperate tacitly with each other in some 
respects, and to imitate each other with respect to technique (Leibenstein, 1966: 407). 
In this sense, Leibenstein explains that x-efficiency has to do with improvements due 
to intra-plant motivation, external pressures and the capacity to trade inputs in 
imperfect markets. As examples of x-efficiency gains, Leibenstein stresses two main 
typical examples: first, the existence of similar firms in terms of resources and inputs, 
but with a great gap in terms of output production, and second, a firm that changes 
management (a resource not perfectively traded in markets) and has a sudden increase 
in productivity with the same resources in place. Therefore, comparison is a 
methodological way to apply and understand the notion of x-efficiency, which Niosi 
27 
(2002a) applies to the realm of innovation systems by means of benchmarking. In the 
same way that similar inputs can yield very different results in firms, Niosi (2002a) 
proposes that different innovation systems have different results due to the different 
level of development of their institutions. This author proposes that institutions can 
exhibit inefficiencies due to organizational inertia, badly designed contracts and 
information asymmetries (among organizations and employees), and lack of 
appropriate learning routines (p. 295). Moreover, sometimes the problem is not about 
getting efficient performance, but about getting the results that those institutions are 
supposed to pursue by mandate. When institutions do not reach the goals set by their 
mandate, they are x-ineffective (Niosi, 2002a). This study mentions how the 
development of R&D routines (a crucial activity in an innovation system) is 
underdeveloped in Mexico. In general terms, it can be said that Mexico is a slow 
learner innovation system because it already has in place sorne institutional measures 
that are supposed to support innovation, but overall output metrics reveal poor results 
in this area (see Section 2.7). 
Porter's 'cluster' 
Porter's (2000) definition of a cluster is: 
"A cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
commonalities and complementarities. The geographic scope of a 
cluster can range from a single city or state to a country or even a group 
of neighboring countries. Clusters take varying forms depending on 
their depth and sophistication, but most include end-product or service 
companies; suppliers of specialized inputs, components, machinery, and 
services; financial institutions; and firms in related industries. Clusters 
also often include firms in downstream industries (i.e. channels or 
customers); producer~ of complementary products; and specialized 
infrastructure providers. Clusters also often involve a number of 
institutions, governmental and otherwise, that provide specialized 
training, education, information, research, and technical support (such 
as universities, think tanks, vocational training providers); and 
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standards-setting agencies. Government departments and regulatory 
agencies that significantly influence a cluster can be considered part of 
il. Finally, many clusters include trade associations and other collective 
private sector bodies that support cluster members."(p. 254) 
The industrial boundaries of Porter's 'cluster' are not defined. In terms of industrial 
aggregation, Porter talks about companies and institutions in a particular field. At first 
glance, this cluster seems similar to the RIS, in the sense that both concepts include 
not just firms but also supporting institutions. The RIS pinpoints the "whole panoply 
of innovation organizations". Thus, the RIS focuses on organizations that can have a 
role in the generation of knowledge (such as universities and public research 
laboratories). Porter does not clarify what raIe these institutions play, except to say 
they are linked to companies by commonalities and complementarities. Therefore it is 
not clear what the role of these institutions is. AIso, the words commonalities and 
complementarities seem to evoke either links among firms along the chain value of a 
given product, or cooperation of similar competing firms. Again, Porter does not 
clarify which is the case. 
The spatial scope of the 'cluster' is completely open. As Porter admits, the cluster can 
be as big as a country. Setting geographical boundaries for innovative or productive 
economic agglomerations can be a very difficult task, and Porter foregoes tackling 
that issue. 
Porter does not develop the analysis of regional externalities. Instead Porter (2000) 
argues for sorne economic spillovers somewhat similar to traditional Marshallian 
agglomeration advantages. He mentions the access of specialized inputs and 
employees, access to information and knowledge, complementarities (i.e. product 
complementarities), and access to institutions and public goods. It seems that Porter 
(2000) assumes that spatial praximity is the main ingredient for obtaining these 
advantages, because he does not develop any concept related to learning. A socio­
economic factor that Porter advocates is that clusters tend to reduce opportunism 
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problems, much in the line of the transaction cost school. The argument is made 
mainly for the vertical integrated firm in the sense that by locating most of its 
operations in one place, information about the different units will be more readily 
available and this could prevent sorne kinds of opportunism, such as principal-agent 
problems. 
According to Porter (2000), another benefit of the cluster is innovation and new 
business formation. The main reason for this is that firms in the cluster can perceive 
more rapidly new opportunities due to proximity to leading firms. Porter's cluster 
explanation is an extension of his diamond of competitive forces that determines the 
competitive advantage of nations (Porter, 1990). The diamond is composed of firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry; factor conditions; demand conditions; and related and 
supporting industries. Porter (1990) argues that if these forces are closely located they 
can bring competitiveness to their members. Porter assumes that these forces are 
equally important for all industries. 
Martin and Sunley (2003) strongly criticize Porter's cluster concept. Regarding 
industrial boundaries, these authors stress the ambiguity of the limits based on a 
"particular field". They argue that Porter does not explain if the firms in the cluster 
are big or small, or their degree of specialization. As for the relation between the 
firms in that "particular field", Porter includes downstream and upstream industries, 
and the way to set boundaries depends on the strength of the spillovers these 
industries have with the firms in the "particular field". Martin and Sunley highlight 
that Porter does not provide any explanation about how to measure the strength of 
these spillovers. The geographical boundaries issue is another aspect of which Martin 
and Sunley are very critical. Assurning that the advantages of clustering can be 
gained no matter how far away the participants are located from one another is a 
serious weakness of the concept, and we should say that this is also a weak issue in 
the other concept we have seen. Regarding the socio-economic advantages of the 
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cluster, Martin and Sunley argue that Porter places more emphasis on the kind of 
institutions that made the cluster and not too much on the way in which they actuaHy 
interact. As Cooke (2001) explains, in sorne real cases there isa whole set of 
organizations present in a cluster, but the cluster is not as successful as others with a 
more reduced set of supporting institutions. 
1.1.2. The agglomeration concepts and aerospace clusters 
The objective of this section is to assess the relevance of the reviewed concepts for 
the aerospace industry. The first question is why aerospace industries agglomerate. 
Since aerospace is a high-technology sector, it requires very complex and specialized 
inputs and resources. Therefore, it is expected that the scarcity of these resources 
makes them agglomerate in just certain geographical areas. However, although 
aerospace shares sorne characteristics with other high-technology sectors, it has very 
specific features. Moreover, the agglomeration forces may not be the same for aH 
aerospace clusters. As Martin and Sunley (2003) suggest, a good starting point is to 
evaluate industrial boundaries, geographic scope and socio-economic dynamics in the 
cluster. 
Industrial Boundaries 
As it was shown, not aH the concepts are weH defined in terms of their industrial 
boundaries. The concepts that have a clearer definition are the 'industrial district' 
with its "homogeneous product", the 'anchor tenant' with a "technological area", and 
the IS with "products for specific uses", and the 'growth pole'. Conversely, the 
'cluster' is the least defined concept in terms of industrial boundaries. The 'growth 
pole' claims that the ability for an industry, or for that matter a firm, to drive others is 
what makes that entity an engine, and therefore the place where the engine is located 
becomes a growth pole. How much force is needed for an industry or a firm to be 
considered an engine is not a well-developed issue in Perroux. Porter 'clusters' are 
defined by the even less clear term of "particular field", and the limits of that 
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particular field are set by the strength of the spillovers between the participants 
industries and organizations; assessing that strength is what makes the industrial 
boundaries of the concept a blurred issue. 
The type of firms and range of related or associated industries that should be included 
in the concepts are also different. The 'industrial district' is supposed to be composed 
of small firms, highly specialized in one productive stage of the final homogeneous 
product. Therefore, the very nature of the firm in the district makes it dependent 
and/or complementary to the others. Such a high specialization would not be feasible 
if the firm was isolated. Nevertheless, the mere condition of high specialization does 
not necessarily imply cooperation and co-location with others. It seems that the tacit 
component of the craft-like traditional products made in the paradigmatic Italian 
industrial districts, is what allows this kind of arrangement. However, when more 
large and bulky products are involved, the "growth pole" is better suited to explain 
agglomeration. By the volume of its inputs and outputs, a big firm serves as a pole of 
attraction for several smaller supplier and client firms. Moreover, the engine firm or 
industry can even create the seedbed for new industries dependent on the operations 
of the former. As it was shown, Perroux did not develop this issue in depth, but his 
contribution was to highlight the power of the big firm to shape its landscape by 
means of its inputs and outputs and by innovation. In a more innovation-focused 
approach, the regional RIS concept tries to uncover how firms and organizations form 
networks to collaborate in innovation projects. These networks can be formed by a 
different set of arrangements ranging from the existence of a big firm dominating 
small ones to the existence of multiple small firms without any hierarchical 
relationship. AIso, the way in which the government interacts with these networks 
can vary greatly from direct intervention to only providing support. Therefore, what 
matters is that local networks do foster learning among participants. The anchor 
tenant concept is developed in more detail and more clearly explains how the big 
R&D firm is able to create the necessary conditions for suppliers, universities and 
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related R&D organizations to establish a capacity that would not be possible without 
this anchor tenant. The main difference with respect to the growth pole is that the 
anchor tenant attracts others by means of the knowledge it generates or requires, and 
not mainly by the physical inputs and outputs it spawns. For instance, the anchor 
tenant can be a university. This is more likely in the early phases of a technology that 
heavily depend,s on university research, like biotechnology (Feldman, 2003) or 
renewable energies in which an interesting example is Strathclyde university In 
Glasgow, Scotland, where important firms around the world involved in wind and 
tidal turbines have set up research centres and manufacturing facilities to benefit from 
the high impact research done at that university3. In general, it can be said that sorne 
IS arrangements can include an anchor tenant as an actor that significantly determines 
the dynamics of the system. Indeed, anchor tenant proponents claim that such a firm 
enhances IS productivity by increasing the local university researchlindustrial R&D 
productivity. Both, the anchor tenant and the IS are defined in a learning context, 
although the former is explicitly addressed to high technology, while the latter is 
somehow open, and even sorne of the empirical works address industries that are not 
characterized by a high-tech context. Porter's 'cluster' specifies neither the degree of 
specialization of the firms that integrate the cluster, nor the size of the firms involved. 
It seems that the 'cluster' is open to any type of firm and productive arrangement. In 
table 1.1 we summarize ail the agglomeration concepts. 
3 The Economist. 2011. "R&D in Scotland: Green rush", The Economist, February 17. Retrieved from: 
< http://www.economist.com/node/18178477> 
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In terms of industrial boundaries for aerospace, the first step is more or less c1ear: 
every firm that makes sorne component for the aircraft [IS: products for specifie uses] 
or that helps build it can be considered an aerospace firm. 4 The aerospace pyramid 
classifies ail these aerospace firms5 in layers, the highest of which consist of the 
systems integrator, the most important firms in the industry [Growth Pole: Engine 
firm]. On the contrary, when firms are low on the pyramid, such as parts suppliers, 
their aerospace activities tend to be combined with participation in other industries6. 
For practical reasons, in this thesis every firm that produces aircraft parts is going to 
be considered as an aerospace firm. Also, as it is explained in section 4.2, regional 
promotion offices in Mexico have updated lists of aerospace firms. 
4 The difficulty cornes when a firm's actlVltles pertain to sectors in addition to aerospace. This 
situation is common to metal shop firms that are usuaJly suppliers to a range of industries. 
5 It is important to note that not just small suppliers, but also Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms are involved in 
other sectors besides aerospace. For instance, Bombardier is involved in other transportation markets 
like trains, while General Electric has a wide range of products outside of turbines, like electro 
domestics. However, most of these firms have clear aerospace divisions. 
6 For statistical reasons firms are c1assified everywhere every year according of the most important 
product or servicès (in terms of sales) SIC or NAICS codes, thus, smaller firms may be reclassified 
regularly depending on the sector they produce components for. 
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Figure 1.1
 
The producers' pyramid
 
Tïcr 1 
TÎtT "2 
Tler 3 
Source: Niosi and Zhegu (2005: 8) 
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The second step is not as clear. There are at least two ways to classify aerospace 
firms: by their tier position (see figure 1.1); and by the type of aircraft to which their 
activity is targeted. In this sense, both Toulouse and Sào José dos Campos have a 
system integrator which is in the top tier - Airbus and Embraer respectively; but, 
Toulouse and Everett have system integrators for more than IOO-seat aircraft, while 
Montreal and Sào José dos Campos have system integrators for regional and business 
jets, and Wichita is the home of several business jets system integrators. Moreover, 
sorne clusters like the Montreal one, have system integrators in different segments, 
thus additionally ta Bombardier, Montreal has Bell Helitopter. 
There are two additional aspects that must be con~idered when characterizing c1usters 
according to the nature of firms located within them. The first is that the existence of 
a system integrator is not a predictor of a specifie set of other tier or complementary 
firms in the c1uster. In Montreal there are more firms dedicated to different parts of 
the business and regional jets than in Sào José dos Campos, even if both clusters are 
specialized in such smaller jets (Goldstein, 2005). Moreover, the existence of 
different firms dedicated to different parts in the same cluster does not strictly 
translate into collaboration between them. The decision to collaborate depends on 
technological or business strategie issues and not so much on geographical proximity. 
According to Goldstein (2005), Bombardier executives declared that if necessary, 
they could seek complementary firms elsewhere in the world. Thus they do not feel 
constrained by "local availability". This view is reinforced by the assertion made by 
Niosi and Zhegu (2005) that international spillovers are cornrnonplace in the 
aerospace industry. Furthermore, Niosi and Zhegu (2010) provide examples in which 
sorne system integrator firms are more likely than others to act asanchor tenants of 
their respective clusters. The intensity on R&D activities seems to be the element that 
set apart system integrator firms that act as anchor tenants. For instance, Niosi and 
Zhegu (2010) show how the acquisition of Learjet (located in Wichita, Kansas, US) 
by Bombardier, meant the transfer of R&D activities to Montreal; deprived from 
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R&D-intensive activities the system integrator is no longer able to exert the function 
of anchor tenant as it used to (p. 272). 
The second aspect is the fact that there are clusters in which tier 2 companies, such as 
engine manufacturers and not tier 1 aircraft integrators, are the prominent firm in the 
cluster or the anchor tenant, as is the case with General Electric in Cincinnati. As it is 
going to be explained in section 1.2.2, it is important to highlight that the different 
modules that made up the aircraft can be produced in different parts of the world, 
because aircraft - conversely with automobiles - are produced in shorter numbers 
According to the above explanations, the aerospace cluster structure exhibits 
characteristics that make them akin to the growth pole, anchor tenant and, in sorne 
instances, the IS. First, the big firms that tower above aerospace clusters are indeed 
engines in the place where they are established, as the growth pole suggests. The 
huge investment in facilities and personnel, and the high added value of the activities 
have a huge impact in the zone. The presence of that large firm also represents the 
possibility for specialized suppliers to emerge. Second, like the anchor tenant concept 
suggests, these specialized suppliers may be the result of employee (and as a 
consequence, knowledge) mobility from the anchor to other firms in the area. In this 
sense, not only may specialized suppliers benefit, but competitors and other 
subsystem integrators benefit from the recruitment of former workers of the anchor 
tenant firm. Therefore, the structure of aerospace clusters seems to be heavily 
influenced by the presence of an anchor tenant. Third, government support is crucial 
to this industry, thus, as the IS concept highlights, institutional patterns of 
communications and collaboration are present in aerospace clusters. Nevertheless, the 
financial and political support that this industry needs is so vast that institutional 
support usually cornes from the national and not just from the regional level. 
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Spatial Scope 
ln terms of geographical scope, the 'industrial district', but specially the 'growth 
pole', and 'anchor tenant' include at their core a city-like region, but this area can 
also cover its outskirts, what is called in North America the metropolitan area, usually 
containing several neighbouring cities. This will depend on the connectivity of the 
outskirts of the metropolitan region with the central city. The existence of efficient 
transportation systems and infrastructure that allow the movement of people (and 
with them their ideas) in relatively short periods of travel is what delimitates the 
influence area of an engine firm or an anchor tenant. The 'c1uster' does not specify its 
geographic limits, although sometimes these seem to be either metropolitan or 
provincial. The RIS is the more ambitious in its conceptualization of "region", by 
identifying regionalization and regionalism forces as the driving forces that shape the 
region. In this sense, both the RIS and the 'industrial district' consider socio-cultural 
and historical factors that shape the region. Nevertheless, in the empirical works on 
regional innovation systems (perhaps for practical reasons like available statistics), 
the regions always match certain existing administrative demarcations such as 
metropolitan areas (regionalization).7 This is somewhat problematic since these 
administrative regions can vary greatly, from country to country, in size and in their 
degrees of integration with the so-called national economy and international 
economy. 
In terms of geographic scope, limits are also a difflcult issue in aerospace. The works 
of Beaudry (2001), Smith and Ibrahim (2006) and Cooke and Ehert (2009) are very 
revealing of this respect. According to the second authors, there are fi ve aerospace 
7 It seems that Cooke and Morgan (1998) develop a dichotomy between regionalization and 
regionalism inspired by the European experience, in which historical regional identities have 
developed and preserved thernselves over centuries. Even if this phenomenon can have sorne parallels 
in other parts of the world, as it surely does, l am not sure that it can be applied to ail regional 
economic phenomena in the world. 
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clusters in the UK (they cite as a source a 2001 report from the Department of Trade 
and Industry): North West, South West, East Midlands, North Ireland, and Wales (pp. 
362-363); yet Cooke and Ehret (2009) argue that there are two aerospace 
agglomerations in Wales alone, one in the north and one in the south (pp. 554-555). 
To make matters more complex, Beaudry (2001) in her study of cluster effects on 
aerospace firms' growth, proposes counties as the relevant regional dimension. 8 This 
author identifies 5 counties in Wales -Clwyd, Powys, Mid Glamorgan, South 
Glamorgan, and West Glamorgan- with aerospace activities (p. 434), from which 
only three -Clwyd, Mid Glamorgan, and South Glamorgan- were identified as having 
a strong fixed effect (pp. 417,436), thus, presumably considered as clusters. 
None of the authors mentioned, made completely clear why they chose a particular 
geographic unit. It seems that the criterion fol1owed by Smith and Ibrahim (2006) is 
based on broad regional political administrative divisions9 (Wales is in itself a 
country) that ultimately may have the political and economic resources to support 
clusters. In the case of Cooke and Ehert (2009) it seems that their choice is based on 
mere geographical proximitylO. Since these authors are concerned with learning and 
local systems, it may be that they consider proximity as a condition to interact. For 
Beaudry (2001) the approach is different. This author does not assume clusters as 
given. On the contrary, she explored which of t~e counties do have a positive impact 
on firms' growth. Once that exercise done, just sorne of the counties were identified 
as having a fixed effect. In the description about how Montreal came to be an 
8 Beaudry (2001) uses the European NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) as the 
geographical unit. According to this author the UK had 65 NUTS at level 3 (the maximum 
disaggregation level), and for Wales alone, the number is of 8, from which 5 had aerospace fLrms. 
9 Smith and Ibrahim (2006) explain that if "[a] region had more people employed in that industry [in 
this case aerospace] that one would expect given the size of the region in terms of its labor force" it 
can be considered a cluster in that industry (p. 362). Nevertheless, how the regions are pre-defined has 
an impact on final results. In this case it seems that the whole of Wales was taken as a region, and as 
such it prevented further divisions within Wales itself. 
10 Cooke and Ehret (2009) do not give an extensive explanation for their daim of two agglomerations. 
Instead, they show a map of Wales in which the agglomerations are visually identified. 
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aerospace cluster and later an aerospace regional innovation system, Niosi et al 
(2005) adopt the metropolitan region as a unit of analysis. At the same time, he 
recognizes both national and provincial government (outside the metropolitan area) 
intervention to foster innovation in Montreal. 
As Niosi et al (2005) stress, one of the main agglomeration forces at play in the case 
of aerospace is specialized labour. Thus, it seems that the scope of the cluster has to 
be delimited in sorne way by the possible mobility (or absence of mobility) of this 
specialized work force. In this sense, the metropolitan area may provide an adequate 
geographical scope for clusters inaerospace. Therefore, an important question in the 
case of Mexico is to understand what the most important agglomeration forces at play 
are, and see if they are strong enough to claim that a cluster even exists. Perhaps a 
mere collection of firms within a state or a metropolitan area, operating in the 
aerospace industry is not a sufficient condition for a region to be called a "cluster". 
Socio-economic dynamics 
Ali these concepts claim that spatial proximity is a necessary condition to develop 
socio-economic dynamics that gives regions an advantage. It is important to remark 
that knowledge generation lies beneath sustainable advantages. Therefore, it lS 
important to know who generates the knowledge; what kind of knowledge lS 
generated; and how knowledge is generated and transferred to others. The industrial 
district is not completely clear in this respect. It seems that the firms connected with 
the final international markets are the ones in a better position to be knowledge 
generators and disseminators. In this sense, the cultivation of craft-like tacit 
capabilities coupled with marketing tendencies are the type of knowledge that is 
important for this industrial arrangement based on traditional products. This implies 
both cooperation and competition, since firms are dependent on each other in order to 
bring the final product to the market. Sorne say that a social network locally rooted 
underlies that kind of arrangement. In sorne ways, this situation resembles the 
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Marshallian labour pool and the "atmosphere" in which the secrets of the trade are in 
the air. The industrial district concept is mainly concerned with relationships between 
firms. This is because firms are the main actors in traditional products. However, 
when it cornes to more complex and high tech products, other actors are important as 
weil. For this reason, the IS approach puts the accent on relations not just between 
firms but also with other organizations. Different sectors exhibit different 
characteristics in terms of innovation, but in general it can be said that organizations 
like universities and research laboratories are agents with a central role in the 
generation of knowledge. AIso, government agencies are responsible to encourage 
innovation activities by means of fine tuned policies and measures. There can be 
several ways in which firms and other relevant agents interact to generate knowledge. 
The important point of the IS approach is that firms do not innovate in isolation; there 
are other agents that participate in the innovation process, whether by directly 
creating knowledge or by supporting innovation-Iead activities of firms. Therefore, 
the IS perspective analyzes the institutional pattern of communication between 
relevant organizations. As it was mentioned, the IS theory recognizes several ways in 
which actors communicate and transfer knowledge. However, in the case of high­
technology sectors, there are usually critical agents involved in the generation of this 
knowledge. Big firms like the ones described in the growth pole are the ones that 
dominate some of these sectors and generate most of the knowledge in the cluster. 
While Perroux does not make an in-depth exam of how knowledge is created by these 
firms, he certainly recognized that these engine firms can create the conditions for 
new industries to emerge. 
The anchor tenant concept - that in Agrawal and Cockburn also makes reference to a 
big firm - goes into more detail about how that firm creates and affects the flow of 
knowledge in its surroundings. Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) argue that the anchor 
tenant firm is able to raise the level of the RIS by means of localized knowledge 
spillovers. The mere fact that a firm - or a research university or public laboratory in 
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sorne cases such as biotechnology, according to Markusen and Feldman - has R&D 
capacity opens the possibility that former employees can move out of the firm and 
apply elsewhere sorne of the knowledge acquired in the anchor tenant firm. This is in 
line with the labour pool agglomeration proposed by Marshall. Of course, here there 
is the assumption that specialized people tend to be attracted to and remain in the 
same geographic place. Another advantage of the anchor is that it attracts specialized 
suppliers by means of its sophisticated demand and large volume. Since technology­
intensive supplies and products have tacit knowledge characteristics, being located 
nearby can help to facilitate interaction. This argument is not without problems. 
According to Breschi and Lissoni (2001), much of the allegedly localized knowledge 
spillovers are in fact market transactions that do not depend too much on spatial 
proximity. These authors criticize the quasi automatic localized knowledge spillovers 
version which is usually expressed in studies that address the impact of external R&D 
(especially public and/or academic) on private firms' innovative capabilities. The 
'anchor tenant' approach does not make the localized knowledge spillovers 
assumption, instead it shows the way in which university research is collocated with 
industrial R&D, but without making a daim in the causality. AIso, Agrawal and 
Cockburn (2003), do not portray external university/public research as a substitute of 
industrial R&D. Indeed, one of the tenets of the concept is that the anchor tenant may 
be able to influence public research by means of its own research ability. For Porter, 
spatial proximity is the main driver of information and knowledge sharing. He 
advocates agglomeration economies and the reduction of opportunistic behaviour as 
the main advantages of proximity. Thus, this author suggests the traditional 
transaction-costs explanation in which the frequency of transactions and dependency 
on each-other will diminish the opportunistic behaviour of the parties, and this 
situation willlead to cooperation and competition. Martin and Sunley (2003) criticize 
this explanation as overly simplistic. While it is true that in sorne cases co-operation 
is a plausible behaviour, there are cases in which it is not necessary and can be even 
be detrimental to firms. Therefore, locating next to a competitor or a supplier is a 
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matter that should be analyzed as a strategie issue instead of deciding de facto that 
collocation involves cooperation. Sometimes collocation couId serve to imitate or to 
steal ideas and workers. It seems that in many instances closeness is not a decisive 
factor in diminishing opportunistic behaviour. 
Marshallian agglomeration forces, the growth pole, the anchor tenant and the RIS 
contain elements that help to explain kno'wledge dynamics in aerospace clusters. In 
this industry, big firms are the ones that generate critical knowledge, and often 
demand for specialised parts, components and services. Like the growth pole 
perspective suggests, these firms have the power to influence the way in which 
knowledge is created, and are giant magnets of other firms. Indeed, in the aerospace 
sector, big leading firms are the major repositories of crucial knowledge. Moreover, 
like the anchor tenant suggests, these firms are able to influence suppliers and 
research laboratories by means of their sophisticated demands. According to Niosi et 
al (2005), Bombardier was a crucial factor for the introduction of aeronautics 
engineering degrees in local universities. The same seems to be true in Washington 
State where universities are under the influence of Boeing. The pool of specialized 
labour is another characteristic of the aerospace sector, pretty much in line with 
Marshall. On the other hand, contrary to collocation for cooperation (as is suggested 
in the industrial district and Porter's cluster), it seems that cooperation in the 
aerospace sector is not limited to proximity. As we have seen, a great deal of the 
interactions takes place outside of the cluster (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). Smith and 
Ibrahim (2006) and Cooke and Ehret (2009) also stress the fact that a good deal of the 
interactions of cluster firms occur with out-of-cluster firms. The way in which these 
interactions occur has a lot to do with the corporate strategies of leading firms. One 
major feature of Niosi et al (2005) is that they pay attention to interaction not just 
between firms, but also between other organizations like universities and research 
centers. Thus, the RIS has sorne elements that 'help to explain how other 
organizations support the creation of knowledge in the firms. In particular, Niosi et al 
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(2005) explain how the national and the provincial governments have set-up policies 
to create research centres and to fund the costly development of new planes. 
Finally, recent work by Giuliani (2007) underlines the fact that within the same 
cluster, knowledge can be very unevenly distributed. If the secrets of industry are in 
the air, sorne companies seem to breathe a more healthy air than others; large firms 
usually have more information and better quality information than smaller firms in 
the same cluster. Such intra-industry differences depend on the absorptive capacity of 
the firms, and this on R&D capabilities and size (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Giuliani (2007) makes a distinction between business networks and knowledge 
networks. The former are the normal links that a firm establishes to exchange inputs 
and outputs, while the latter are channels by which knowledge may t1ow. Although 
business networks can indeed be the carriers of knowledge, Giuliani (2007) shows 
that this is not always the case. From the policy point of view it is important to 
distinguish between these two networks. As we are going to see in section 1.3.3, 
policy should pay attention to those links that carry on knowledge that could lead to 
innovation, and not only to business links. Moreover, this explanation implies that 
only certain firms are able to absorb external knowledge. Giuliani and Bell (2005) 
call these firms technological gatekeepers because they are the intermediaries 
between external knowledge and cluster's firms with less developed absorptive 
capacity. In this sense, an aerospace anchor tenant is expected to act as technological 
gatekeeper, and as such it is important that an aerospace cluster promotes the 
development of those types of firms. 
In the next section we are going to present a technology transfer cycle based on the 
product life cycle industry life cycle theory to understand what are the activities more 
likely to be transferred to Mexican clusters. 
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1.2 The civil aircraft manufacturing industry's technological trajectory 
Introduction 
The civil aircraft industry is constantly changing. Changes occur at various levels. At 
the technological level it is clear that the knowledge base underlying the aircraft as a 
product is experiencing important technological changes like the introduction of new 
materials (ultralight alloys, composites), propulsion systems with a high bypass ratio, 
and the massive use of digital electronics for the instruments of the aircraft (Esposito, 
2004: 453), even though these changes might be considered incremental by some 
(Kehayas, 2007). These changes have allowed an important increase in performance 
regarding fuel saving, reliability, safety and speed (Esposito, 2004: 453). AIso, these 
new technological developments have implications at the organizational level on 
which firms seek ways of coordinating the ever increasing exchange of knowledge 
within and among different organizations (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). The 
increasing importance of some of these parties and the emergence of new actors in 
developing countries have an impact at the industrial structure level, where there have 
been numerous collaborations and joint ventures among a series of relevant players in 
the industry, not seen in previous decades (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985; Niosi and 
Zhegu, 2005). 
As it will be argued in this section, the changes noted above have very important 
implications in the localization (or delocalization) of the different activities pursued 
by different firms in the industry. According to Niosi and Zhegu (2008), the Product 
Life Cycle (PLC) theory coupled with the Industry Life Cycle (ILC) Theory, 
developed originally by Vernon (1966) and Klepper (1997) respectively, can be 
useful for understanding some dimensions of the internationalization strategies 
followed by relevant firms in the civil aircraft manufacturing industry. In this sense, 
the aim of this section is to show how the PLC and the ILC coupled with concepts 
pertaining to innovation (the concept of technological trajectory, and its underlying 
46 
knowledge base) and management (modularity) research streams, can explain the 
current delocalization processes in aircraft manufacturing. The emphasis is on 
newcomer countries like Mexico with no previous capabilities in that industry, which 
can be considered net technology receivers of the internationalization trend. 
Many countries like Argentina, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey, have attempted 
to nurture the aerospace industry within their borders (Zhegu, 2007: 221). Most of 
these attempts have resulted in failure or limited success. Understanding the 
knowledge base dynamics beneath the technological trajectory of this industry is 
crucial for national governments to have a more complete idea of the economic and 
institutional infrastructure needed to support this industry. Ultimately, an assessment 
of the civil aircraft manufacturing PLC and ILC is needed to be realistic about the 
degree of development that newcomer countries like Mexico can achieve. 
The rest of this section is structured as follows: section 1.2.1 briefly describes the 
main tenets of the ILC-PLC and sorne of their extensions. Section 1.2.2 by means of 
four concepts describes the aircraft as a technological artefact with very idiosyncratic 
characteristics. Section 1.2.3 integrates the notions of the previous two sections, and 
it explains how the very nature of the aircraft and the firms' internationalization 
strategies in that industry limit the type of activity that can be expected to be found in 
newcomer countries like Mexico. 
1.2.1. The ILC-PLC and its implications for delocalization of industrial activity 
The goal of this section is to present the main elements of the PLC theory and ILC. 
Pioneered by Vernon (1966), PLe theory is concerned with the location decisions of 
firms as depending on the particular stage of the product in the PLC - new, maturing, 
or standardized. In the first stage, a firm will be more likely to establish production 
facilities in the market it originally tries to serve. Even if there are other potential 
production locations apparently more cost efficient (once taken into account 
transport, inputs and other operative costs), the decision to undertake production near 
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the intended market is based on communication opportunities and external economies 
(p. 194). According to Vernon (1966), in the early stages of introduction of a new 
product, it can be un-standardized for sorne time requiring changes in inputs, 
processlllg, and final specifications (p. 195). In this sense, the ability to change 
inputs, more than lower its price, is crucial to capture market share; this is also 
possible by the low price elasticity of demand typical of new products, that allows 
charge of a high price without much loss in demand; aU this requires a good deal of 
communication between customer, suppliers and even competitors, that is achieved 
by locating production near the firm (Vernon, 1966: 195). In terms of the industry 
structure, Klepper (1996) argues that in this first stage the entry of new firms rises, 
and the most recent entrants account for a disproportionate share of product 
innovations (p. 564-565). 
In the maturing stage of the PLC, sorne processes of production of the product begin 
to standardize, with consequent effects on scale economies by mass production, and 
the consideration of minimum production costs (Vernon, 1966: 196). AIso, market 
and design uncertainties decline. In terms of the industry structure, the number of new 
entrants decline, the leadership of the industry stabilizes and firms are busier in 
process than in product innovation (K1epper, 1996: 564-565). 
Going back to Vernon, he proposes that in the mature stage, if demand for the product 
has increased in foreign markets, firms begin to consider serving markets outside 
their home country. In a strict sense, this opens the discussion of internationalization 
because, for the first time, the firm (that already developed and produced a successful 
product in its home market) has the possibility of establishing operations in other 
countries. According to other internationalization authors like Caves (1971) and 
Hymer (1976), at this point firms have acquired specific-assets, which can be 
exploited in other markets. The eclectiç OU (Ownership, Location and 
Internationa1ization) paradigm developed by Dunning (2000) refers to these specific­
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assets as an ownership advantage. Caves (1971) argues that those specific-assets are 
built by means of product differentiation, which means that they operate in an 
oligopolistic market in their home countries. This is in line with the argumentation of 
the ILC, which claims that in the standardization phase, scale economies take 
relevance and sorne firms are driven out of the industry; an event that is known as the 
shakeout (Klepper, 1996). However, Klepper (1997) shows that there are sorne 
industries in which the shakeout does not occur. He explains that the PLC does not 
take into account that as the product moves along its cycle, specialization due to 
learning, might lead to a division of labour within the industry. Therefore, the design, 
manufacturing and marketing of the product usually is not done by the same firm. 
Based on that idea, Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2000) argue that this division of R&D 
(both for product or process), manufacturing and marketing impedes the possibility of 
appropriability (ofR&D results) and increasing returns which makes difficult to erect 
entry barriers. Thus, on one hand internationalization authors agree that in the 
standardization stage there is an ownership advantage that the firm can exploit 
elsewhere, but on the other hand, the industrial structure authors comment that there 
can be many structural arrangements, and as such the way in which this 
delocalization takes places may also vary. 
The decision to go international can be essentially made in three ways: exporting, 
licensing or establishing foreign subsidiaries. Vernon (1966) does not provide a 
definite answer as to which of these three modes is preferable. He asserts that cost 
considerations and scale economies definitely play a role in this decision. Caves 
(1971, 1982) argues that if the knowledge about the specific-assets is intangible by 
nature and refers to organizational procedures and marketing abilities able to 
differentiate the product, the firm is more likely to establish its own subsidiary in 
foreign markets because of the difficulty to transfer that kiri.d of knowledge. 
Regarding location characteristics, Dunning (1981: 27) explains that "the larger the 
number and the greater the differences between economic environments in which an 
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enterptise operates, the better placed it is to take advantage of different factor 
endowments and market situations." It means that the ownership-advantages gained 
by firms in their home countries can be better exploited in settings different from the 
home country. In a similar lane, Kuemmerle (1997) developed a typology about R&D 
subsidiaries: 
"the home-base-augmenting site -is established in order to tap knowledge 
from competitors and universities around the globe; in that type of site, 
information flows from the foreign laboratory to the central lab at home. The 
second type of site, home-base-exploiting site- is established to support 
manufacturing facilities in foreign countries or to adapt standard products to 
the demand there; in that type of site, information flows to the foreign 
laboratory from the centrallab at home."(p. 62). 
This typology recognizes that the main locus of innovation is the home base site; 
although R&D subsidiaries can also contribute to the enhancing of home-created 
advantage and not just ta the adaptation of teclmology ta foreign markets. However, 
Niosi (1999: 114) points out that new realities show that expatriate R&D units can 
have different mandates that go from acquiring new teclmologies to sustaining 
existing core teclmologies. This author explains that the mandate of a specifie 
expatriate R&D unit may depend on teclmologically strategie issues like for instance 
the differenees in teclmology inputs in the home and host country, but also on other 
factors not much strategie in terms of teclmology, like the acquisition or merger with 
firms that have R&D units. The point we want to stress is that even if R&D in the 
home country is important in creating an original advantage in a firm, the sustaining 
of this advantage or even the creation of new ones, can potentially rely on the firms' 
expatriate R&D units. 
Going back to the original PLC-ILC line, it suggests that once the product reaches the 
standardization phase (Vernon, 1996) an industry shakeout occurs and the leaders 
reinforce their position (Klepper, 1996) and gain valuable specific-assets (Caves, 
1971, 1982) or ownership advantages (Dunning, 2000) that can later be exploited in 
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other markets (Vernon, 1996; Dunning, 1980), although in sorne instances other 
markets provide a way to extend those advantages too (Kuemmerle, 1997). According 
to these authors the way in which internationalization should be done is not a simple 
decision because it depends on the differences in the home and foreign location and 
in the way in which that foreign location can be a way to advance capabilities. Thus, 
the delocalization decision may not necessarily by the most economically "efficient" 
in the short run. As we saw above, under the framework of the ILC, that 
internationalization decision should also be dependent upon the particular labour 
division within the industry in the home country and the foreign country industry 
structure. This is a very important issue since the aircraft industry displays a labour 
division among firms and among countries. 
Following the reasoning line of Vernon (1966) when the product is standardized: 
" ... foreign investors seeking an optimum location for a captive facility may 
not have to concern themselves too much with questions of market 
information; presumably, they are thoroughly familiar with the marketing end 
of the business and are looking for a low-cost captive source of 
supply."(Vernon, 1966: 203) 
It is at this point that Vernon acknowledges that developing countries can play a role 
in the internationalization decision. Before this, ail considerations pertained more to 
firms in developed countries serving the markets of developed countries. Figure 1.2 
illustrates the main tenets of the PLC-ILC presented so far. 
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Figure 1.2
 
Representation of the PLC-ILC theory
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Vernon (1966) also acknowledges the possibility of a decomposition of the 
production activities, situation that will allow firms to locate different paI1s of this 
process at different sites. Thus, even if the product is weil standardized, in sorne cases 
its production process can be divided in information-intensive, thus expensive 
operations, and low-cost operations. This division allows for a good number of 
possibilities of productive arrangements that Vernon did not analyze in depth. Other 
pioneering authors in internationalization studies inspired by the product life cycle 
approach, like Knickerbocker (1973), Ronstadt (1978) and Fagre and Wells (1982) 
propose a richer scenario of possibilities. 
Knickerbocker (1973) explains that the delocalization process described by Vernon is 
driven by strategie issues and not just by cost reduction considerations. Paradoxically, 
contrary to the assumption that delocalization of production is a process driven by a 
reduction of uncertainty in the architecture of the product; establishing activities 
overseas implies a high degree of uncertainty about the local environrnent 
(Knickerbocker, 1973). This author argues that a lot of rival firms fol1ow the steps of 
leader firms when going overseas. Given the uncel1ainty about the advantages and 
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obstacles that foreign locations may provide, once a leader firm takes the decision to 
go to a specific location, rival firms cannot afford to lose the potential advantages. If 
the location turns out not as promising as it seemed, at least ail firms will face the 
same fate. Therefore, except for the first-mover firms, the majority of firms 
delocalizing activities do so more as a defensive move than as a carefully planned 
strategy. Knickerbocker (1973) calls this move the oligopolistic reaction, because it is 
observed in oligopolistic producer structures in the home countries. It is important to 
recall that the aerospace industry is oligopolistic, at least in aircraft integration, as 
weil as in major subsystems, such as engines, avionics, and landing gear. 
If the oligopolistic reaction is the impulse behind much of the delocalization 
strategies followed by firms towards newcomer countries, the way in which this 
strategy actually takes place depends also in the home country. When talking about 
the relationship between host governments and foreign firms, Fagre and Wells (1982) 
analyzed sorne factors that could influence the degree of ownership of the foreign 
firm's subsidiary (with the assumption that normally, foreign firms prefer to have 
complete ownership over their subsidiaries, and host governments prefer to have a 
capital mix arrangement). Among those factors, the access to export markets is 
relevant for our study purposes. These authors argue that usually foreign firms took a 
high share of ownership over their subsidiaries when they represented export bases. 
This is because governments in host countries are eager to increase exports. 
Moreover, when the output of the subsidiaries are intermediate goods which have 
value only when combined with other intermediate goods made by the same firm in 
other location/country, governn1ents may be willing to accept even full ownership by 
the foreign firms (Fagre and Wells, 1982: 13). 
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Although the bargaining model just described, has lost certain relevance (see 
Ramamurti, 2001) given the widespread of liberalization policies 11 followed by 
developing countries like Mexico; it is important to note the importance of producing 
a complete product or sub-system. As we are going to stress later, this is an essential 
element for bargaining as well as for learning. In the same token and in a Mexican 
context, studies using the global value chain concept, like Bair and Gereffi (2001) and 
Bair and Dussel-Peters (2006) highlight the importance of full-package production 
(as opposed to assembly subcontracting) in the garment sector, as a condition for 
upgrading in the value chain. These studies explain that full-package production l2 
represent not just an upgrade, but also in sorne cases the possibility to continue in the 
value chain and avoid competitive threats from other locations. The net balance of 
these authors for the Mexican case (which comprised a lot of foreign firms) is 
negative, as most of the firms in Mexico have not achieved the full-package option, 
as opposed to sorne firms in Asian countries. 
While producing a complete module or sub-system is a very important achievement 
in technological terms, the next step should be related with R&D. Ronstadt (1978) 
analyses the different mandates of overseas R&D units of US based firms. This 
author's scheme is very rich since it illustrates that production and R&D can be 
located either in the US or abroad and either coupled or de-coupled from one another. 
Moreover, the type of R&D activity in foreign R&D units might be used to serve 
markets whether in the home country, the host country or both. A very important 
feature is the evolutionary character of these foreign R&D units. Ronstadt (1978) 
argues that for a foreign R&D unit to leave behind the function of mere technology 
Il Private property is seen as the more efficient ownership in liberal economic ideas, and in principle, 
private foreign ownership is ok as far as it be the more efficient option in terms of resources allocation. 
12 Contrary to assembly subcontracting, full-package production implies: puréhasing the fabrics needed 
for a particular garment, contributing to design specifications, producing a sampIe for the buyer to 
approve, grading and marking a pattern, laundering or finishing the garment, and occasionally shipping 
directly to retail outlets (Bair and Dussel-Peters, 2006: 207). 
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transfer (its initial purpose) and become a generator of technology for the host 
country or even serve the home country market or the global market, the firm has to 
have a substantial investment in production operations in that location (p. 12). More 
recent authors like Mariani (2002), calls the attention to the scientific content of the 
overseas R&D. This author claims that R&D-only affiliates usually are dedicated to 
activities with high scientific content while R&D-and-production affiliates are 
dedicated to more user oriented aspects that usually do not require much scientific 
content. This trend would be more likely for high technology sectors in which science 
is very important. One conclusion of Mariani (2002) is that localities with a science 
infrastructure are more akin to the establishment of R&D-only affiliates that belong 
to firms in high technology sectors. Newcomer countries in aerospace should be 
aware of this general trend, in order to have realistic expectations about the 
technology that will be transferred from foreign firms. 
1.2.2 The aircrafi as a modular system 
This section, by means of four concepts, analyses the main technical dimensions of 
the aircraft as an artefact. The first is the concept of product architecture that dates 
back to the work of Simon (1962) and Alexander (1964), and has been framed in 
more modern terms by Ulrich (1995) and Baldwin and Clark (2000). The second 
concept is dominant design, first developed by Abernathy and Utterback (1978). The 
third is the concept of technological regime inspired by the work of Nelson and 
Winter (1982). Finally, if we are interested in complex products like aircraft, Hobday 
(1998) makes the claim that the concept of complex product systems (CoPS) may 
help because this kind of product exhibits major differences compared to simpler 
ones. 
Although they come from different research streams, these four concepts - product 
architecture, dominant design, technological regime and complex product systems ­
are complementary to a great extent. Nevertheless, sorne important differences exist, 
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and they represent obstacles to their integration. What follows is a brief analysis of 
these concepts, as they relate to aircraft. 
Sorne authors like Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and Langlois (2002) argue that the 
architecture of a product has implications in the way knowledge is created and shared 
among the different organizations participating in its conception and production. 
Thus, we are going to briefly discuss how the product architecture influences the 
organizational coordination within and among the different parties, especially 
regarding knowledge creation and sharing. 
Product Architecture 
The concept of product architecture originates in the seminal work of Simon (1962) 
and Alexander (1964). For instance, in his work on the architecture of complexity, 
Simon (1962) discusses the properties of complex systems. This author claims that 
social action (whether economic interaction or human-made artefacts) shares the 
underlying principles of systemic complexity that characterize the natural world. By 
complex system he means " ...one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a 
non simple way" (p. 468). One property of these complex systems is hierarchy. The 
property of being hierarchical means that " ...a system [... ] is composed of interrelated 
subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach 
sorne lowest level of elementary subsystem" (Simon, 1962: 468). Simon (1962) 
clearly shows how the hierarchy property, together with a near-decomposability 
property, helps to reduce the complexity arising from having too many parts 
interacting in non-simple ways. The near-decomposability property is what will later 
be known as modularity. Therefore, it can be argued that the study of product 
architecture is needed for the design of products as a strategic activity in the 
management of product development. 
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Later, authors like Henderson and Clark (1990), Ulrich (1995), Schilling (2000) and 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) used Simon' s (1962) insights to build a framework for 
analyzing the architectural properties of products in order to understand their 
evolution and to devise product design strategies. Specifically, these later works 
stress the advantages of modular architectures. The first step to understand what the 
implications of modularity are is to give a definition of product architecture, and of 
the term "modular". 
Although the works cited above have sorne things in common, not ail agree on aH 
aspects related to the definition of product architecture. Next, we are going to show 
the main differences and commonalities ofthese works. 
In an article about architectural innovation, Henderson and Clark (1990) describe 
architecture as a system. A component is defined as a physically distinct portion of 
the product that embodies a core design concept and performs a well-defined function 
(p. 2). 
According to Ulrich, there are three main relevant dimensions for defining product 
architecture: "( 1) the arrangement of functional elements; (2) the mapping from 
functional elements to physical components; (3) the specification of the interfaces 
among interacting physical components."(p. 420) 
Baldwin and Clark argue that, "a module is a unit whose structural elements are 
powerfully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements 
in other units."(p. 63). Regarding the system, they propose that "[a] complex system 
can be managed by dividing it up into smaller pieces and looking at each one 
separately. When the complexity of one of the elements crosses a certain threshold, [a 
separate abstraction that has a simple interface can isolate complexity]. The 
abstraction hides the cornplexity of the element; the interface indicates how the 
element interacts with the larger system."(p. 63-64). This means that the intricate 
57 
interactions among sorne components are embedded in the module and the rest of the 
system does not have to deal with that complexity, for that reason, the complexity is 
said to be hidden. 
According to Schilling, ail entities can be viewed as system of components, and each 
ofthose components is, in turn, a system offiner components (Schilling, 2000: 314). 
Ali four definitions share the idea that a system or product is made up of elements, 
components, or modules. The way these modules are attached to the system reveals 
the architecture or configuration of that system. A system may itself be part of a 
larger system in a hierarchical fashion. 
Defining modules 
The definition of a module is more problematic. For instance, Ulrich (1995) defines a 
component as a separable physical part or subassembly (p. 421); for Schilling (2000), 
the definition of a component depends on the level of analysis, or on the ultimate 
possibility of having an elementary particle (although in the case of human-made 
products, this last possibility is not relevant). It seems that for these two authors the 
definition is completely dependent on the level of analysis. The assertion of Ulrich 
(1995: 421) about architecture as a mapping between physical elements and function 
structures that can go from one-to-one, many-to-one, or one-to-many does not reduce 
the relativity of his definition. This is because Ulrich recognizes that the function of a 
given structure is dependent on the level of abstraction. But even if we take a 
structure at a specific level of abstraction, the problem is to what ultimate physical 
element we have to assign a specifie function. In the end, these two definitions seem 
to rest on practical judgments. 
In Henderson and Clark (1990), a module embodies a core design that performs a 
well-defined function. Instead of defining a module by its physical properties or 
characteristics, the module is defined by a core design. Here, core design is 
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understood as the technical way to solve a problem. Thus, ail physical elements 
needed to realize the core design principle are part of the module. Of course, 
establishing what is a core design is not without problems, and also implies sorne 
degree of relativity. 
Trying to build a more solid definition, Baldwin and Clark (2000) based their concept 
of module on the strength or weakness of the connection between structural elements. 
This definition is very close to the spirit of cluster analysis, in the sense that elements 
in the cluster are more related among themselves than with other elements in other 
clusters, although this does not mean that cluster elements have no relationship 
outside the cluster. Again, this definition has relativity aspects, not just because of 
strength or weakness as a criterion, but <iJso because of the problem of defining the 
number of modules. Let us recall that in the statistical cluster analysis the number of 
clusters must be set according to a certain judgment; in the same vein, the number of 
groupings of structural elements in a CoPS must be set based on sorne judgment. 
Yet, when can product architecture be said to be modular? As we have seen, since 
definitions of module vary, the answer must vary to sorne extent, depending on the 
author. 
Henderson and Clark (1990) do not make a specifie statement about this issue; they 
just assume there are modules in the system. Nevertheless, it can be argued that to the 
extent that core design principles depend on specifie elements, and those specifie 
elements are mainly involved in specifie core design principles, the architecture has a 
greater degree of modularity. 
Ulrich (1995) puts it this way: "A modular architecture includes a one-to-one 
mapping from functional elements in the function structure to the physical 
components of the product, and specifies de-coupled interfaces between components. 
An integral architecture includes a complex (not one-to-one) mapping from 
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functional elements to physical components and/or coupled interfaces between 
components." (p. 422) 
Based on their previous definition of module, Baldwin and Clark (2000) define 
modularity as "a particular design structure, in which parameters and tasks are 
interdependent within units (modules) and independent across them." (p. 88). 
Schilling (2000) argues "systems are said to have a high degree of modularity when 
their components can be disaggregated and recombined into new configurations ­
possibly substituting various new components into the configuration- with little loss 
offunctionality."(p.315) 
There is a general consensus about the fact that ail architectures have some degree of 
modularity. In this sense, integral architecture - a system with no identifiable 
modules (like the famous pin of Adam Smith) - and moduiar architecture should be 
understood as ideal types. Most products will fall somewhere on the continuum 
between these extreme cases. 
According to Brusoni and Prencipe (200 1), Niosi and Zhegu (2005) and Frigant and 
Talbot (2005), the airerait is a complex system with a high degree of modular 
architecture. In that case, the system is the whole airerait and it is made up of 
different subsystems or modules arranged in a hierarchical fashion. These subsystems 
are in turn made up of other subsystems. Figure 1.3 by NASA, illustrates some of the 
main subsystem and their main function. 
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Figure 1.3 
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Figure 1.3 coincides with a definition of architecture based on a structure of functions 
like the one proposed by Ulrich (1995). If we follow figure 1.3 and Ulrich's (1995) 
defihition, the aircraft is a system whose modules accomplish one or several weil 
defined functions, and thus the degree of modularity is important. Also, even if figure 
1.3 is a good illustration, it lacks sorne subsystems, like the landing gear and 
hydraulic systems, and the avionics, which consist of the integration of the navigation 
and the flight control systems (Frigant and Talbot, 2005: 344). 
In terms of its 
\ 
hierarchical features, Niosi and Zhegu (2005: 12) show how the 
aircraft can be viewed as three layers system that has other subsystems that in turn 
have modules. The first one is the aircraft itself conceived as a whole system; the 
second level is made up of the avionics system, the propulsion system, and the 
airframe structure; and the third level is made up of electronic and electric 
components that are attached to the avionics system, engine and components that are 
part of the propulsion system, and fuselage parts, cabin, fuel systems, landing gear 
system and hydraulic systems that are attached to the airframe structure. 
In terms of the interfaces, Fringant and Talbot (2005) explain that the avionics system 
has a large number of interfaces, like the flight control system and the electronic 
power supply; various fuselage parts like the wings are attached to the main airframe 
by simple mechanical attachments and so is the landing gear; the engines are attached 
to the wings by means of engine pods and pylons, with the help of mechanical and 
electric connections which also control the wings ailerons and the retractable landing 
gear (p. 344-345). 
The current state of modularity of the aircraft is the result of a particular evolutionary 
path involving technical advancements, market demand, and strategie manoeuvres. 
One major result is that the degree of modularity may not be the same even for 
aircrafts in the same class (Frigant and Talbot, 2005). To have a better idea of this 
evolution, we will re-examine the concept of dominant design. 
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Dominant design 
The concept of dominant design was developed before the new conceptualizations of 
product architecture that we have already seen. In fact, Baldwin and Clark (2000) 
recognize the influence of this concept on their work. 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) developed the concept of dominant design to address 
the dynamics of innovation at the industry level. They stress that the focus of 
innovation is different as the life cycle of a product advances. They arrive at the 
conclusion that innovation in product - understood as a radical improvement in 
product characteristics - is prominent in the first phase of a product's life cycle, while 
innovation in process - understood as radical improvement in the way the product is 
made - is prominent in the latter phase of the product's life cycle. The reason is that 
once a product achieves enough market acceptance over its rivais, its design becomes 
dominant in that segment. In other words, the product becomes the standard to which 
ail participants must adhere if they want to be in the business. 
Other influential authors like Tushman and Anderson (1986) used the concept of 
dominant design to explain how the change in the type of innovation - whether 
product or process - presents different risks and opportunities for incumbent firms 
and new entrants. These authors make the link between changes in the dominant 
design and changes in the industrial structure. According to these authors, in terms of 
previous knowledge, there are two types of discontinuities, competence-enhancing 
and competence-destroying knowledge, the latter related to the establishment of a 
new dominant design. The explanation is that competence-enhancing change favours 
the CUITent industrial structure, while competence-destroying change glves new 
entrants the opportunity to get a position in the industriallandscape. 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) integrate various contributions that deal with dominant 
designs. They claim that the dominant design concept can be useful for hierarchical 
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complex systems like the aircraft. Much in line with Simon's (1962) explanation, 
these authors presents the idea of dominant design as a strategy to facilitate the 
production of an artefact by fixing sorne dimension. However, it is important to point 
out, that in the case of the aircraft, even if sorne technical dimensions of the 
architecture have been fixed (e.g. like the existence of two wings) the complexity 
within those dimensions has been increased (e.g. modern wings are made of 
numerous parts that interact in a non-simple way compared to wooden wings of prior 
aircrafts). In this sense, the overall complexity of the aircraft has been increased in 
spite of the existence of a dominant design. 13 As we are going to see below, this 
seems to be the consequence of the constant technical and markets needs which the 
aircraft has to meet. 
Murmann and Frellken (2006) explain that normally there are several technical 
dimensions involved in the consecution of a general function embodied in a product 
or system. How to choose the parameters of these technical dimensions is a complex 
task, since changes in one of them may bring changes in others, very much in the 
spirit of Baldwin and Clark's (2000) definition of architecture. Faced with this 
challenge, engineers and designers usually reduce this complexity by fixing the 
parameters of sorne of these technical dimensions. Which technical dimensions must 
be fixed and how to do it depends on the particular circumstances of a technology. 
Once sorne critical technological dimensions get established and accepted by other 
actors (e.g. competitors, suppliers, customers) they become part of the dominant 
design in a product class. 
The establishment of a dominant design in a product class is a guidepost that serves 
to explain the unfolding dynamics of innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), 
13 Perhaps this overall complexity would be even greater ifthose fixed technical dimensions were not 
in place; e.g. had an aircraft company the task to chose among different wings configurations each 
time a new plane is developed, the complexity sure would be enormous. 
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organizational forms (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and the industrial organization 
involved in that product class (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Before proceeding to explain dynamics, it is important to know how to delimit the 
boundaries of a product class. Murmann and Frenken (2006) suggest that 
fundamental operational principles should be considered when defining a product 
class. It is not the goal of this work to review ail the operational principles that 
differentiate the aircraft from other human-made artefacts used for air travel: in this 
work we are focusing on civil aircraft. In terms of sector delimitation, Niosi and 
Zhegu (2005) show that civil aircraft manufacturing generates more employment than 
military aircraft manufacturing. In terms of technology, according to Kehayas (2007), 
subsonic civil aeronautical technology shows important differences from supersonic 
military technology'4. 
Before a dominant design in a product class is established, several firms compete to 
get the acceptance of the relevant actors. Although Abernathy and Utterback (1978) 
presented markets as the most relevant actors, Murmann and Frenken (2006) argue 
that in the case of complex products there are also other key actors on the institutional 
landscape (e.g. system integrators, R&D alliances, specialized supp!iers, 
governments, etc.), who participate in the negotiation of the main technical 
dimensions and their parameters. This is a period of ferment (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) in which innovation is carried out mainly at the product leve! or, in 
the framework of Murmann and Frenken (2006), at the !evel of fundamental 
operational principles, and the main objective is to achieve performance. 
Once a specifie architecture or design is selected by the combination of market, 
technological, and institutional forces, a dominant design emerges. This architecture 
14 Subsonie makes reference to planes that do not have the eapaeity to overeome sound veloeity, while 
sonie makes reference to planes that can go above sound veloeity. The Concorde is an example of a 
sonic plane. Almost ail civil aviation planes are subsonic. 
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contains in most cases sorne degree of modular features since one of the objectives is 
precisely to facilitate the production process. Different modules have different 
impacts on operational principles. In most cases, the fundamental operational 
principles are mostly related to certain modules. 
This implies that, once the dominant design IS established, the fundamental 
operational princip les of the artefact change more slowly, and innovation centers on 
secondary operational principles. According to Abernathy and Utterback (1978), 
dominant design opens a period of process innovation and only minor incremental 
innovation at the product level, or a competence-enhancing period according to 
Tushman and Anderson (1986). However, for complex products like the aircraft, 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) argue that innovation can be radical or incremental 
after the dominant design emerges, and at different levels of hierarchy. In fact, in 
modules with high-hierarchy and with close relationship with operational principles, 
innovation will be incremental, but in modules on the lower levels of the hierarchy, 
innovation can be either incremental or radical. This last type of innovation makes 
reference to great performance improvements, or completely new knowledge and 
skills needed for its accomplishment. Therefore, parts of the system can experience 
radical innovation at the subsystem level, but at the system level will be considered 
incremental. Even sorne core modules can suffer important changes, but unless those 
changes lead to great modification in the way those modules interact with others, the 
changes in those core modules may be radical at the module level but with no major 
alteration of the product architecture (e.g. fly-by-wire systems may allow a better 
control and monitoring of the different mechanical systems, but the relationship 
among those systems remains more or less the same). 
The relative stability of the dominant design at the system level makes possible 
incremental changes (and radical changes at lower subsystem levels) that enhance 
customer value. Nevertheless, once the system can no longer perform as expected, or 
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when new needs appear, there are again incentives to experiment with new principles 
in order to address these issues. This marks the beginning of a new ferment period in 
search for a new dominant design. Sometimes, not all fundamental principles change, 
but changing even one requires a reconfiguration of the system architecture. The 
current adoption of composites in the aircraft construction seems to be the case in 
which a change in one of the parts implies important changes in other parts of the 
system. 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) posit that the dynamics of dominant design in complex 
systems imply different risks and opportunities for incumbents and new entrants. 
These will vary depending on the level of the change and the position in the 
hierarchy. For example, a change in architecture promoted by a system integrator 
involves certain adjustments at that level of the hierarchy, but lower levels will need 
bigger changes ifthey want to adjust. 
A comprehensive description of the fundamental operational principles that may form 
the dominant design of aircraft architecture is beyond the scope of this revision; 
however, sorne authors do state sorne major arguments regarding these principles. 
Although it may exist more than one account about the actual number of aircraft 
configurations that can be labelled as a dominant design, here we are going to present 
three historical moments on which three works more or less coincide (Esposito, 2004; 
Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Kehayas, 2007)15. It is important to note that these three 
works go in depth about the technical characteristics of the aircraft and their impact in 
its development. Table 1.2 shows the characteristics of three historical dominant 
design configurations. 
15 Esposito (2004) uses the concept oftechnological paradigm; Niosi and Zhegu (2005) use the concept 
of dominant design; Kehayas (2007) refers to revolution in the aircraft configuration. 
• • 
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Table 1.2 
Subsonic civil aircraft dominant designs characteristics 
1935 Late 1950s-1960s 1985-1990 
OC-3: B-707: • Supercritical wings 
•	 Ali metal • A jet propelled airliner • Composite 
•	 Two wings attached to • Four engines, ail metal • High by-pass turbofans 
fuselage (Kehayas, 2007; Niosi Fly-by-wire• 
•	 Two motors and Zhegu, 2005) (Kehayas, 2007) 
•	 Propellers Old piston changeover to Use of advanced 
•	 Retractable landing gear the jet engine materials and electronics 
(Niosi and Zhegu, 2005) (Esposito, 2004) (Esposito, 2004) 
Niosi and Zhegu (2005) explain that the DC-3 plane designed by the Douglas 
Company in the US was the prototypical model in this first dominant design 
architecture, and it sold over 10,000 units ail over the world. Among the" ... key 
characteristics were an all-metal fuselage (replacing wooden bodies), retractable 
landing gear (substituted for fixed gear) and monoplane wings with two piston 
engines (instead ofbiplane wings)." (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005: Il). Regarding the DC­
3 plane made byDouglas, Bagley (1990) asserts that it was " ... the first truly effective 
civil airliner capable of providing a regular, reliable transport service generating a 
profit for its operator from passenger revenue alone." (p. 631). 
The introduction of the B-707, in the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, 
signalled the era of the jet engine in civil aircraft. The massive adoption of the B-707 
and the adoption of the jet-engine by others make that plane the second dominant 
design (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Kehayas, 2007). According to Esposito (2004: 454), 
the changeover of the engine industry from the old piston engine to the new one 
based on the jet engine was truly a paradigmatic change. If we consider thrust as a 
critical function and the propulsion system as a high-hierarchy module, we can 
consider that the change indeed modified in sorne way the dominant design of the 
aircraft: the new speed required massive reinforcement in airframes, adjustments of 
cabin noise insulation among other major changes. 
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Although there is not a prototypical plane for a third dominant design, there are sorne 
elements that have been introduced that seems to be mandatory for new planes like 
the introduction of new materials such as ultra-light alloys and massive use of 
electronic instruments." (Esposito, 2004: 453). These improvements affected the 
three main high-hierarchy modules: airframe, propulsion systems, and avionics. Thus, 
it can be certainly argued that sorne of the dominant design features changed. 
According to Esposito (2004), this change brought about incredible improvement in 
speed and fuel-efficiency. 
The three authors coincide in signalling the inclusion of the jet engine in the late 
1950s as a break-through moment. Only Esposito (2004) shows the more recent 
inclusion of new materials and electronics as another paradigmatic moment. There 
may be several reasons for the other authors not to claim this. First, for Niosi and 
Zhegu (2005), the important issue is how, among competing technologies, one is 
chosen as the dominant. In this case, it may be the new technologies applied to 
aeronautics which were born outside of aeronautics, like composites, and may coexist 
as long as they accomplish their function. Thus, there is not a need for just one 
solution. Second, it may be that it is too early to determine which navigation 
electronic system is best, for instance. Third, and perhaps more important, it may be 
that the new aeronautical technologies enhance the actual architecture and as such 
they do not represent a departing from it. FOUlih, as it can be inferred from Kehayas 
(2007)16, it may be that Esposito (2004) by including safety and comfort in his index 
16 Kehayas (2007) defmes aeronautical technology as being composed of aerodynamics, structures, 
propulsion, and systems and configuration (p. 600). Thus, according to him, since the introduction of 
jet-powered planes like the Cornet and the B-707, ail new aeronautical technologies introduced have 
been evolutionary instead of revolutionary. Kehayas (2007) states that for an aeronautical technology 
to be considered revolutionary, it should have a great impact on direct operation costs (DOC): 
ownership (depreciation and interest), insurance, fuel, maintenance and crew costs, and landing and 
navigation fees. He recognizes that other improvements outside the aeronautical technology can have 
an impact (for instance, a better manufacturing process or the sharing of common parts among 
different generations of planes) on the DOC. 
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is going beyond strictly aeronautical technology. Although safety and comfort issues 
are critical to the well- functioning of the air navigation system as a whole, it may not 
be a change in terms of aircraft architecture. In any case, it is true that the inclusion of 
new technologies (that may or not be strictly aeronautical) like composites (Esposito, 
2004), avionics (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005) and supercritical wings (Kehayas, 2007), 
and the focus on issues like comfort and safety (Esposito, 2004) are changing the 
knowledge needed to succeed in the design and manufacturing of commercial 
aircraft. 
Integral to current aircraft organizational architecture (or architectures) is its modular 
division. In terms of modularity, the aircraft has migrated from intra-firm modularity 
to inter-firm modularity. Fringant and Talbot (2005) explain that inter-firm 
modularity was encouraged by European governments in the context of the creation 
of Airbus. The four participant firms in the Airbus consortium - Aerospatiale from 
France, DASA from Germany, BAE from England, and CASA from Spain - were 
assigned a specifie part of the Airbus aircraft. Thus, the first factor toward inter-firm 
modularity was political (Fringant and Talbot, 2005). These authors claim that a 
second factor was the choice of Airbus to use electronic controls that allowed for the 
suppression of a large part of the mechanical and hydraulic connections, that 
eventually allowed a better partitioning of the aircraft (Fringant and Talbot; 2005; 
344). Since the model offered by Airbus had considerable market success, its 
competitor Boeing in the US, as weil as Canada's Bombardier and Brazil's Embraer 
rapidly followed similar strategies. 
Another major element in inter-firm modularity is that aircraft is a global product, 
and an expensive one. In order to get international markets and reduce their 
dependence on just one government for the funding R&D, and thus reducing market 
and technological risk, large systems integrators had to rely on foreign independent 
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suppliers of subsystems, that would co-develop wings, landing gear or avionics with 
them. 
The modularity achieved by Airbus and Boeing has allowed them to develop de 
concept of "family" in which different aircraft models share sorne component with 
other models (Fringant and Talbot, 2005). For instance, the Airbus models 
"A318/A319/A320/A321 and A330/A340 have the same instrument panels, the same 
piloting procedures, the same avionics and several of the same systems. There is 
practically no difference in the cockpits. The wings of the A3l8/A319/A320/A321 
are ail identical, only the length of the fuselage (and consequently the number of 
seats) differs." (Fringant and Talbot, 2005: 345). This description of modularity is 
very much in line with the concept of architecture developed by Schilling (2000) in 
which this author stresses that the possibility to change modules from system to 
system is what makes a product modular. We can even talk about intergenerational 
modularity in these cases. 
Several factors have contributed to the increasing trend of modularity in the aircraft 
industry. From the technological perspective, the existence of a dominant design in at 
least two moments in the history of the commercial subsonic aircraft means that the 
main modules are defined, and both subsystems and interfaces become standardized. 
Also, the ever increasing complexity of the knowledge needed (see CoPS below) is a 
factor that encourages division of labour and thus administrative modularity. Authors 
like Benzler and Wink (2010) even talk about modularization of R&D (p. 324). These 
authors stress the ever increasing importance of new technological systems -like 
composites- used on new generation planes. Since much of the knowledge pertaining 
to those new technological systems fall outside of the traditional or core (Ehret and 
Cooke, 2010) capabilities of final assemblers, these have to rely on specialized 
suppliers notjust for manufacturing but a1so for R&D. Ehret and Cooke (2010) make 
the distinction between "core" and "strategic" capabilities in the context of aerospace. 
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According to these authors, the new teclmological systems represent "strategic" 
capabilities possessed by specialized suppliers, and for final assemblers these same 
capabilities are "non-core" in the sense that they do not posses them. This situation 
encourages the seeking for partners and places that have relevant knowledge on the 
new technological systems, which in tum favours further modularity (Benzler and 
Wink 2010). From the market and political perspective, the goal of leading firms to 
sell more planes leads them to sign offset agreements that drive them to manufacture 
part of the plane in a foreign country (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2007; Benzler and 
Wink, 2010). 
Technological regime 
Taking as a departure point that knowledge is the bottom line of innovation, Nelson 
and Winter (1982) developed the concept of technological regimes, and Dosi (1982) 
developed the concept of teclmological trajectory to explain the differences between 
the natural trajectories of different technological sectors. Expanding that concept, 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) propose four dimensions that capture the logic of 
technological regimes: a) innovation opportunity - the efficiency of R&D investment 
in terms of innovationlinvestment; b) appropriability - the capacity of a firm ta 
appropriate the benefits of its innovative efforts-, c) characteristics of the knowledge 
base - the degree of tacit/codified- and d) cumulativeness - the degree to which new 
knowledge depends on older knowledge. Evidently, the analysis scope of this concept 
is broader than the previous ones, because the aim is ta understand the evolution of a 
complete teclmological sector, not just a product or industry. 
The knowledge base relevant for the design and manufacture of aircraft has both tacit 
and codified characteristics. In terms of codified knowledge, it can be argued that 
ever-increasing inter-firm modularity implies the standardization of interfaces in 
order to develop modules in an independent way. This standardization is reflected in 
the clear definition of the interfaces between the main subsystems and the overall 
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aircraft. AIso, there are numerous licensing agreements between the leading firms and 
companies based in developing countries. These licensing agreements imply that 
firms in developing countries receive a complete set of instructions regarding the 
aircraft for which they will produce sorne component or module. Of course, this can 
be done for aircraft models developed previously for which there is already a good 
deal of codification. Thus, in this industry, like in most other ones, time plays in 
favour of codification, however, new aircraft models imply a good deal of tacit 
knowledge thanks to the constant addition of new technologies to these models. 
On the other hand, there are always tacit characteristics of the knowledge base. 
Authors like Ehret and Cooke (2010) point out that the overall design and final 
assembly of planes is the final assemblers' core and strategie capability, which they 
try to keep secret. In this sense, final assemblers, like Bombardier or Airbus, have 
embedded that ability in their organizational routines. For these reasons, alliances to 
develop new aircraft between leader final assemblers - like Embraer from Brazil ­
with other firms in developing countries like China, involve an intense technology 
transfer program. Mitsubishi from Japan has also received technology from Boeing in 
order to develop and produce new wings for the Boeing 787 (MacPherson and 
Pritchard, 2007; McGuire et al, 2010). If we follow this explanation, even if the 
development and manufacture of new aircraft or just certain modules is an ability 
with a high tacit component embedded in organizational routines, this does not mean 
that it is not possible for potential competitors to eventually develop such an ability. 
This is more so when leading companies install factories in other countries. 
Paradoxically, alliances and agreements between leader assemblers and firms in 
developing countries to produce new models (or adapt older ones) have shown 
precisely that technology transfer programs must include the tacit element required to 
design and manufacture aircraft modules and even the whole artefact. 
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Cumulativeness is overwhelming, but like in ail industries, useful knowledge fades 
out in time. On the one hand, it can be argued that in fact, the knowledge to design 
new models is related to a high degree with the knowledge to develop previous ones, 
since many aspects in the dominant design architecture are relatively fixed as argued 
by Kehayas (2007). On the other hand, even if strictly speaking the dominant design 
architecture of the aircraft has not changed much, too many technologies are 
continuously been added or modified (Esposito, 2004). This represents a whole array 
of new abilities that have to be mastered in order to keep pace with the advancement 
in this industry. According to Fringant and Talbot (2005), new developments in 
avionics systems are giving this module of the aircraft more prominence in the overall 
architecture. These arguments imply that even if old knowledge is important, its 
prominence over new knowledge will certainly diminish with time. 
There is another factor that makes the assessment of cumulativeness in the knowledge 
base even trickier. Benzler and Wink (2010) use the distinction between synthetic and 
analytical knowledge to illustrate that the new technologies used in new generation 
planes are more related to the scientific inquiry -analytical- way of learning than to 
the traditional engineering know-how -synthetic-. According to these authors, the 
way of making planes is changing from a product centred approach style to an 
integrated innovation approach. Put it in rough terms, now the challenge is how to 
integrate technologies -like composites and electronics- that require an R&D 
expertise usually located in other agents. In this sense, the problem is not just of 
cumulativeness, but also the widespread of this knowledge into more players, like 
specialized suppliers and research institutes. 
According to Esposito (2004), in terms of innovation opportunity, "even a modest 
increase of technology is only obtained through large investments." (p. 463). 
Nevertheless, that investment is often weil compensated for by future payoff in 
technology and sales (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985). 
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Complex Product Systems 
Hobday (1998) defines complex product systems as "high cost, engineering-intensive 
products, system, and constructs."(p. 690). He continues: "The term complex is used 
to reflect the number of customised components, the breadth of knowledge and skills 
required and the degree of new knowledge involved in production, as weil as other 
critical product dimensions." (p. 690). 
Sometimes products can be mislabelled as CoPS. Acha et al (2004) argue that the 
automobile is usually classified as CoPS, but they mention that the fact that it is 
mass-produced and a consumer good prevent to classify the automobile as a CoPS. 
Jin et al (2004: 2) complement the previous argument and explain that even if the 
automobile has a lot of components and needs interdisciplinary knowledge and skill, 
most of the components are standardized and can be produced in volume. Hobday 
(1998) argues that these particularities make CoPS exhibit different evolution patterns 
and thus need different managerial approaches. 
In line with the definition of CaPS, the aircrafi is a high-cost hierarchical product 
system that requires knowledge in diverse areas. A major characteristic of aircrafi 
development is its high up-front cost; according to Esposito (2004), the cost of 
developing the Boeing 777 was US$5 billion. This cost has been increasing from the 
beginnings of the industry. According to Esposito (2004), the" ... sharp increase in 
price is strictly related to the cast of aircrafi development, which grows rapidly in 
step with technological growth." (p. 451). Continuous pressure for improvement 
(implying not only advances in aeronautical technologies or production methods, but 
also the incorporation of new technologies), constant changes in demand, and the lack 
of standardization of several parts, makes the development of a new aircrafi more 
onerous than has previously been the case (Hobday, 1998). 
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The wide range of abilities and knowledge needed to design, produce and assemble 
an aircraft sets it apart from other hierarchical products. Even for just one module like 
the engine, Prencipe (1997) shows how Roll Royce had maintained and nurtured a 
knowledge base that encompasses several areas. Sometimes, Roll Royce does not use 
ail that knowledge in a direct way; instead, it uses it to verify the pieces and services 
that may eventually outsource to third pal1ies. This leads to the assel1ion that system 
or subsystem integrators know more than they do (Prencipe, 1997; Fringant and 
Talbot, 2005; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). In this sense, knowledge management is a 
critical activity for system and subsystem integrators. They should maintain a certain 
in-house capability in several fields, in order to design the overall module or system, 
transfer it and/or verify the work done by third pal1ies. 
Other authors Iike Benzler and Wink (2010), Ehret and Cooke (2010) and McGuire et 
al (2010) suggest that the situation just described may be in transition to a scenario in 
which the final assembler or system integrator will indeed lack sorne relevant 
knowledge given the diversity of technologies employed nowadays. For instance, 
Ehret and Cooke (2010) when using the division between "strategie" and "non­
strategie" capabilities, argue that the former are possessed not only by system 
integrators and high-Ievel companies in tier 2 such as engine manufacturers, and 
landing gear producers. Moreover, system integrators do hot posses ail "strategie" 
capabilities. Benzler and Wink (2010) put emphasis in what they cali "technological 
platforms" as the main factor for future relocations of the aerospace industry. 
According to these authors, in the future, the aerospace cIusters able to nUl1ure firms 
and research organizations active in the new technologies -i.e. composites- will have 
better chances to attract relocation activities from incumbent aerospace firms. The 
argument of these authors is that the impol1ance of those complementary technologies 
is such that they will influence the localization decision of incumbents in a way that 
was not thinkable before. McGuire et al (2010) interpret Boeing' s decision to rely on 
the Japanese Mitsubishi for the construction as weil as sorne design work for the 
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wings of the 787, as a loss of competitiveness by the American firm (p. 371). The 
authors cited in this paragraph give the impression that in the near future, system 
integrators will use more technologies than the ones they are actually competent at. 
Yet, nevertheless, it seems early to assess the extent of the importance in strategie 
terms of those new technologies. Ultimately (at least if we follow theory), only a 
change in aeronautic technology able to transform the dominant design 17, will be able 
to greatly diminish the strategie importance of current leaders' knowledge. 
1.2.3 Expected delocalization strategies 
Since leading aerospace companies are concentrated in few countries, a main motive 
to go international is precisely to exploit the proprietary assets developed in home, 
that other countries do not posses. One may think that exports could be a good way to 
accomplish that objective since a lot of countries cannot afford to build their own 
planes, and that is actually the case in many instances; although for countries which 
have sorne capacity at aircraft production, conditions are different. Sorne of them use 
offset agreements to oblige those leading firms to carry on a percentage or the totality 
of the production in the host country. However, even if offset agreements may play a 
raie in driving firms to internationalization, other factors are important too. For 
instance, the ever rising up-front costs of R&D, makes sharing risks with local firms a 
reasonable strategy by leading firms. In sorne of these instances knowledgeable local 
partners have been developed (like in Japan) which makes internationalization of 
activities more pervasive than before. 
Thus, leading aerospace firms may pursue either the exploitation of their specifie 
assets, and/or take technological advantages like knowledgeable partners, labour 
pools and host government incentives. Benzler and Wink (2010) argue that there is 
another motive to go to international in the case of aircraft. They exp1ain that 
17 As it was explained, accordding to Kehayas (2007), the incorporation of composites materials does 
not represent a change in the dominant design of the overall aircraft architecture. 
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different markets may present different conditions in terms of the customer, and for 
that reason, it is important to be present to know how to better service those markets. 
However, we think that the importance of the eustomer is somehow overstated in that 
argumentation, because the civil aircraft industry satisfies a more or less standard 
demand worldwide. 18 Thus, we do not see market segmentation to be as important as 
for instance in the auto industry in which differences in road conditions, weather, 
income, and even cultural values do play a very important role in shaping crucial 
dimensions of the vehicle as an artefact. 
We contend that there is another motive to go international that is not much related 
with market considerations. It has to do with the simple motive of costs reduction. 
This motive is relatively new, apparently because leading aerospace firms did not 
think that the high quality standards could be easily met. However, delocalization of 
production driven by low-cost considerations is taking force and Mexico is a vivid 
example of that trend. Thus, we think that the original concern of the PLC, namely to 
study the pattern of delocalization of activities towards low cost location as the 
product matures, is very pertinent. While sorne authors neglect the importance of this 
theory for the case of the aircraft, Niosi and Zhegu (2008) argue that there are several 
aspects of the evolution of the industry (mainly those related to final assemblers) that 
conform to the theory. The purpose of this section is to stress those aspects of the 
PLC theory that, when coupled with the concepts reviewed so far, explain the 
possible delocalization strategies followed by leading aircraft manufacturing firms. 
18 Benzler and Wink (2010) argue that the trend to customize a plane model into different ones (Iike 
different cabin interior and passenger electronics (p. 325)) in order to accommodate different demands 
of airlines, gives sorne role to the market. Since Asia is seen as the more dynamic market, these 
authors argue that eventually sorne parts of the aerospace activity should be located close to the market 
in order to be responsive to its demands. If markets do matter to the extent the authors suggest, 
(According to the authors the US market has shaped the development of current aircrafi carriers), 
perhaps we ail will be flying on Chinese-costumed planes in the future, because, given the huge costs 
and scale economies present in aerospace, it seems unlikely to expect market segmentation in the most 
important systems. Thus, customization may be present in minor designs and modules, and as such, its 
effect will not be as large as to be.a decisive factor for delocalization. 
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In the original work of Vernon (1966) new products were produced in places where 
there were no cost advantages, but proximity to an affluent market is crucial. Behind 
that answer lays the assumption that critical inputs - human, financial, capital - were 
present in the original firm location. The presence of those inputs is what set the 
innovator firm's locations apart from other locations that lacked those inputs and 
sophisticated demands. Although sorne authors have criticized Vernon for failing to 
predict actual internationalization modes of entry (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985; 
Cantwell, 1995), we contend that the aircraft industry - by means of the special 
market and techno-economic characteristics mentioned above - represents an almost 
ideal case that evokes the original concern expressed by Vernon: if more and more 
information in the industry is being codified, if telecommunications and transport are 
much more efficient, and if leading firms already have sorne experience overseas, 
why do planes continue to be assembled in Everett, Toulouse or Montreal? Part of the 
answer is great sunk costs19 and the development through decades of a specialized 
labor pool not easily mobile (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). However, new realities, like 
the desire of new countries to nurture the industry, and the cost reducing strategies of 
leading firms towards low-cost locations, may challenge established C!usters. In sorne 
way, the intention of this work is precisely to throw light on how these new realities 
(in this case the development of China or Mexico as cost efficient locations) may 
alter the current state of affairs in the aircraft manufacturing industry. 
The first issue to asses from the PLC standpoint is precisely if the stages view is 
pertinent to aircraft. Although there is not a single product life cycle, it can be argued 
that there has been a succession of cycles each time a new dominant design emerged 
(Niosi and Zhegu, 2008). The problem is that even if different specifie product 
architectures have been accepted as the dominant design at a specifie period; that 
19 Sunk costs are investments for which value is foregone upon exit (Cabral, 1995: 161). Since those 
investments cannot be put to alternative uses, but are essential to current operations, firms have to 
make the investments, and the only way to recuperate them is when c10sing and selling them. 
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architecture is made up of several modules, each of them fol1owing a kind of PLC of 
its own. As mentioned before, a dominant design implies by definition the 
establishment of a series of interfaces among the modules. These interfaces remain 
more or less fixed for the duration of the production cycle of the model, and that is 
what gives the architecture a sense of stability. This does not prevent the eventual 
changes within each module (as long as those changes do not modify the interface of 
the module with the whole system in a serious way). Those changes may imply the 
use of new skills and capabilities, and as such, the opportunities for innovation within 
the module may vary across modules. For that reason, the prominence of the different 
modules through time may vary greatly. This situation may have enormous 
implications for predicting the stages in the cycle for the whole complex product 
system. One implication in terms of delocalization is that modules in their final stage 
of their PLC, with less importance in the overall architecture and with a good deal of 
codified characteristics in their knowledge base may be the ones most easily 
transferred to more cost-efficient locations. Yet, as Ehret and Cooke (2010) explain, 
even if final assemblers outsource a lot of components, they continue to carry on 
activities that are neither "core" nor "strategie" (perhaps for political-economical 
reasons, such as maintaining a level of employment that justifies government 
subsidies). If we couple this situation with the fact that subsystems are themselves 
modular, we have a situation in which the most likely activities to be outsourced in 
the near future to countries like Mexico, would be parts (perhaps large and/or 
relatively complex ones), but not the integration activities needed to have the module 
completely ready to couple with other parts of the plane. As Fagre and Wells (1982) 
explain, tl}is situation has important consequences for the learning process. This can 
also slow the process for setting R&D units like the ones described by Ronstadt 
(1978). 
The second issue is related to the division of labour. As mentioned before, Vernon 
does not examine in depth the possibilities of division of work for the same product 
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by the same firm. However, fol1owing Ronstadt (1978), we propose the fol1owing 
tentative explanation. First, like in almost any industry it seems reasonable to divide 
aircraft activities into manufacturing and R&D. 2o When firms are experimenting with 
different product architectures it seems likely that they can gain advantage by 
locating R&D activities and production together. Once a dominant design emerges, 
and product and process teclmologies are standardised, it seems more fruitful to 
transfer production to more cost-efficient locations. However, if the firm wants to tap 
other markets it may have to establish manufacturing activities in those markets (even 
if those markets do not represent low-cost efficient locations in the strict sense). 
Additional1y, if these locations represent an opportunity for learning, R&D-units may 
be established (Kuemmerle, 1997). If the location is not a dynamic growing market or 
if it does not have a teclmological infrastructure to benefit from, the most probable 
reason a firm would establish there is to obtain low-cost manufacturing, and R&D 
activities might remain in the original centers where they can profit from existing 
resources. In any case, system design and R&D are the core activities of the firms and 
the last that they would delocalize. As we have seen, for a foreign company to 
establish a foreign R&D unit, it should have already a heavy investment in 
production, but passing that production threshold is not evident in al1 cases (Ronstadt, 
1978). 
Although logical, the above explanation raises sorne questions. If the aircraft industry 
has already experienced the existence of dominant design architectures, why just until 
recently aerospace firms are transferring sorne of their activities to low-cost regions? 
There are several reasons. First, at its origins, civil aircraft teclmology was related to 
military teclmology; thus, dominant countries were reluctant to al10w the transfer of 
these teclmologies, and when it occurred, it was for old plane models (of course 
geopolitical issues were part of the story). Second, aircraft facilities are a long-lasting 
20 Perhaps a more thorough division will be design, R&D, testing, manufacturing and assembling. 
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phenomenon given their high sunk costs and economies of scale (Niosi and Zhegu, 
2005). Third, it may weil be that the current dominant design of the whole plane and 
its main modules is just more amenable to this partitioning of tasks. Fourth, as 
Vernon (1979) and Ronstadt (1978) point out, once firms take steps toward 
delocalizing activities, they gain valuable learning about how to manage activities 
overseas. Fifth, sorne developing countries have already achieved a very good level in 
human skills and infrastructure for manufacturing activities not seen in previous 
decades. And above ail, the emerging countries (the BRICs) are now the largest 
markets for civil aircraft, while the US and Western Europe are fairly saturated. The 
governments of sorne of these markets (particularly China) trade market access for 
technology. 
Another important point In the discussion is the fact that many countries (e.g. 
Argentina, Indonesia and Rumania,) have attempted, and most failed, to create a 
complete aircraft industry - R&D and manufacturing included - almost from scratch 
(McKendrick, 1992; Steenhuis and de Bruijn, 2001). The importance in military 
terms and the high technology reputation of that industry has always been a powerful 
drive for sorne countries. Sorne accounts reveal how these countries support the 
building of that industry even at the expense of financial considerations. In this sense, 
the development of an aircraft manufacturing industry in sorne countries can be better 
explained by purposeful efforts of national governments than by sorne derivations of 
PLe. These efforts include offset agreements like in the case of sorne Asian countries 
like Japan. These agreements condition the purehase of foreign planes on the 
inclusion of local content. Since Asian governments have control over major national 
carriers, they can coordinate that effort. Another major example is Brazil, which has 
achieved the development of the world player Embraer. The focus on indigenous 
R&D capacity from the start (Steenhuis and de Bruijn, 2001), and strategie 
government support and guidance (Hira and De Oliveira, 2007) played in favour of 
the consolidation of an indigenous high technology firm - Embraer - in a developing 
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country. A priori, it seems very unlikely that Mexico in its current circumstances 
could implement an independent strategy of the sort mentioned above. As we are 
going to explain in section 2.7, Mexico has followed free trade policies in order to 
promote production for exports, although with poor results in terms of technological 
development. These conditions make the PLC an adequate framework to analyze the 
case of Mexico. 
Summarizing the concepts seen in this section, it can be argued that the modular 
architecture of the aircraft is in principie the main enabler of vertical disintegration at 
the industry level. Inter-firm modularity makes reference to the relationship of 
different firms carrying out the production of a specific module that ultimately fits the 
overall architecture of the final product, in this case the aircraft. 
The evolution of the aircraft product architecture and the achieving of a Dominant 
Design depend on the complex interaction of very different modules and their 
connection to the overall architecture or system. Sorne authors stress ever increasing 
costs for the development of new plane models due to the new knowledge (Prencipe, 
1997) needed to accommodate ever increasing new technical, safety and comfort 
market demands (Esposito, 2004). This reinforces the complex nature of the aircraft 
(Hobday, 1998). However, even if this is true, other authors suggest that the CUITent 
Dominant Design has remained unchanged for sorne decades (Kehayas, 2007). This 
does not prevent the different modules from continuing to exhibit important 
innovation features (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Fringant and Talbot, 2005) and 
consequently rising costs and performance. Indeed, According to Murmann and 
Frenken (2006), when a Dominant Design in a hierarchical and complex product like 
the aircraft is fixed for sorne time, innovation should be incremental at the whole 
system level, while it could be incremental or radical at different subsystem or 
modular levels. 
83 
According to PLC logic, the setting of a Dominant Design opens the door to relocate 
standardized and codified activities in cost-efficient locations. According to this 
explanation, it should be expected that Mexico receives an important transfer of that 
kind of aircraft manufacturing activity. However, it should be stressed that since 
Mexico does not have important indigenous aircraft manufacturing firms, nor a 
governrnent drive to establish them or create high-Ievel academic institutions or 
public research labs in aerospace, the type of activity most likely transferred to 
Mexico has to be related to manufacturing and not to R&D. Its closeness with the US, 
a leader in that industry, plus its manufacturing experience, skills and infrastructure 
make Mexico a natural target for foreign firms trying to reduce costs in the most 
codified parts of their production processes. 
In figure 1.4 we incorporate the technical dimensions of the aircraft and the cluster 
characteristic of the aerospace industry to our previous model of the PLC-ILC (see 
figure 1.2). AIso, we added the host governrnent involvement as a crucial factor for 
aerospace companies to overcome the uncertainty to move overseas. This last issue is 
precisely the subject of the next section. 
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1.3 Innovation and Technology Policy (ITP) 
In section 1.1.1 we introduced the concept of innovation system, in which it was 
stressed that different organizations -firms and non-firms- contribute to the 
knowledge producing effort. As Malerba (2002) suggests, a sectoral production 
system can eventually become a sectoral innovation system. For that to happen, the 
development of knowledge-complementary organizations and institutions should be 
created. As we are going to explain in this section, in order to transit from an 
aerospace production system to an innovation system sorne policy measures are 
needed. This is even truer for newcomer countries with limited innovation 
capabilities like Mexico. The rest of this section goes as follows: first, section 1.3.1 
describes the theoretical bases for policy intervention in the realms of technology and 
innovation; second, section 1.3.2 discusses the evolutionary character that a policy 
should show; section 1.3.3 stresses the systemic features of an innovation system; and 
section 1.3.4 integrates the previous elements to illustrate the main features of an 
innovation and technology policy. 
1.3.1 Pertinence of an ITP 
Sorne economists have long recognized that markets alone are not enough to achieve 
an optimal allocation of resources in the case of funds for investments (Scitovsky, 
1954) and more specifically in investments for R&D and innovation-related activities 
(Arrow, 1959). Scitovsky (1954) presents a thorough classification of the different 
external economies (now known as externalities) and explains how in the presence of 
sorne of these, predicting future profits is rather difficult and so is the right amount of 
investment funds. Arrow (1959) explains that innovation-related activities usually 
exhibit increasing returns, inappropriability, and uncertainty, and thus markets are not 
weil suited to guide the optimal allocation of firms' funds to innovation (and in sorne 
cases the markets are not even yet developed). More recently, economists Iike 
Krugman (1991), have retaken the concepts of externalities and increasing returns to 
explain geographical agglomerations of economic activity. A common conclusion of 
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these authors is that when economlc activity exhibits the characteristics just 
mentioned, the government has a role to play in helping the economy as a whole to 
achieve a better allocation of resources. This conclusion has grounds on historical 
data, as the works of authors like Scott (1993) Mowery and Rosenberg (1995) show. 
The first author stresses that one of the components that made possible the advanced 
high-technology industrial system in southern California were the "lavish Department 
of Defense procurements"(p. 55). In their analysis of the role of basic research in the 
United States, Mowery and Rosenberg (1995) document how in 1985, 48% of basic 
research was done by universities and colleges (p. 10). Next, we are going to briefly 
present sorne of these concepts. Next, we are going to further explain how the very 
nature of high technology activities deserves other mechanisms to support them other 
than the market. 
One fundamental assumption in mainstream economics textbooks is the existence of 
diminishing returns, which states that a certain point average costs per unit rise as 
output grows. Thus when the marginal cost of producing an additional output unit 
exceeds the marginal income expected from that output unit, production should stop, 
and companies do not grow anymore. Arthur (1994) explains that this assumption 
leads to a predictable equilibrium for prices and market shares, and represent an 
obstacle to the permanent growth of firms. However, in real economic activity there 
are a lot of activities that exhibit increasing returns, which means that as output grows 
average cost per unit decreases. Reinert (2007) illustrates this situation: 
"The first copy of a Microsoft product may cost $100 million to 
produce, copies number two to 200 million - if distributed 
electronically - may cost only a few cents of less to produce and 
distribute. High fixed costs create important economies of scale or 
increasing returns. This, in turn, creates very high barriers to entry 
for competitors, and leads to an oligopolistic market structure far 
removed from the standard assumption of economic theory." (p. 108) 
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Contrary with what happens with diminishing returns, Arthur (1994) argues that the 
existence of these increasing returns make for multiple equilibrium points and 
predictably, market shares are no longer guaranteed. Moreover, wîth the same idea of 
increasing returns, Arthur (1989) developed a model of competing technologies, to 
explain how difficult is to predict which one will prevail. He explains that small 
events that initially may favour the adoption of one of those technologies in the early 
stages may prove critical for later market dominance of that technology. This 
introduces us to the concept of path dependence sequence of economic changes that 
Paul David (1985: 332) defines as a "one [in] which important influences upon the 
eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings 
dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces." Without going in depth 
in the discussion about path dependency, here we want to stress that history matters, 
and this is more so when increasing returns are in place, because early adopters or 
developers may prevents or diminish future development of other players (or places). 
Indeed, Arthur (1989) highlights that early adopters (of nascent technologies) impose 
externalities on later ones by rationally choosing technologies to suit only themselves 
(p. 127). Therefore, history matters not only in deciding which players take more 
relevance, but also in the way in which the technology evolves. The previous quote 
introduces us to the issue of externalities. 
Although the concept of externality is widely used, it is important to c1arify the 
meaning of it, since there are different types, and sometimes different authors mean 
different things when using the concept. When the "output of the individual producer 
may depend not only on his input of productive resources but also on the activities of 
other firms", there are externalities (Scitovsky, 1954: 144). Scitovsky stresses that 
there are two ways in which this can happen: 1) a direct one in which the activity of 
the other firm enters directly in the production function; and 2) an indirect one in 
which the activity of the other firm alters the priee of inputs. The former is a 
technological externality that is now known as a spil1over, and the latter is a 
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pecuniary externality. Krugman (1991) cites Marshall (1890) to exemp1ify the type of 
externalities that leads to geographical concentration of economic activity. Following 
the definition put forward by Scitovsky (1954), Breschi and Lissoni (2001) 
characterize the two first Marsha11ian externalities as pecuniary externa1ities, and the 
third one as a techno10gica1 externality. While authors like Audretsch and Feldman 
(1995) c1aim that technological externalities (known also as spillovers) are present in 
c1usters, Breschi and Lissoni, are careful and recognize that in fact technological 
externalities may be present, but they not necessari1y have to be confined to a certain 
geographical area. 
In the presence of increasing returns and externalities it is very difficult to predict 
with accuracy future states of affairs, which necessari1y introduces the issue of 
uncertainty. Arrow (1959) highlights uncertainty as an element that prevents the 
accurate calculus for an optimal allocation of resources to inventive activities. He 
mentions that "[b]y the very definition of information, invention must be a risky 
process in that the output (information obtained) can never be predicted perfectly 
from the inputs" (p. Il). A concept better suited to hand1e this issue is bounded 
rationality. Taking ideas from "behavioralists" scientists like Herbert Simon, Nelson 
and Winter (1992) exp1ain that "real-life decision problems are too complex to 
comprehend and therefore firms cannot maximize over the set of a11 conceivable 
alternatives, [instead], in the short and medium run the behaviour of firms can be 
explained in terms of relatively simple decision rules and procedures" (p. 35-36). In 
line with this reasoning, Arthur (1994) stresses that in ill-defined or complicated 
situation humans look for patterns to simplify the problem and create hypotheses. By 
putting in practice those hypotheses and evaluating which one achieve a satisfying 
result (that is not necessarily an optimal result), humans learn by discarding poor 
performing hypotheses and generating new ones with the benefit ofhindsight (Arthur, 
1994: 406-408). Therefore, human rationality (and by extension organizationa1 
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rationality too) is said to be bounded by human cognitive limitations and by the 
cumbersome amount of information relevant for a given situation. 
Evolutionary approaches of economic change (Nelson and Winter, 1982) incorporate 
the concepts seen above and represent a foundation to explain why and more 
important how the government should intervene to promote innovation and 
technological development (Metcalfe, 1994; Teubal, 1997). In broad terms, 
evolutionary approaches stress two characteristics that should be taken into account 
when it comes to foster innovation; namely the evolutionary and the systemic 
character of innovation. As we saw, the first characteristic implies that learning is a 
process that is not automatic (bounded rationality), takes time, and requires 
purposeful efforts to set the positive feedback effects (increasing returns) to roll on, 
and build a virtuous path. In this sense, governments should help firms and other 
relevant organizations in the building of capabilities that result from those learning 
processes. Since different stages of the capabilities accumulation process present 
different challenges, policy measures should vary accordingly. It is for this reason 
that policy need to evolve. Regarding the systemic nature of innovation, it is weIl 
known that no single firm has aU the relevant knowledge for innovation. Thus, firms 
have to seek out for other firms, universities, and research laboratories in order to 
complement their capabilities and knowledge. We are going to outline the main 
features of those two broad aspects of innovation and how they should be considered 
in an ITP. 
1.3.2 Evolutionary character of innovation 
Within this feature of innovation there are two main emphases. Authors like Metcalfe 
(1994) have put forward the notions of variety and selection applied to the ITP arena. 
According to Metcalfe (1994) "The aim of technology policy is ... to stimulate the 
generation of variety through innovation and to ensure that feedback from the 
selection process does not operate to the detriment of variety creating mechanisms" 
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(p. 933). Thus, this author uses the evolutionary concepts of variety and selection, 
and suggests that policy should be targeted to those processes. Other authors like 
Teubal (1996) and LaU and Teubal (1998) have concentrated in how sorne policy 
measures can catalyze learning processes that could eventually upgrade firms' 
technological capabilities. The difference in these two approaches lies in the degree 
of technological development of the countries studied. When Metcalfe (1994) talks 
about variety and selection, he refers to the capacity of a firms' population to 
regenerate their R&D and irmovation routines, while Teubal (1996) and Lall and 
Teubal (1998) provide guidance to develop that kind of routines on firms without that 
previous expertise. Given that our study focus is on a developing country like 
Mexico, we are going to go in depth into the second approach. 
A first aspect of evolutionary ITP is the evolution of that policy itself. Teubal (1996) 
proposes that an evolutionary policy should at least have two stages, an infant stage 
and a maturity stage. The main objectives of the infant stage of an ITP are spreading 
endogenous R&D processes In the private sector; nurturing collective, 
multidisciplinary and cumulative learning process; achieving critical mass of projects; 
developing policy capabilities; and defining incentives to encourage the adoption of 
learning routines in the firms (Teubal, 1996: 452). In the infant stage, horizontal 
policies are recommended to catalyze R&D activity in the economy as a whole. 
Teubal (1997) defines horizontal policies as market-friendly programs supporting 
R&D/irmovation in the business sector irrespective of industrial branch or even 
technological area (p. 1163). LaU and Teubal (1998) put forward the concept of 
market-stimulating technology policies,needed to complement those horizontal 
policies, and as sorne sort of intermediate phase before moving into the mature stage. 
These authors identify the technological problems of sorne developing countries in 
the foUowing way: 
"Learning is needed to identify and to gain access to technologies, and to 
master, adapt and improve upon them. It may involve considerable risk, 
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costs and time. Learning and developing routines are incremental and 
path dependent processes, requiring conscious decisions by firms rather 
than the mere accumulation of production experience (passive leaming­
by-doing does exists, but generally plays a small role in capability 
development). Given these costs and risks, vertical policies may be 
required to promote entry into activities with "difficult" technologies, and 
horizontal policies to encourage the undertaking of complex, new 
technological functions."(p. 1374) 
There are three elements of market-stimulating technology policies. The first has to 
do with setting the priorities of the policy in order to shi ft the economy from a low to 
a high technology growth path. This implies the identification of activities that have a 
significant technological potential and that may generate beneficial externalities for 
other activities (Lall and Teubal, 1998: 1375). The second has to do with the 
government efficiently signalling the intended policy by different promotion 
mechanisms. Finally, the third is the institutional building around those policies. The 
generation of capabilities within the bodies designing, implementing, evaluating and 
monitoring the policy, and the set up of new institutions and/or organizations is the 
third part of the policy (Lall and Teubal, 1998: 1375). 
In the mature stage, targeted policies are common place. "In contrast to horizontal 
programs, targeted programs are focused on a particular sector or technology and 
their main goal is the creation of a new multiagent structure...Their impact may 
crucially depend on the prior accumulation of favourable background conditions, 
including a c!ear vision."(Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008: 157). Clusters are among 
the multiagent structures proposed by these authors. Thus, targeted policies have also 
an implicit regional dimension21 , which is very helpful for our purposes given that we 
are interested in factors that can help foster aerospace C!usters. 
21 Interestingly the authors do not remark this regional dimension. Perhaps this is explained by the fact 
that these authors are familiar with a smaIJ country like Israel in which the regional dimension is not 
much important as for instance in Mexico. 
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1.3.3 Systemic character of innovation 
The other characteristic of innovation and technical change is its systemic character. 
Since agents have bounded rationality, no single one is able to have ail relevant 
knowledge and capabilities needed for innovation, they have to seek other agents in a 
continuous basis. A departure from the neoclassical economic theory is the 
recognition that other agents besides fi l'ms, like research laboratories, play a 
fundamental role in the generation of knowledge leading to innovation. Moreover, 
institutional patterns of support and communication play a crucial l'ole too. In this 
sense, governments need to adopt a proactive role in ITP to create synergies among 
the participants. Based on the national innovation system perspective, Teubal (2002) 
proposes the following component sub-systems: the business sector; the supporting 
structure; interactions and links; institutions and markets; and culture and social 
structure (p. 235). Since the supporting structure and the institutions and markets 
components have already been addressed, we are going to outline the business sector 
and the interactions and links (the culture and social structure is out of the scope of 
this work). 
Teubal (2002) considers the business sector to be the "backbone of the system and its 
restructuring is the central axis of the process of transformation of systems of 
innovation."(p 236). This clearly recognizes that for-profit firms are the ones that 
ultimately will materialize innovation by means of their resources, including their 
routines, knowledge, links and strategy. This author puts also attention on the 
diversity of this business sector. According to him, achieving a critical mass of firms 
and at the same time a certain level of diversity is a condition that will facilitate a 
further restructuring of the sector. 
Regarding interactions and links, Teubal (2002) states: "While not denying the 
impol1ance of non-market links, weil functioning of SI also require significant market 
links e.g. among firms in different stages of production, strategie partnerships or 
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alliances due to technology or other complementarities; or inter-firm links flowing 
from market-based processes of diffusion of new generic technologies, ... the non­
market interactive learning is related in sorne way to market links and market 
transactions" (p. 237). Similar to the argument of Breschi and Lissoni (2001), that 
states that most of the knowledge spillovers are mediated by weIl defined 
membership exchanges, Teubal (2002) stresses that most transfers of technology have 
to be made mainly by formai and explicit links. 
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1.3.4 Theoretical implications of an evolutionary and systemic approach to ITP 
In this section the objective is to show which elements of the ITP outline described 
above may (or may not) apply in the context of Mexico's aerospace. Derived from the 
evolutionary and systemic perspective presented above, there are sorne implications 
for the development of an independent aerospace sector in a developing country like 
Mexico. In principle, fostering a new sector implies targeted policies. However, 
according to Avnimelech and Teubal (2008), those kinds of policies are better 
introduced once the R&D routines have been already promoted in the economy as a 
whole by means of horizontal and market-building policies. Teubal (1996) mentions 
that for Mexico the need of an R&D policy was evident in the early 1990s when the 
country liberalized its trade (p. 449). The logic was that Mexican firms had to 
upgrade their capabilities to be competitive vis-a-vis international firms either in 
domestic or in international markets. Indeed, Mexican authorities created sorne 
programs and institutions directed to the promotion of technology in the years the 
Teubal (1996) mentions. However, after almost twenty years, the results have been 
poor (Foro Consultivo, 2000-2006). Therefore, the problem is how to formulate a 
targeted policy towards the development of an aerospace sector, in an envirorunent in 
which the R&D activity is underdeveloped. 
This situation presents two obstacles. First, if we take the aerospace sector as a 
techno-economic system in its own, the first priority of the system is to get 
acquainted with the basic technological activities of the sector. In the same way that 
Teubal (1996) identified the liberalization of the 1980s to be the time for Mexico as a 
whole, to put forward R&D activities; it follows that for the aerospace sector a similar 
event should come up before going into promoting R&D within the sector. Thus, 
there should be a period of technological learning that anticipates an infant stage of 
an ITP. Tentatively we are going to call that stage a preliminary stage of 
technological learning. The second obstacle is somehow a logical sequence of the 
preliminary stage and also has to do with the poor results of ITP in Mexico. This 
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means that before going into targeted policies (that are more pertinent in a mature 
phase) there should be an infant stage dedicated to promote R&D (by means of 
horizontal policies) upon the already technological-experienced aerospace sector. 
Although the description just made resembles a linear sequencing, real techno­
economic activity requires most of the times sorne mixing of the policies regardless 
of the time frame. There are at least two reasons for that. One is that aerospace, 
although being an old sector, is constantly evolving, and that implies that catching-up 
requires certain speeding up. No country can afford to wait to promote R&D until ail 
firms are totally acquainted with ail technological activities. Second, other countries 
are also making serious attempts to enter the industry, and being late might mean to 
be left out in an industry characterized by huge scale economies (partially reflected 
by "regional-economies") that engenders cumulative advantages, thus reserved for 
few players (Krugman, 1986: 7-8). Keeping in mind that these three proposed stages ­
preliminary learning, infant stage and mature stage- overlap, the next step is to 
describe what type of policies will be better suited to accomplish the objectives of 
these stages. 
It seems c1ear that horizontal policies, market-building policies and technological 
infrastructure policÎ'es (Justman and Teubal, 1995) are greatly needed in the first two 
phases proposed. Teubal (1997) states that the objective of horizontal policies is the 
"promotion of socially desirable technological activities (SDTAs) and associated 
management and organizational routines within business enterprises/.. .ISDTAs 
include firm-based R&D (or, more generally, innovation), technology transfer, 
adoption, and diffusion ... "(p. 1165). Although Teubal (1997) does not limit horizontal 
policies to small and medium enterprise (SME), he did put emphasis on SME as the 
ones that may face major obstacles in developing R&D and management capabilities. 
However, in the aerospace sector most tier 1 and tier 2 firms are large corporations; 
perhaps sorne suppliers (often specialized) may enter into the category ofSME. In 
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this sense "big firms" should also be addressed heavily in a horizontal policy for the 
aerospace sector in Mexico. 
Teubal (1996: 453) highlights that "building markets refers first and foremost to 
markets of services supporting R&D and innovation-consultancy and advisory 
services; tests and analysis, and financial services". Justman and Teubal (1995) define 
technological infrastructure as "a set of collectively supplied, specific, industry­
relevant capabilities, intended for several applications in two or more firms or user 
organizations. They are embodied in human capital, and include also elements of 
physical capital and knowledge (p. 260). Given that Mexico is relatively new to the 
industry, it is very likely that those kind of specialized services and dedicated 
infrastructure exist in limited amounts in the country or they are even non-existent. 
Therefore, in this regard, the efforts of a policy should be directed to the construction 
of those specialized services and infrastructure, since they will not be an automatic 
market consequence of the presence of aerospace subsidiaries. 
Also, Teubal (1996: 453) argues that "Market-building is relevant for only a small 
fraction of the R&D process itself - for numerous reasons the penetration of R&D 
into the economy is done first and foremost by user organizations rather than by 
specialized suppliers of knowledge (this may be increasingly be less true due to the 
emergence of world markets for certain types of technology, a result of the process of 
globalization)". This means that firms and related organizations are the main actor in 
the R&D process. The R&D carried by institutional suppliers is somehow 
complementary. What Teubal mentioned in parenthesis in the quotation creates a 
paradox though, at least for developing countries. If R&D is the best vehicle for 
learning, the fact that firms need to do less R&D (given that specialized suppliers 
fulfil that role, at least partially) limits their cognitive process of learning. This 
implies that specialized suppliers are becoming more and more important 
organization that should be supported also in terms of R&D routines. 
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If the business sector is the backbone of the innovation system, it is normal that 
policy efforts be directed to help firms (and other private organizations involved 
directly in the added value) in their capabilities accumulation. Apparently the 
identification of the business sector is a straightforward exercise. Nevertheless, the 
nature of the firm deserves sorne discussion. Many of the aerospace firms established 
in Mexico are part of a much larger network under a well-defined corporate mandate. 
These companies are more and more distributing different tasks among its 
subsidiaries in a way that requires a high degree of coordination. Since part of the 
policy should be precisely to encourage firms to carry out activities with more 
technological content, an ITP should pay attention not just to the subsidiary and the 
current state of its capabilities, but also to the capabilities the headquarters could 
eventually transfer to the subsidiary or even the capabilities that the subsidiary could 
eventually develop that could be even novelty for the corporate parent. Apparently no 
single aerospace subsidiary in Mexico has the freedom to nurture more complex 
capabilities than the ones it already has. As an example of a subsidiary that has 
strategie manoeuvre to enhance its capabilities, Pratt and Whitney Canada, the 
subsidiary of a US firm, is a very active player in aerospace innovation at a world 
scale. One implication of this discussion is that policy makers should have 
communication not just with subsidiaries but also with corporate headquarters. This 
pattern of communication among these actors should eventually lead to learning not 
only in firms, but also in government agencies, which have to learn from their 
experiences promoting the sector (both, good experiences and pitfalls). 
Under these circumstances, it is clear that subsidiaries have to be a crucial element in 
the learning processes. Thus, in the short run a great deal of the policy efforts should 
be directed to promote the transferring of sorne parts of multinationals' R&D 
activities to their Mexican subsidiaries. Nevettheless this is not a straightforward 
result, because multinational firms will be unwilling to transfer R&D activities in an 
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environment in which complementary assets, infrastructure, and R&D services are 
absent. Indeed Lall and Teubal (1998) clearly illustrate this situation: 
"In developing countries...not only is the internai base of knowledge for 
mastering technologies relatively weak, the supporting network of other 
enterprises, institutions and human capital is also underdeveloped. This makes 
even relatively "easy" tasks difficult, costly and unpredictable. With industrial 
maturity there is a shift in technological effort from these to more demanding 
tasks or minor or major innovation, calling for higher levels of skill and more 
formai R&Deffort."(p. 1371) 
Therefore, to encourage foreign firms to transfer R&D activities it is important to 
develop a technology infrastructure. In the case of aerospace, specialized suppliers, 
research laboratories and universities with modern infrastructure (like wind tunnels 
and state-of-the-art machinery and electronics), are agents whose capabilities must be 
supported, and in most of the cases created given their absence. However, building 
that technology infrastructure takes sorne time and huge amount of investment. Thus, 
it is not likely that that kind of infrastructure and supporting agents will be in place 
soon. For this reason it is important to underline the fact that a preliminary stage of 
technological learning is needed before embarking in a more R&D-oriented stage. 
CHAPTER II
 
OVERVIEW OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION SYSTEM IN
 
MEXICO
 
The objective of this chapter is to put in context the evolution and current situation of 
the aircraft industry in Mexico. Sorne historical facts are shown along with the main 
attraction factors, policy measures and incentives. Figures of main indicators like 
exports, number of firrns, employment are presented and compared with other 
developing countries like Brazil, China and India. A brief characterization of the 
major firms in the main locations is presented. Additionally, the main characteristics 
of Mexico's innovation system are presented. In the end, sorne historical examples 
about new corner countries in aerospace and the automobile industry in Mexico are 
presented as historical implications that should be kept in mind when proposing 
policy measures. 
2.1 Historical attempts at building an indigenous aircraft industry (191 Os-1940s) 
Historical accounts reveal that Mexico had an interesting attempt at building aviation 
and aerospace sectors back in the 1910s. Indeed, the country bears sorne records in 
these areas. For instance, in 1910 in Mexico City took place the very first plane flight 
in the country (on a French plane) that was also the first flight ever in Latin America; 
the first plane ever used in actual military air-naval bombing was used in a battle in 
the Sonora coast; Francisco Madero, winner of presidential elections after the fall of 
Dictator Porfirio Diaz in 1911, was the first head of state to ever flight in a plane22 . 
More important perhaps, is the figure of Juan Guillermo Villasana, a Mexican 
engineer who, among other achievements, designed and patented a propeller ("hélice 
22 Archipiélago. 2006. "Inicios de la aviaci6n en México". Archipiélago. 14 (54): 55-59. Retrieved 
from: <http://www.joumals.unam.mx/index.php/archipielago/article/viewFile/19897/18888> 
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Anahuac") that was exported to countries in Central and South America and Japan23 . 
Under the presidency of Venustiano Carranza, and the leadership of Villasana, an 
official aeronautics construction facility was created ("Talleres nacionales de 
construccion aeronautica ") in 191524 . In this facility, 100% Mexican made planes, 
called Series A, B to H were manufactured. One of these planes is said to be 
employed for the very first time in the world as a commercial courier delivery 
servicing the Mexican postal service (Jauregui, 2004: 138). 
Although the facility was able to develop an indigenous helicopter and a 
multipurpose plane, it fall in demise, and was acquired by Canadair in 1941. It was 
shortly nationalized again in order to pursue indigenous projects for the military, but 
agreements with the US, who was very active in World War II, forced to redirect 
activity at servicing US planes. The manufacturing of indigenous models (or for that 
matter of any mode!) ended and the aerospace activity in Mexico was dedicated to 
maintenance and service of planes brought from the US25 . 
Therefore, it can be said that there is a break in the accumulation process of aerospace 
capabilities. In this sense, later activity in the sector is not dependent on this previous 
one. Perhaps, the only way in which these first attempts influence future development 
was the continuity in maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) capabilities, that had 
to be kept and developed to service the planes bought outside the country. This 
tentatively explains the existence of an aerospace engineering degree since 1940 at 
the National Polytechnic Institute in Mexico City, where the major airport of the 
country is located. 
23 Hemandez Dominguez, E. 1. 2007. "Alas de México, Los Talleres Nacionales de Construcci6n 
Aeronautica". Excelsior. February Il, 2007, sec. 6. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.inehrm.gob.mx/pdf/exc_alas_mexico.pdf> 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
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2.2 Early attraction of manufacturing subsidiaries (1960s-2000) 
It was in the late 1960s, when the first aerospace subsidiary manufacturing facility 
was established in Mexicali, the capital of the state of Baja California26 . One of the 
first documented cases was the facility opened in Mexicali, by Allied Signal, a US 
company which was a supplier of another American firm, Garrett aero-engines27 . The 
main motivation was to lower costs following the example of companies in other 
industries like auto parts and electronics that had already sorne years of experience in 
south of the border operations. Thus, the maquiladora28 program was the main 
attractor to these first companies that opened manufacturing facilities in Mexico and 
they were located in the border. 
It can be argued that there was not a purposeful attempt by the Mexican govenunent 
to attract aerospace firms specifically in those years. The goal was to attract US 
manufacturing irrespective of their field, as long as those firms considered Mexico a 
place with the conditions to carry on their respective activities. The main advantage 
that Mexico provided was a low cost operations location. It was under these 
conditions, that sorne aerospace firms (related with electronics like Allied Signal and 
Rockwell Collins) started to locate mainly in Baja California in the cities of Mexicali 
and Tijuana. Indeed, as it was later corroborated in the field study, this state has the 
ancient firms established in the country and currently hosts almost half the aerospace 
companies in the country. An interesting point is that Mexicali and Tijuana are not 
the only industrial cities in the US-Mexico border. For instance, another important 
industria1 border city is Ciudad Jm'trez in the state of Chihuahua, which hosts only 
26 Ornelas, S. L. 2010. "Mexico's aerospace industry climbs higher", MexicoNow, September-October,
 
2010,21-25.
 
27 Flight International. 1988. December 10. Retrieved from:
 
<http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1988/1988%20%203564.html?search=mexicali%20alli
 
ed%20signal>
 
28 The maquiladora is a fiscal regime established in Mexico back in the 1960s that allows duty-free
 
inputs under the condition of subsequent export. 
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few companies that barely touch aerospace activity. One possible explanation for this 
may be that in the beginning, aerospace companies were suspicious about the 
feasibility to transfer activities to Mexico, and wanted to close monitor these 
activities, and reduce transportation costs. US California is a very important place in 
terms of aerospace activity, and most of the companies initially (and currently) 
located in Baja California have their counterparts in California. The states of Texas 
and New Mexico (adjacent to Ciudad luirez) represent a lesser share of the US 
aerospace activity compared to California. Even if this explanation has sorne grounds, 
as the activity increases in Mexico, the feasibility is already proven, and as such the 
geographical distance surely diminishes in importance as the existence of impOltant 
aerospace firms in the city of Chihuahua (which is not a border city) testify. 
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2.3 Explicit intent to foster the aircraft industry (2000-2005) 
In year 2000, there were only 20 aerospace companies in Mexico, and they exported 
products wOlih 150 million USD to the United States29 . The downturn in the Mexican 
economy at the time urged the country to promote export sectors other than the ones 
already been promoted like automobile, electronics and auto parts. Thus, the idea 
took force in Mexico to promote a sector that had already sorne antecedents (though 
small), with good prospect of value added, and a prestige image associated. It was 
under the early presidency of Vicente Fox in year 2000 that aerospace was considered 
an important sector to promote30. However, it was until the next presidency that the 
main efforts in terms of policy support were materialized. This was signalled with the 
inauguration of the Bombardier plant in the state of Querétaro. 
Therefore, from 2000 to date, Mexico has initiated an explicit campaign to attract 
aerospace companies to the country. The prior experience of the pioneering firms 
established in the country was taken as a sign that such a production, with high 
quality and safety standards, could indeed be done in the country. This situation, 
combined with the need to encourage other export sectors to help the troubled 
economy in the early 2000s, seems to be the detonator of this promotion. The 
experience in the automotive, auto parts, and electronics sectors represented the 
promise of a skilled labour force that could be relatively easily trained into aerospace 
activities. Additionally, the existence of an indigenous metal-mechanic sector meant 
the possibility to develop an important supplier base. Although it is difficult to assess 
in an objective measure, according to interviews with the firms, the feeling is that 
these promises have been only partially fulfilled, with the last one to a much lesser 
extent. 
29 Ramirez, F. 2005. "Alas mexicanas". CNN Expansion.com, December 21. Retrieved From: 
<http://www.cnnexpansion.com/xsITransform.php?xmlurl=http://www.expansion.com.mxlarticulo.asp 
?cve=93 1_3 J&xslurl=http://www.cnnexpansion.com/xsl/exparticulo.xsl> 
30 Ibid 
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2.4 A visible support policy (2006-date) 
It was by the middle of the decade that concrete steps to support the sector were 
materialized. Aware of the fact that aircraft manufacturing would need sorne extra 
attracting factors in order to migrate to Mexico in important numbers, government 
authorities have devised support in terms of infrastructure and incentives. In terms of 
infrastructure, the main steps have been the building of the Querétaro aerospace park 
(now occupied by Bombardier), located near the airport, and the development of 
education and training programs related with aeronautics. Regarding the latter, a 
brand-new aeronautics university has been created in the city of Querétaro. 
Established universities in other cities of the country opened engineering degrees in 
aeronautics as weil. Also, sorne training institutes have opened programs for 
aeronautics technicians, and sorne institutes have even been created expressly for that 
purpose, like the CENALTEC in the city of Chihuahua. In this sense, the 
development of a work force prepared in aeronautics has been taken as an important 
step in the policy to foster the sector. However, it is important to mention that 
currently, most of the firms employ engineers and technicians from diverse 
backgrounds. The educational infrastructure that has been created is taught to be 
important in the years to follow. 
Although there are no incentives targeted specifically to the aerospace industry, firms 
in this industry can apply to different programs that are available to other firms 
irrespective of the sector they operate in. The Ministry of Economy and Promexic031 
present the incentives to invest in Mexico under four headings: support for R&D, 
fiscal credits, training support, and local-government incentives32 . 
31 Promexico is an office dependent of the Ministry ofEconomy, which is in charge ofboth, promoting 
Mexico as a recipient of foreign investment, and helping Mexican firms that want to go international. 
32 Promexico. 2010. Power point presentation. 
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One of the most important attractors is precisely the first one. From year 2001 to 
2009 there was a fiscal stimulus program33 which consisted on tax credits in which 
firms were given 30% back of the spending and investing under R&D activities and 
in the training of specialized persOlmel essential for the attainrnent of the previously 
established objectives (Dutrénit, 2009: 250). This program was changed in 2009 and 
now it is called fund for technological innovation34 . This new program started with a 
budget of approximately 210 USD million in 2009 (2,500 million Mexican pesos), 
and has three subdivisions: the technological innovation program for high value­
added business targeted to small and medium enterprises (24% of the fund); the 
development and ilIDovation ofprecursor technologies program targeted to firms with 
links with universities and research centres (28%); and the competitiveness program 
targeted to big firms (48%)35. Starting in 2009, the new R&D program does not 
reduce taxes; instead, it gives direct financial support prior to initiation of the project. 
Dutrénit (2010)36 reports that for year 2010 these three programs amounted to 190 
USD million, supporting 707 projects in 543 firms. Figures for aerospace are 5.3 
USD million supporting 25 projects37 . Even though, the sum is welcomed, this fund 
should eventually become much larger if it really wants to support high impact 
projects. For instance, the development of new turbines requires funds in the order of 
USD billions. 
The second group of incentives are fiscal incentives that are awarded to firms that 
either do strategic projects, capital investments, or exports. The third group has to do 
with labour training. And fourth, state and local governrnents have implemented 
incentives like infrastructure, land, and tax credits on payroll and property. Under the 
33 In Spanish, Programa de estimulos fiscales (PEF).
 
34 In Spanish, Fondo de innovaci6n tecnol6gica (FIT)
 
35 Olivares Alonso, E. 2009. "El CONACYT reorienta los planes de apoyo a empresas", January 14.
 
Retrieved from:
 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2009/0 Il 14/index.php?section=politica&article=0 15n 1pol>
 
36 Dutrénit, 2010, Power point presentation.
 
37 The number of firms and the specifie fund that was applied were not available.
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head of Promexico and with representation of different Mexican states, the federal 
government promotes the country in international air-fairs. 
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2.5 The Mexican aircraft industry in figures 
According to the FEMIA38, product exports of aerospace firms based in Mexico 
represented approximately 3.5 billion USD for the year 201039. In Mexico the exports 
value is a figure that represents production since almost all sales in this industry are 
exported, at least for the moment. Available data for year 2008 reveals that Brazi140 
industry had an output of 7.55 billion USD from which 90% were exports (Maculan, 
2010: 1). For year 2008 Mexico had exports for 3.127 billion USD, thus if we take 
the exports from Brazil, we have that Mexico aerospace industry exports were about 
46% compared to those of Brazil. In the case of India, exports amounted to 1.21 
billion USD in 2008 (Mani, 2010: 46) which represents 39% of the Mexican exports. 
Therefore, Mexican exports are almost half the exports of a country that has an üEM 
like Brazil. ' 
In terms of evolution it can be seen in figure 2.1 that from year 2006 on, the industry 
started an upward trend in exports. If we relate this trend to the historical facts laid 
out in the previous sections, it can be argued that the strong goverrunent promotion 
did coincide with the increase in the output. However, figure 2.lalso shows how the 
sector is very sensible to international slowdowns like in year 2009 when negative 
impacts from the financial crisis of 2008 were felt. Indeed, previous projections had 
2009 amount of exports equal to 4.050 billion USD41 . 
38 FEMIA is a non-profit association that group aerospace firrns in Mexico (Federaci6n Mexicana de la
 
Industria Aeroespacial).
 
39 FEMIA web site: http://www.fernia.com.rnx/
 
40 Although Brazil, China and India do not present identical aerospace circurnstances cornpared to
 
Mexico -Brazil has Ernbraer a leading OEMs, and China and India have final assernblers, e.g. Cornac
 
and Hal respectively-, these three developing countries are indeed cornpetitors in terrns of attraction of
 
new aerospace investrnents. For this reason sorne cornparison with these three countries are pertinent.
 
41 FEMIA. 2009. Report presented at the Foro Internacional clusters 2009. August I3, Reynosa­

McAllen.
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Figure 2.1 
International trade of the Mexican aerospace industry (Years 2002-2010, USD 
millions) 
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In terms of employment, this indicator has also followed the upward trend beginning 
in year 2006. 
Figure 2.2
 
Employment in the aerospace industry in Mexico
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Information for the year 201042 regarding the number of organizations related with 
aerospace reveals that there are 203 located in sixteen Mexican states. In figure 2.3 it 
can be seen how the number of firms has grown rapidly since year 2006. Let's 
remember that in year 2000 there were only twenty firms in the country, thus, in one 
decade the increase has been of a great magnitude. Again, it is year 2006 where this 
trend took a notorious upward shift. Approximately 78% of these organisations are 
dedicated to manufacturing (M), 13% to maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), 
and 9% to engineering and design (E&D).43 
42 FEMIA web site: http://www.femia.com.mx/
 
43 The actual percentages for M, MRü and E&D may vary slightly for year 2010; the percentages used
 
were from previous information for year 2009 when there were 193 firms.
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Figure 2.3
 
Number of firms in the aerospace industry in Mexico
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However, in addition to private productive firms, this list also contains organizations 
such as universities, research centers, airlines and sales representative offices. For 
example in Mexico City there are two universities UNAM (Autonomous National 
University of Mexico), and IPN (National Politecnic Institute) that are classified as 
E&D because they have degrees and laboratories totally or partialy dedicated to 
aerospace; also, the five remaining organizations are either airlines or sales offices 
that sell imported spare parts, and for that reason they are classified as MRO. Thus, 
the actual figure for just the private productive firms is lower than 203, and should be 
close to the 152 firms that are classified as M. After doing the field work, it was also 
evident that sorne firms that are classified as M, are indeed firms that may give sorne 
service (e.g. heating treatment to metal parts) to firms that do directly participate in 
aerospace activity. Thus, the number of aerospace productive firms should be about 
ISO. Moreover, from this last figure, sorne firms are only partially dedicated to 
aerospace (from which sorne are just metal workshops). Thus, although it is difficult 
to calculate, the actual number of firms which are devoted completely to aerospace 
has to be weil under 150. 
If we compare the number of firms with a country like Brazil, we see that Mexico has 
more companies, even with the adjusted figure just described. The number of firms 
that made up the aerospace industry in Brazil is 40 (Maculan, 2010). One interesting 
fact is that from ail the aerospace output in Brazil, Embraer represents 80% of the 
activity (Maculan, 2010). Although that indicator is not available for Mexico, it is 
very unlikely that a single firm has such a big share of the national total. In any case, 
the number of companies established in Mexico and the rate of growth of this 
number, reveals the importance of the country for the world sector. This assertion is 
also supported by a study shown below that reports the number of aerospace 
investments in different parts of the world. 
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According to the consulting group AeroStrategy44 (figure 2.4), from 1990 to 2009, 
Mexico is the country that has received more manufacturing investments in 
45 
aerospace. Other countries that are pursuing aggressive strategies include China, 
second, Russia, fourth, and India in fifth place. It is important to note that that study 
takes into account the discrete number of investments and not the actual amount 
invested. For instance, since China hosts an Airbus manufacturing facility to 
assembly a complete A320 plane, it seems logical to expect the level of such 
investment be higher than the ones that have been done in Mexico so far. The 
important point in this piece of information is to stress that several players are setting 
foot in Mexico, and eventually that may provide a major ecosystem of different firms 
active in the country. 
44 Aerostrategy. 2009. "Aerospace globalization 2.0: the next stage", September, pp 1-8. Retrieved 
from: 
<http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/s ites/Promexico/resources/LocaIContenti1092/2/Aerostrategy2.j 
pg.pdf> 
45 The study consists of publicly announced 497 major investments (283 joint ventures and 214 organic 
investments) made by 1eading aerospace OEMs and service companies in the period 1990-2009, from 
which 178 pertain to manufacturing, 97 to engineering/R&D, and 222 to MRO (Ibid: p. 2-3). 
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Figure 2.4 
Number ofmanufacturing investments in aerospace, period 1990-2009 
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Even though the logical advantage of Mexico is low cost for manufacturing, the 
country also appears in sixth place in terms of investments in Engineering and R&D, 
with China closely following in seventh place (figure 2.5). Again, we should be 
cautious with this figure, since countries like Brazil, which is ninth, has an OEM like 
Embraer, thus the amount and the level of engineering/R&D may be bigger.46 
Moreover, recently Honeywe1l47 and General Electric48 have alUlounced the opening 
of research labs in China. While these two new investments will make China has 
more R&D investment, the important point is that both Honeywell and GE will form 
a joint venture with a Chinese counterpart. Therefore, those investments will support 
the development of capabilities in local firms. Indeed, the AeroStrategy report 
mentions how most of the investments made in Mexico, whether for manufacturing 
or R&D, are made by means of wholly-owned subsidiaries instead of joint ventures. 
The principal reason is that there are no Mexican local firms to organise joint 
ventures to begin with. 
46 However, Bemardes and Guilherme de Oliveira (2003) explain that by corporate policy, Embraer
 
purchases ail the commercial systems and technological packages that are included in its planes,
 
because these are not considered as a competitive differential for the company; consequently, the
 
innovation strategy of Embraer, is directed more to technological adaptation than to development of
 
creative innovation (p. 506). In this sense, having an OEM assembler sure gives place to R&D
 
activities, but the nature of these activities depends on other factors too.
 
47 Gupta, A. and Wang, H. 2010. "Cornac: China's challenge to Airbus and Boeing", Businessweek,
 
June 30. Retrieved From:
 
<http://www.businessweek.com/globalbizJcontent/jun2010/gb20100630_522595.htm >
 
48 Barboza, D., Drew, c., and Lohr, S. 20 Il. "G.E. to share jet technology with China in new joint
 
venture", The New York Times, January 17. Retrieved from
 
<http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/0 II 18/business/globaI/18plane.html>
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Figure 2.5
 
Number of engineering/R&D investments in aerospace, period 1990-2009
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The previous discussion leads us to the issue about the type of firms that are being 
established in the country. As it was shown in GRAPHS 4 and 5, Mexico has a 
similar value as China for the number of investments in manufacturing, as weil as in 
Engineering and R&D. However, there are two main aspects that are not captured by 
those indicators. First of al!, contrary to Mexico, countries Iike China, Brazil and 
India have final assembler firms. The most weil known case is that of Brazil which 
has a national owned firm Embraer; a leading world company able to design and 
integrate whole planes. China and India also have final assemblers, AVIC and HAL 
respectively. China has foreign firms forming joint-ventures with local firms to 
assembly licensed planes, and national-owned firms that pursue proprietary models. 
Examples of the first case are Embraer and AVIC joint-venture to assembly the ERJ­
145 regional bi-reactor in Harbin49, and the Airbus and AVIC joint-venture for the 
final assembly of A320 planes in Tianjin5o. Examples of the second case are the 
regional jet ARJ-21 whose first delivery has been delayed 51 , and the recently 
announced C919 (a single aisle plane with over 150 seats that will compete with the 
A320 and the B737) that is scheduled to f1ight in 2014; both developed by Comac52 . 
India has the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), a government-owned firm, 
which is mainly concentrated on the military sector, but who also has civil 
capabilities able to integrate planes under licence like the Domier 228 53 . 
49 Tison, M. 2010. "La rivalité Embraer-Bombardier se transporte en Chine", La Presse, November 18.
 
Retrieved from: <http://Iapresseaffaires.cyberpresse.ca/economie/transports/20 1011118/0 1-4343 853-la­

rivalite-embraer-bombardier-se-transporte-en-chine.php>
 
50 Bradsher, K. 2006. "Airbus and China select assembly plant site", The New York Times, June 9.
 
Retrieved from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/business/worldbusiness/09airbus.html>
 
51 Sobie, B. 2009. "Querétaro prepares for massive aerospace growth", Flight International, April 20.
 
Retrieved from: <http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/20/325253/queretaro-prepares-for­
mass ive-aeros pace-growth. htm1>
 
52 Einhorm, B. 2010. "China takes aim at Boeing and Airbus", Businessweek, November 24. Retrieved
 
from: <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_49lb4206017295460.htm>
 
53 Govindasamy, S. 2010. "HAL sets sights on global presence", Flight International, March 1.
 
Retrieved from: <http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 10/03/0 1/338726/hal-sets-sights-on-global­

presence.html>
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Two issues are salient in the above description. First, the three countries, Brazil, 
China, and India, have at least one final assembler firm while Mexico does not. 
Although Bombardier is a final assembler, it does not conduct final assembly In 
Mexico. That fact limits the accumulation of local capabilities in Mexico. AIso, In 
other emerging countries, the final assembly is conducted either by a national-owned 
firm (like Embraer in Brazil) or by a joint-venture including a national-owned firm 
(like AVIC with Embraer and Airbus in China). There are no large nationally-owned 
firms in Mexico, and it seems unlikely that a foreign final assembler would decide to 
do that all by itself given the huge costs, capability restrictions and risks involved. 54 
The related second issue is that the government is backing those final assemblers in 
those other three emerging countries. Although today Embraer is a private firm, in its 
beginnings it was a government firm. AVIC and Cornac in China and HAL in India 
are government-owned firms. The general economic orientation of the current 
Mexican government is not well suited to government ownership of any firm. 55 
Therefore, given the lack of a final assembler, and the lack of local counterpart firms 
needed to form joint ventures (not just for final assembly), the main strengths of the 
aerospace sector in Mexico relies in the activities of foreign subsidiaries with just few 
54 Since the announcement of the establishment of the Bombardier plant in Querétaro, government 
officiaIs predicted that a whole plane would be assembled in Mexico by that company by year 2012. 
That event is unlikely to happen. The point we want to stress is that it seems that government officiaIs 
think that to assembly a plane is the logical next step for a manufacturing firm. It is difficult to predict 
if Bombardier (or for that matter any firm in Mexico) will find the technological capabilities (its own 
and the sun'ounding infrastructure), the financial logic, and market imperative to do the final assembly 
in Mexico; however, if international experience is a guide, it seems very unlikely given the absence of 
a strong locally-financed pmtner firm and the still embryonic conditions of aerospace supply in 
Mexico. 
55 In general terms as will be explained in section 4.3, since the aftermath of the economic crisis of 
1982, aIl Mexican presidencies have followed privatization of public firms under the framework of 
liberalization policies. The few remaining government-owned firms are related with energy and health 
(e.g. PEMEX in petroleum; CFE in electricity; Birmex in vaccines). A new national government will 
be elected in 2012. If the current political party (right-wing) remains in power or if the long-lasting 
previous ruling party (the centrist PRl) returns, the more likely scenario will be the continuation of 
those privatization policies since those two political parties were the ones that agreed on that agenda, 
and do not seem to be changing direction any time soon. If the left-wing political party wins, the more 
likely scenario will be to stop privatization but il will not be able to agree on an agenda to build new 
government-owned firms. 
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exceptions of local firms dedicated to mlOor activities (although with interesting 
integration capabilities)56. 
56 We will see sorne examples in the following paragraphs. Other interesting examples of local firms 
with integration capabilities were found while doing the field study, unfortunately for confidentially 
issues we cannot illustrate them. 
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2.6 Characteristics of aerospace firms and Mexican regions 
The aerospace firms located in Mexico are distributed in 16 Mexican states (Mexico 
has 31 states and a Federal District). Table 2.1 lists the states that have aerospace 
firms and shows the principal cities where the firms are located within each state. 
Also the table shows the classification of these firms according to Manufacturing 
(M), Maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), and Engineering and development 
(E&D). The total number of firms given in table 2.1 is older (it is for year 2009) and 
smaller than the one given previously for year 2010. For the new figure there are still 
no specifications about M, MRO, and E&D. 
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Table 2.1
 
Mexican Aerospace Industry by Activity and State, 2009
 
STATE Main cities (M) (MRO) (E&D) TOTAL 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 
Tijuana 
48 1 2 51 
Mexicali 
SONORA 
GuaymaslEmpalme, 
32 0 0 32 
Nogales 
CHIHUAHUA 
Chihuahua, 
25 0 0 25 
Ciudad Juarez 
NUEVO LEON Monterrey MA 13 7 4 24 
QUERETARO Querétaro MA 8 3 3 14 
Matamoros, 
TAMAULIPAS Reynosa, 10 1 0 Il 
Nuevo Laredo 
MEXICO D.F. Mexico D.F. 0 5 2 7 
COAHUILA 
Saltillo, 
5 1 0 6 
Ramos Arizpe 
JALISCO Guadalajara MA 2 0 3 5 
SAN LUIS POTOSI San Luis Potosi 5 0 0 5 
STATE OF MEXICO 
Toluca MA, 
0 5 0 5 
Mexico City MA 
PUEBLA Puebla 3 0 0 3 
YUCATAN Mérida 3 0 0 3 
AGUASCALIENTES Aguascal ientes 2 0 0 2 
GUERRERO Zihuatanejo 0 1 0 1 
ZACATECAS Zacatecas MA 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL 152 26 18 194 
(M) = Manufacturmg 
(MRO) = Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul 
(E&D) = Engineering and Design. 
MA: Metropolitan Area 
Source: FEMIA (2009) 
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As it was explained before, these figures overestimate the actual number of for-profit 
productive firms completely dedicated to aerospace. Both MRO and E&D include 
non-firms organizations (like universities, research centres, sales offices, and 
air1ines), also M includes firms that are not completely devoted to the aerospace 
sector, usually metal mechanic firms that are listed as potential suppliers or that only 
supply a limited amount of pieces for aerospace purposes. Therefore, it is difficult to 
know the exact number. 
As will be explained in section 4.2 we selected four states for the field study. Those 
four states are Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and Querétaro. In order ta 
illustrate the kind of aircraft activity that has been carried on in Mexican firms, we 
are going to present the public information about the activities of sorne important 
firms established in the locations just mentioned. We have chosen to present 
Bombardier: only the OEM final aircraft assembler of the big four; General Electric 
and Honeywell: two firms that stand out for their testing and R&D activity; Cessna 
and Hawker Beechcraft: although not the only OEM of business jets established in 
the country, they are working with composite materials; MD Helicopters: OEM for 
this type of aircraft; ITR, Volare Engineering and Frisa: national-owned companies 
with important projection to the future. 
Baja California 
The state of Baja California is a logical choice since it is the place with older firms in 
the sector (like Rockwell Collins) and with almost a quarter of the companies. 
Tijuana and Mexicali are the most important cities in economic terms. The former is 
the most populated city in the state while the latter is the political capital of the state. 
Both cities border the state of California, US; hawever, Tijuana is closer to big US 
urban centers like San Diego. The Autonomous University of Baja California has an 
engineering degree in aerospace in its Mexicali campus, although the Tijuana campus 
has several other engineering degrees. 
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Located in Mexicali, Honeywell installed a 40 million USD testing center in 
Mexicali, which employs 300 Mexican engineers to perform system integration tests 
for the new Airbus A35057 . 
Volare Engineering is a spin-off that benefited from the experience gained by sorne 
employees by working for a foreign subsidiary. The company is 100% Mexican and 
designs and manufactures aircraft interiors and accessories. This firm was founded by 
three Mexican ex-employees of a Dutch firm that closed its operation in Mexicali 
after the September 11, 2001. Among the products that Vo1are designs and gives 
manufacturing support are kitchenettes, closets, cabinets and meal carts for flight 
attendants. Their main clients are in the US and Canada58 . 
Querétaro 
The state of Querétaro is the one that has received more support from the federal 
government. It has the National University of Aeronautics, and an aerospace 
industrial park adjacent to the airport. One of the advantages of Querétaro is its 
closeness to Mexico City (approximately a two hour drive), which provides 
international flights to Europe and North America and in which good engineering 
universities, like the National Polytechnics Institute, are located. AIso, climate 
conditions and quality of life are often cited as advantages of this colonial city. 
Bombardier stmied activities in Querétaro in 2006. From the four big aircraft 
assemblers -Airbus, Boeing, Embraer and Bombardier- this firm is the only that has 
sorne kind of productive activity in the country. The inauguration of the Querétaro 
plant had media coverage in Mexico, and was used as a strong signal to the world that 
the country wanted to be a player in the industry. Currently (2010), the plant 
57 Negocios, 2010. "Mexican aerospace industry: reaching higher altitude", Negocias, October,
 
Promexico, México. pp 22-25.
 
58 Negocios, 20 Il. "Volare Engineering: a high-flying company with solid foundations", Negocias,
 
December 201 O-January 20 Il, Promexico, México. pp 34-35.
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employs approximately 1,200 workers and is in charge of the manufacture of 
structural aircraft components, including the Global business jet family aft fuselage, 
the Q400 NextGen aircraft flight control work package (rudder, elevator and 
horizontal stabilizer) and the CRnOO/900/l 000 NextGen and Challenger 605/850 
aircraft rudders, as well as main harnesses and electrical sub-assemblies for 
Bombardier business and commercial aircraft59 . In September 2010, Bombardier 
announced that the manufacturing facilities, tools and equipment were already ready 
in Querétaro for the manufacturing of its first aU-composite materials Learjet 8560. 
The responsibilities of the Querétaro plant will be the manufacturing of the fuselage 
lay-up, subsystem instaUation, wiring harness fabrication and installation, wing 
assembly, and horizontal and vertical stabilizer assemblies61 . 
General Electric has a long history in Mexico. It started operations in 1896, although 
its division for aerospace, GE Infrastructure Querétaro (GEIQ), was only created in 
2000. Interestingly, this GE division was the result of a partnership with a public 
technology centre located in Querétaro (CIATQ), although it was always 100% GE 
property. GEIQ provides engineering services in technical disciplines such as 
mechanics, electrical thermodynamics, electronics and software development. The 
firm stands out for its flight simulator, unique in Mexico, which is used to test the 
software developed in the engineering center itself<i2. The center employs 1,300 
engineers (all of them Mexican), and it is dedicated to designing airplane turbines and 
power generation systems. At the moment, the main programs for the aviation 
59 Dana-Jo. 2010. "Bombardier Inaugurates Learjet 85 Aircraft Component Manufacturing Facility in
 
Querétaro Mexico", Aviation News, October 22. Retrieved from:
 
<http://www.aviationnews.us/articles .php?arUd= 12424&start= 1>
 
60 Bombardier web site: < http://www.bombardier.comlfr/aeronautique/galerie-de­

presse/communiques-de-presse/details?doc1D=090 I260d80 13a499>
 
61 Dana-Jo. 2010. "Bombardier Inaugurates Learjet 85 Aircraft Component Manufacturing Facility in
 
Querétaro Mexico", Aviation News, October 22. Retrieved from:
 
<http://www.aviationnews.us/articles. php?arUd= 12424&start=1>
 
62 Negocios, 2011. "A home for technology", Negocios, December 201 O-January 20 Il, Promexico,
 
México. pp 36-37.
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industry are OEnx for the Boeing 787, CF34-10A for the ARJ21-700, and opnoo 
for the Airbus A38063 . 
Located in Querétaro, ITR is a MRü firm, which has been active smce 1998 
overhauling Pratt and Whitney JT8D engines. 1t has also sorne experience in 
manufacturing turbine pipes for Honeywell and Rolls-Royce. Recently it announced 
plans to open in 20 Il a plant to manufacture low-pressure turbines and expand its 
. d'pipe pro uctlOn64 . 
Nuevo Leon 
The metropolitan area of Monterrey, the capital state, concentrates most of the 
aerospace firms in Nuevo Leon. Monterrey counts with renowned public and private 
higher education institutions like the Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon 
(UANL) that has an aeronautics engineering degree, and the weil known 1nstituto 
Tecnologico de Monterrey that teaches several engineering degrees. The UANL plans 
to bui1d a center of research and innovation in aeronautics engineering that will be 
located in the Monterrey airport65 . 
Arnong the aerospace firms located in the metropolitan area of Monterrey, a major 
success case in terms of advanced supply is Frisa which manufactures rings (that are 
later reworked by other firms) to be assembled in aeronautic engines66 . MD 
63 Ibid
 
64 Sobie, B. 2009. "Querétaro prepares for massive aerospace growth", Flight International, April 20.
 
Retrieved from: <http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/20/325253/queretaro-prepares-for­

massive-aerospace-growth.html>
 
65 Torres, A. 20 II. "Avanza industria aeroespacial de Nuevo Leon", El Economista, January 25.
 
Retrieved from: <http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/20ll 10 1/25/avanza-industria-aeroespacial­

nuevo-leon>
 
66 Ibid 
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Helicopters, a US based OEM of helicopters, manufactures the fuselages of its 
helicopters in Monterrel7. 
Chihuahua 
Other developments have been also taking place ln Chihuahua. Although Ciudad 
Juarez has a bigger share of the state's production, so far big names in aerospace are 
established in the capital city of Chihuahua. The Autonomous University of 
Chihuahua in its Chihuahua campus has opened the engineering degree in aerospace. 
Also, a training center, CENALTEC, isdevoted mainly to aerospace technicians. The 
state has also other higher education technical institutes and a public research centre 
in advanced materials. 
Two OEM of business jets are currently located in Chihuahua City. Cessna is 
currently employing 550 workers and produces wire harnesses, metal structures, 
composite components and composite fabrication68 . The other business jets 
manufacturer present in the city is Hawker Beechcraft, which opened in 2007 a sheet 
metal assembly in Chihuahua69 . Recently the firm announced a 12 USD million 
investment to manufacture the fuselage ofits King Air 3507°. 
67 Negocios, 2010. "Mexican aerospace industry: reaching higher altitude", Negocios, October,
 
Promexico, México. pp 22-25.
 
68 Harrison, K. J. 2010. "Bizav manufacturingjobs continue to move south", Aviation International
 
News, October 1. Retrieved from: <http:J/www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/bizav­

manufacturi ng-jobs-continue-to-move-south-264731>
 
69 Epstein, C. 2007. "Hawker Beechcraft opens shop in Mexico", Aviation International News,
 
December. Retrieved from: <http://www.ainonline.com/ain-and-ainalerts/aviation-international­

news/single-publication-story/browse/O/article/hawker-beechcraft-opens-shop-in-mexico­

11817/?no_cache=] &tx_ttnews[storyyointer]=4&tx_ttnews[mode]= 1>
 
70 El Diario. 20]1. "Fabricanl Beechcraft fuselajes en la capital", El Diario, February 23. Retrieved
 
from:
 
<http://www.diario.com.mx/notas.php?f=20 11/02/23&id=afad29ge 1cbe2956df294b2253039cc6>
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2.7 Economie policy and innovation system in Mexico 
Introduction 
Since the debt cnSlS In 1982, the Mexican government has adopted a senes of 
economic reforms that have been labelled by several authors as neo-liberal because 
they are based on the alleged efficiency of market forces in ail realms of economic 
activity. Among these reforms are the control of inflation rates, the opening of the 
economy to foreign capital and trade, the attraction of FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment), and the pursuing of industrial export activity (mainly by means of 
temporal import schemes) (this last dates back to the 1960s, but has since been 
acquiring a central place on the government agenda). Although it is true that these 
reforms have achieved partial success 71 , the overall picture is that Mexico has 
stagnated in two of the most important macroeconomic indicators, namely GDP and 
employment growth, as weIl as productivity increases. 
According to several authors (Cimoli, 2000), these reforms are not only insufficient 
but can be misleading in promoting economic development, at least in the way they 
have been implemented. One crucial aspect that has not been addressed adequately in 
these economic measures is the role of technology and innovation in economic 
development. The main argument is that these reforms (inspired by neoclassical 
economic principles), do not take into account technology in aIl its complexity, and 
instead consider it as a good that can easily be transferred and traded by market 
transactions. Following this vision, Mexican policy has taken few actions to support 
indigenous R&D, attracting foreign R&D and the upgrading of technological and 
organizational capabilities of Mexican or foreign firms active in Mexico. One 
71 In the sense that beginning in the mid-1980s, Mexico went from being essentially an oil-exporting 
country to becoming a major export platform of manufactured goods (Moreno-Brid, Santamarîa and 
Rivas, 2005) 
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consequence of these measures IS that the Mexican innovation system IS poorly 
developed. 
Even if the innovation system in Mexico and the measures taken by the government 
are incomplete and insufficient (and perhaps misleading), the particular history of 
industrialization in this country reveals some accumulation of teclmological 
capabilities in certain regions, and in certain teclmological areas (see Cimoli, 2000). 
At present, the relatively recent establishment of aerospace firms in Mexico and the 
apparent commitment of national and regional governments to that industry might be 
seen as an opportunity to upgrade the teclmological level of the country given the 
high-tech character of that industry. This chapter sketches the environmental elements 
-in terms of current technological capabilities, innovation system and public policy­
that are more likely to accelerate or to hinder the teclmologicallevel of the aeraspace 
industry in Mexico. 
In this sense, one question emerges: before and after liberalization reforms, Mexico 
has undergone major industrial developments (e.g. steel, glass, automotive, 
electronics) but has achieved limited results in terms of teclmological capabilities, 
and only very limited results in terms of innovation on a worldwide basis (if we 
consider innovation as the whole uncertain and partially serendipitous process that 
begins with the conception of a new product or teclmology, goes through R&D, 
continues to manufacturing and ends in successful introduction on the market). What 
would be different in the case of the aerospace industry? Will Mexico play an 
important raie in higher parts of the chain value of the aircraft? Will this foreign 
direct investment in aerospace have spillovers to other industries or services? Or will 
this industry follow the incomplete development pattern that other industries, such as 
the auto industry, have followed? 
In order to shed light on these questions, this section is organized as follows: section 
2.7.1 briefly describes the liberalization strategy followed by the Mexican 
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government since the 1980's, il1ustrating main objectives and especial1y the engine 
growth of that strategy; section 2.7.2 makes sorne remarks about the impact on 
technological capabilities of the liberalization strategy in Mexican industrial 
development via FOI, particularly the export oriented segment known as the 
maquiladora; section 2.7.3 analyzes how these previous issues affect the Mexican 
innovation system and what this might mean for the development of the aerospace 
industry in Mexico; and final1y section 2.7.4 shows sorne historical examples about 
the development of the aircraft industry in new corner countries and sorne remarks 
about the experience of the automobile industry in Mexico. 
2.7.1 Liberalization Strategy 
The main goals of the liberalization strategy in the early 1980s were to achieve a 
stable macroeconomic environment and to pursue an export-oriented growth based on 
free trade. Reinhardt and Peres (2000) argue that the ultimate rationale behind these 
reforms was the belief that markets were more efficient in allocating resources than 
governments. In practical terms, these reforms did achieve partial success in 
achieving macroeconomic stability and export promotion, although under a more 
critical eye the results are cÇ>mpletely insufficient in terms of long-term development, 
a more equal income distribution, or social stability. As far as macroeconomic 
stability is concerned, even if low inflation rates have been achieved, such stability 
was accompanied by an increase in interest rates, with subsequent negative impact on 
investment. 
Growth Engine 
As it has been said, Mexican officiais wanted to change the prevlOUS inward 
orientation of industrialization with an external orientation based on a competitive 
manufacturing export sector. The local industrial sector was considered inadequate to 
the task; therefore, liberalization of trade and capital was a crucial part of this 
strategy. The signing offree trade agreements (mainly the NAFTA) and the attraction 
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of FDI were thus the practical side of the strategy. Somewhat paradoxically, history 
shows that in the following years, the surge of Mexican exports was headed by two 
sectors that were already wel1 established before the "liberalization strategy"; namely 
the automobile industry (Dussel-Peters, 2000: 125) and the in-bond factories known 
as the maquiladora (composed mainly of electronics, auto parts, and garments firms) 
(Gereffi, 1996: 85). Moreover, only sorne old big national-owned firms in traditional 
sectors founded in the ISI period- e.g. Cernex (cement), Vitro (glass), and Grupo 
Modelo (brewery)-managed to thrive in international competition (see Casas, 2005; 
Dutrénit, 2000; Torres and Jasso, 2005). 
In this sense the measures adopted by Mexican governments consolidated processes 
that were already taking shape. Therefore, it is important to understand how these 
processes started and how they have evolved, in order to have a better understanding 
of the potential and limits of that engine of growth. In this review, the emphasis is on 
the manufacturing segment known as the maquiladora because many aerospace firms 
in Mexico are operating under this fiscal regime. 
The maquiladora is a fiscal regime established in Mexico back in the 1960s that 
allows duty-free inputs under the condition of subsequent export. Initial1y, this 
concerned mainly US owned factories dedicated to very simple assembly procedures. 
The main objective of the Mexican government at that time was to create jobs in the 
border regions of the country. On the other hand, the US firms were cutting costs on 
the more basic production processes. Over the years (and perhaps exacerbated by the 
liberalization strategy), sorne of these maquiladoras accumulated technological 
capabilities weil above basic assembly. In sorne products like television sets and 
automobile harnesses, sorne border localities in Mexico, Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez 
respectively, achieved worldwide reputation for the manufacturing capacity of the 
maquiladoras located there. Also, the inland city of Guadalajara was dubbed the 
"Mexican Silicon Valley" for the manufacturing capacity of foreign owned 
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subsidiaries (notably IBM) in computer-related pal1s and peripherals (Gallagher and 
Zarsky, 2007). With the advent of manufacturing in China and other Asian countries, 
sorne of these advantages in Mexico were eroded (Gallagher et al 2008). 
Critics of the policy say that the maquiladora has created few backward linkages with 
national suppliers, and that it has remained a manufacturing enclave of foreign firms 
with limited potential for upgrading in the value chain of their respective product 
segments (Gallager and Zarsky, 2007). Dussel-Peters (2003) argues that all export 
fiscal programs in Mexico based on free temporal imports, of which the maquiladora 
is just one, produce disincentives on linkages with the local economy. The main 
argument is that these programs procure the advantages of zero imp0l1 tariffs to firms 
using it, but no value added tax, and a small income tax. In order to have these 
advantages, the maquiladoras have to export their entire production. For these firms, 
a more active approach in terms of national integration by means of backward and 
upward links will mean the loss of these cost advantages that represent approximately 
50% of their overall costs. However, the other side of the story is poor technological 
development of the local supply base. Thus, even if the maquiladoras seek to locally 
procure their more sophisticated inputs, it will be very difficult for them to find local 
suppliers. 
Given this scenario, there are two main opinions about future paths of action. One of 
them is to limit the advantages of temporal-imports programs and instead concentrate 
on other segments (e.j. Dussel-Peters, 2003). The other is to try to build an 
institutional environment that favours knowledge generation and transfer, in which 
maquiladora-type firms will play a prominent raie (Dutrenit and Katz, 2005). 
Supporters of the first school of thought say that the maquiladora program is almost 
50 years old and integration or spillovers toward the local economy have not been 
significant. Supporters of the second option argue that the limited role of technology 
as pomayed by the liberalization strategy has limited the number and effectiveness of 
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policies intended to improve collective learning and its subsequent knowledge 
transfer and value chain upgrading. 
2.7.2 Impact of the Mexican liberalization strategy on technological capabilities 
Industrial specialization pattern 
Several authors (Amsden, 2001; Cimoli and Katz, 2003; Cimoli et al 2009) have 
pointed out how the liberalization strategy implemented in several countries, of Latin 
America has influenced the industrial specialization of these countries. Cimoli and 
Katz (2003) claim that two main specialization patterns have arisen for countries rich 
in natural resources like Brazil, Argentina and Chile, and low-wage labour-abundant 
countries Iike Mexico and the Caribbean, respectively: the first is the orientation of 
natural resource-processing industries producing commodities to world markets, and 
the second is the assembly and maquiladora-type industries oriented mostly to the US 
market. Palma (2009) shows that even if these strategies have increased exports, the 
increase in GDP has been of a lower proportion. 
Amsden (2001) explains that the rationale behind those liberalization strategies 
followed in Latin America was to "get the prices right" by eliminating economic 
distortions like captive markets, subsidies and trade restrictions very common in the 
1S1 period. However, this author explains that even if those measures were used and 
failed, the reason lays more in the way they were implemented and not in the 
measures per se. Khan and Blankenburg (2009) named this situation institutional 
failure. By this term they refer to the inability of the state to redirect society's 
resources toward learning industries and the lack of institutions to provide rents in 
these industries. As Amsden (2001) argues, one important element in a policy trying 
to develop a new sector is to "get the prices wrong" in order for local firms to be 
profitable and able to compete against established firms in developed countries. 
133 
Cimoli and Katz (2003) and Palma (2009) stress that these liberalization strategies 
have changed the way in which technological capabilities accumulate in Latin 
American countries including Mexico. One important point is that firms that are part 
of a more extensive network in terms of ownership or the kind of technologies used 
(e.g. MNC subsidiaries) were suddenly confronted with optimization processes that 
limited their technological responsibilities and thus their accumulation. 
Although it is true that Mexico and the Caribbean countries have followed a similar 
path in terms of liberalization, there are clear differences. While in both areas MNC 
subsidiaries are the main agents in this trend, in Mexico the sophistication of the 
manufacturing processes seems to be weil above that of the Caribbean. Moreover, 
there are accounts of sorne firms in Mexico that are devoted to capital-intensive 
activities, and sorne firms are even devoted to secondary development. This should be 
understood in the path-dependency logic of technical change. As was stated in the 
previous section, the maquiladora program in Mexico has its origins back in the 
1960s. As Cimoli and Katz (2003) rightly stress, the state-of-the-art techniques and 
organization employed in Mexican maquilas is completely dependent on transfers 
from parent companies. However, the efficient use of those techniques seems to be 
dependent on Mexican workers' experience with them, and that experience takes 
sorne years to build. Moreover, that experience expresses itself in the fact that only 
sorne cities in Mexico are able to host sophisticated manufacturing processes; and 
these cities are precisely the ones with more experience in manufacturing. Indeed, 
according to the OECD, "FDI flows in Mexico are highly concentrated within two 
regions (Centre and Northern Border) that account for more than 90% of Mexico's 
FDI from 1994 to 2007. And while it is presumed that big manufacturing firms 
(BMF) and FDI will bring technological spillovers through S&T expenditures, 
greater productivity and higher wages, this is not necessarily the case." (OECD, 2009: 
p. 18) 
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Even though the liberalization agenda is still important in Mexico, Peres (2009) 
mentions that sorne sectoral programs have been implemented (see section below). 
Nevertheless, this author shows that most of these programs are devoted to 
strengthening and expanding pre-existing sectors like the automotive industry, instead 
of promoting new sectors (p. 182). 
2.7.3 Mexico's Innovation System 
The national innovation system approach (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988) and more 
recently the regional innovation system (Cooke and Morgan, 1998) and the sectoral 
innovation system (Malerba, 2002) put the emphasis on organizational and 
institutional patterns needed in order to innovate. This means that firms do not 
innovate in isolation, on the contrary, there are numerous external factors that 
contribute either directly or indirectly to this innovation effort, and in sorne cases 
innovation is originally conceived and realized through collective effort. 
Although sorne advances can be seen in innovation activities in Mexico, recent 
assessments of Mexico's innovation system reveal its still low level of development. 
In a comprehensive study about Mexico's innovation system, Dutrénit et al (2010: 86­
88) show the low tendency of Mexican firms to do innovative activities in a 
sustainable fashion. AIso, when these efforts occur they are more oriented to adapt 
foreign technologies than to create new ones (Ibid: 87). This is reflected in 
reorientation of indigenous R&D efforts to short term and quality issues instead of 
more long term issues; not well-developed supporting institutions, with the 
consequence of not being able to exploit technological advances made in other 
regions (Cimoli, 2000). In the same token, links among firms and other relevant 
agents are limited. According to Casas et al (2000), "Mexico is characterised by a 
small and not yet consolidated scientific and technological system, incipient 
innovation processes in firms, and emergent university-industry-government 
relationships." (p. 225). The OCDE report on Mexico also shows low indicators and 
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lack of adequate measures to tackle innovation problems. For instance, the report 
shows that the investment in R&D as a percentage of GDP is at 0.5% (where business 
R&D plays a particularly smail role), versus an OCDE average of over 2% (OECD, 
2009: 17). Therefore, we have a scenario in which investment in innovation is weak, 
relationship between higher education institutions, research centers and industry is 
poorly developed, and the main focus of government is on regulatory and 
transportation infrastructure issues, with little attention given to knowledge-related 
factors (OCDE, 2009: 15). 
Other important aspects are the regional and sectoral issues of the innovation system 
in Mexico. While there are sorne efforts at the state level to foster innovation, the 
constitution of Mexico concentrates resources at the federal level; thus, efforts by 
states are conditioned to a great extent on federal funding (OCDE, 2009: 15). An 
important issue regarding state support is the duplicity of efforts. Since any public 
program claiming to support a high technology industry requires important financial 
resources, it is unlikely that Mexican states, and the federal government itself, could 
sustain such an industry in several states at the same time. A major regional remark is 
that sorne authors have observed that inner cities tend to exhibit more local linkages 
than border cities (Gereffi, 1996: 88). This may be due to the fact that inland .cities 
like Monterrey and Guadalajara have an industrialization experience previous to the 
maquiladora. 
In terms of support for specific economlC branches, the 2007-2012 Sectoral 
Economic Program72 of the Mexican Economic Ministry does not contain a specific 
program for the aerospace sector. It only mentions the desirability for the Mexican 
economy to upgrade to a high value added sector like aerospace and aeronautics, 
among others (p. 50). Even if the national government does not have a structured plan 
72 See Programa Sectorial de Economfa in the references. 
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to support the aerospace sector, it seems that sorne state governments do have sorne 
sort of programs in place. A priori, it seems that these states interested in aerospace 
have FDI-attraction programs as their main policy. Nevertheless, the detailed 
measures employed by these states are going to be part of the inquiry ofthis study. 
2.7.4 Historical examples of the aircraft industry in new corner countries 
This section illustrates sorne historical implications of other countries that have 
attempted to develop an aerospace sector, and sorne analogies of the automobile 
industrialization experience in Mexico. The purpose is to put in context the 
challenges for the Mexican innovation system in order to erect a solid aerospace 
industry. 
Aerospace industry development in other countries 
First of ail, it is important to explain sorne initial conditions and strategie postures. 
Contrary to other countries, Mexico has not had, and it is not interested in domestic 
military aircraft production. For the case of Canada, it is crucial to see how military 
procurement was part of its aircraft capacity building. Overhaul and maintenance, and 
later the licensing of Briti.sh aircraft military models by British subsidiaries marked 
the beginning ofthat industry in Canada (let's not forget that Canada was a part of the 
British dominion) (Niosi et al, 2005). Othercountries with conditions more similar to 
Mexico, like Brazil and Argentina developed their aircraft industries originally based 
on military goals too, although only Brazil was successful (Hira and De Oliveira, 
2007). These countries also started by acquiring licenses to produce foreign planes. 
Whatever the historical reasons for the absence of a military aircraft industry attempt 
in Mexico, the fact is that the country starts with only a very limited experience, 
based in the overhaul and maintenance of military and civil aircraft bought from 
foreign countries. One may add that experience in the manufacturing of motor 
vehicles and auto-parts are also important assets. 
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The countries mentioned above could learn from licensing military and civil aircraft 
models, or by acquiring or licensing in new models. However, that possibility is not 
clear for Mexico. As it was said, Mexico is not interested in developing a domestic 
military aircraft sector, which left out the possibility of licensing military aircraft 
production. Thus, the country has to depend on the civil sector alone. 
These historical examples bear one implication: ail countries, except the four original 
leaders (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) that in one moment 
attempted to develop the aerospace sector had to rely at the beginning in the 
transference of foreign technology by established firms, combined with the 
development of local capabilities. 
The next issue is what kind of technology is more appropriate to seek. According to 
Goldstein (2002): "the traditional trajectory for a developing domestic aerospace 
sector is a three stage process: first, countries begin with co-production agreements; 
second, as the industry develops, a viable set of subcontractors develops and finally, 
the domestic industry is capable of putting aU the pieces together and become a final 
assembler of complete aircraft."73 Nevertheless, the recent Japanese example shows 
that pursuingjust one (or sorne) part of the plane couId be a good strategy, instead of 
trying to build the whole aircraft. As was mentioned before, the Japanese firm 
Mitsubishi is now a world player in the design and construction of wings, thanks ta 
the deal made with Boeing. Then it developed its own regional jet, which was 
recently put on the market. With the high degree of modularity and high costs, it is 
inconceivable for one firm or a newcomer country to master ail the knowledge and 
technologies needed to build a new plane. Therefore, concentrating in just one of 
those modules could be a good strategy. 
73 Quoted From McGuire et al (2010: 368). 
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Ali the countries mentioned above, except Mexico, have one characteristic in 
common; in the early moments of the development of their aircraft industry, there 
were local-owned firms supported by the state. For instance in the case of Brazil, 
Embraer was astate enterprise, privatized in 1994 when it had already achieved a 
good technological standing. The Canadian firm Bombardier has benefited from 
government supports at different moments of its life. Therefore, two implications are 
drawn in this case; first, government support is an indispensable condition since high 
fixed upfront costs make new attempts unprofitable; and second, sorne nationally­
owned enterprise seem to be a necessary condition for the further development of 
capabilities within the industry. 
Summarizing so far, we have four important historical implications for the 
development of an aircraft industry in a new corner country: 1) in a first phase, 
technology has to be licensed or transferred from abroad; 2) in an early moment of 
the development (perhaps not at the beginning) a locally-owned firm should enter the 
industry; 3) this firm (or firms) should be specialized in one of the main modules of 
the plane (or in the assembly of the whole plane, although this option isbecoming 
more difficult); 4) state support has to be present in the different phases of 
development. 
Automobile industry in Mexico 
The case of the automobile industry may suggest sorne lessons for aerospace in 
Mexico. One similarity is that both sectors were initiated thanks to a big influx of FDI 
by world leading firms. Nevertheless, the nature of that FDI was different. US, 
European, and Japanese automakers established plants in Mexico to tap the local 
market. The policy of import-substitution enforced by the Mexican government in 
1962 required that automobiles to be sold in Mexico should be produced locally. 
Moreover, a certain percentage of the content had to be 10cal1y supplied. Before that 
enforcement, automobiles were imported or locally assembled from completely 
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imported kits. Therefore, it can be said that foreign firms established in the country to 
comply with the rules that the Mexican governrnent imposed. Retrospective studies 
(see Bennett and Sharpe, 1979) stress the inefficient productive scheme resulting 
from the overregulation of Mexican governrnent and the unwillingness of foreign 
firms to improve sorne of their processes (which hinder the possibility of exports). 
With the end of the import-substitution era, in the early 1990s the liberalization 
policy pursued by the governrnent reduced in significant ways the prior restrictions. 
This allowed foreign companies to restructure their operations, and decided to 
concentrate on manufacturing their Mexican plants (Carrillo, 1995). 
Sorne years after the automakers, sorne auto-part producers established 
manufacturing operations in the northern border cities of Mexico under the 
maquiladora program. Two characteristics of these operations are that almost aU 
inputs are imported from different parts of the world and very little produced in 
Mexico. Once transformed, with little added value, they are exported to a plant in 
which the part will be integrated in a subsystem or system. This plant could belong to 
the auto-part company itself or to a third party outsourcing company; but it is almost 
always located outside Mexico. Sorne scholars identify sorne improvements in the 
technological activities of these auto-parts subsidiaries (Carrillo, 1995). For instance, 
the establishment of a development facility by the leading auto-part company Delphi 
in Ciudad Juarez is shown as a step forward (Carrillo and Lara, 2005). However, 
those cases remain rare, and their interaction with the local environrnent is minimal. 
This historical sketch of the automobile industry in Mexico shows that foreign firms 
establish whether to comply with regulations or to obtain sorne benefit. Automakers 
had no other option but to establish in the country if they wanted to tap the local 
market. Once the regulations were lifted, automakers took advantage of the already 
experienced subsidiaries and restructured them according to their new needs. This 
movement consolidated these subsidiaries as manufacturing bases with export 
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quality, usmg significant amounts of imported goods. Indeed, the NAFTA was 
heavily promoted by the big three in Detroit, with the intention to lower their costs in 
order to face Asian competitors. In terms of local technological content (and perhaps 
learning), this restructuring has diminished the need for engineering activities in the 
subsidiaries (Cimoli and Katz, 2003). In the case of the auto-part companies, they 
began explicitly as subsidiaries that wanted to benefit from low-cost labour, with the 
majority of their inputs coming from outside the country. Over time, a handful of 
these auto-parts companies have opened development facilities being Delphi the most 
salient one. 
On one hand, there are two positive points m this story: one is that automakers 
continued manufacturing cars in the country even when they could have looked for 
other alternatives once the liberalization policies were in place. In addition, the auto­
parts companies have developed manufacturing capabilities and sorne of them even 
development capabilities. On the other hand, only one national-owned automaker 
(who was devoted to building trucks and buses) surged from that process of 
industrialization. Also, the auto-parts companies still remain from the most part 
detached from the local economy. 
In the case of the aerospace sector, foreign firms are not in Mexico to tap the local 
market. In fact, it can be said that they already have the market. The Mexican aviation 
market has always relied on imported planes. Aerospace companies are established in 
Mexico to lower manufacturing costs. 
In general, it can be argued that aerospace is more and more a world market in which 
firms should target different clients in the world to recuperate the huge cost of the 
development of aircraft. Also, given the stringent safety requirements and technical 
standards in the industry, whole aircraft, modules and sub-systems are relatively 
homogeneous no matter for which markets they are made for. For these reasons is 
very unlikely that Mexico, or any country by itself, can offer a market opportunity to 
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develop new aircrafi technology. The technical difficulties experienced by civil 
aircrafi are almost the same in every country74. Also, Mexico (as explained in section 
2.7.3) does not have a solid R&D system; thus is not a country in which aerospace 
firms could expand their capabilities or acquire new ones (Kuemmerle, 1997). The 
size of the Mexican aviation market although noticeable, it is not as dynamic and 
large as for instance the Chinese one. Therefore, the only reason for aerospace firms 
to establish subsidiaries in Mexico is to reduce costs. Moreover, making an analogy 
with the automobile industry, preliminary information indicates that the kind of 
aerospace subsidiaries present in Mexico resemble more the auto-parts than the 
automakers. Thus, whole assembly and system integration is not what is in the plans 
for Mexico, at least for now. 
The implications drawn are the following: 1) before the Mexican government can 
think of sorne rneasures to enforce sorne Mexican content in planes bought by 
national airlines, sorne sort of system integration activity should take place in the 
country. In this sense, the attraction efforts should include system-integrator 
companies (that actually do that kind of activity, because it may be a system 
integrator company but manufacturing spare parts to be integrated in other places of 
the world). 2) Eventually, the Mexican government would need to heavily support the 
creation of a national-owned firm dedicated to system (or subsystem) integration for 
the learning process to continue. 
74 The only Mexican-owned automaker created in the import substitution period (and to date) is 
specialized in trucks and buses. Different countries indeed present different geographical conditions, 
highway infrastructure and business practices. Thus, each country represents indeed a market 
opportunity given the different needs and obstacles of the different geographies (perhaps this was more 
salient before than nowadays). In this sense being a local firm, in terms of ownership, did provide an 
advantage to exploit that opportunity. However, in the case of aerospace, local markets for civil 
aircrafi are not much different from country to country. Perhaps in other segments of aviation like 
aquatic landing planes, water bombers, or forest recognition planes, local environments do present 
different tecJmical problems and as a resuIt market opportunities for learning and developing new 
technologies. In which case, being domestic, having public sector support and strategie freedom of 
action would be essentiaI to pursue those opportunities. 
CHAPTER III
 
HYPOTHESES FOR THE MEXICAN CASE
 
Research Objective 
As stated in the introduction, the research goal of this work is to understand the type 
of activities being carried out by the aerospace industry located in Mexican clusters, 
and to assess if policy actions put in place to support the industry are conductive to 
master aerospace technology. 
Theoretical Contributions 
At least three main research streams are pertinent to this quest. The first relates to 
industrial clusters and regional innovation systems. In this sense, this research aims at 
advancing knowledge about the agglomeration forces that shape aerospace clusters in 
developing countries. At the same time, it is important to discuss the usefulness of the 
different competing concepts on innovative agglomerations. The discussion in the 
scientific literature has been seant and each author or current has limited itself to 
advancing their own positions without trying to reduce the number of alternative 
concepts or assess their historical, industrial or national limitations. Therefore, the 
theoretical contribution of this research is centered on the pertinence of the different 
concepts of industrial and innovation agglomerations. The second research stream has 
to do with the interrelated concepts of product and industry life cycle, dominant 
design, and modularity. Here the intention is to demonstrate how the complexityof 
the aircraft as a complex product poses challenges to traditional explanations (usuaUy 
based on other types of products) of those concepts. A priori, it seems that the mere 
entrance of Mexico as a visible player signais the deepening of internationalization 
trends in that industry, with still poorly known consequences. Finally, the third 
stream deals with sorne aspects of catching-up policy. In this sense this work tries to 
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join others in their claim that the Mexican government should pursue a more strategie 
hands-on innovation policy in order to accelerate catching up with industrial and 
emergent nations. 
Hypotheses and Research questions 
A priori, it seems that Mexico is not an exception to the tendency of the aerospace 
industry to cluster in a few regions. But a word of caution is needed. When we talk 
about the Querétaro or the Monterrey aerospace cluster, should we think about 
agglomerations similar to the ones found in Montreal or Toronto (Canada), Toulouse 
(France), or Everett (US)? Moreover, when newspapers and regional government 
agencies claim to have OEMs firms in their local clusters, should we think that these 
"OEMs" play a similar role to the role they play in their home countries or regions? 
Of course, the answer is no. While it is true that there is sorne important 
manufacturing capacity in place in ·Mexico that makes possible the transfer of sorne 
aerospace activities, the PLC-ILC approach predicts that the more likely activities to 
be transferred in the near future should be of a lesser technological level compared to 
the ones in advanced aerospace c1usters. More important, the eventual upgrade of the 
technological content of those activities will depend greatly on the capacity to build a 
technological platform able to encourage that undertaking. This line of reasoning 
leads us to propose the following general hypotheses that summarize the conceptual 
discussion, research questions that will guide the inquiry, and empirical hypotheses 
that answer those questions. 
General hypothesis 1: The relatively high codification of the technological 
knowledge base of the aircraft industry is related to the high degree of modularity that 
exhibits the production of this artefact. This is true also for the different sub-systems 
that made up the aircraft. Given this modularity, a modified version of the PLC-ILC 
approach for aerospace, predicts that system and sub-system integrators have the 
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possibility to transfer the manufacturing of sorne of their simpler subsystems to low­
cost locations while keeping integration activities in their home locations. 
General hypothesis 2: Initial conditions in countries with underdeveloped innovation 
systems (like Mexico) cannot procure ail relevant capabilities, knowledge and 
infrastructure needed to sustain the production of complete aircrafi systems, complex 
sub-systems or R&D activities. 
General hypothesis 3: Given the low technological profile of aerospace activities (at 
least in an initial state) more likely to be transferred to a low-cost country like 
Mexico, the main decision factors for firms 100king for a place to establish there, are 
related to traditional mimufacturing cost advantages rather than to Marshallian 
agglomeration forces. 
General hypothesis 4: Given the stringent standards of the aerospace sector, the 
potential transfer of activities (as simple as they may be) by foreign firms to their 
subsidiaries requires certain degree of capabilities and infrastructure in the host 
locality. 
General hypothesis 5: The technology needed to mount aircrafi systems or 
subsystems should come from leading foreign companies, at least in a first stage of 
development of the industry in a developing country. 
General hypothesis 6: Technological infrastructure and specialized services devoted 
to the aerospace sector should be developed to encourage foreign firms to take the 
risks to transfer more complex activities to their subsidiaries. 
General hypothesis 7: For this infrastructure to be effective from the financial and 
learning perspectives, it should be targeted to selected aeronautic technologies on 
which firms seem to be more capable of learning, or niche opportunities available. 
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General hypothesis 8: A public-owned75 firm or firms will eventually have to be 
created to benefit from the entrepreneurship that those kinds of firms usually exhibit 
thanks to the freedom to choose different strategie patterns. In a first stage, this firm 
should be heavily supported by the state given the high costs of operation. 
General hypothesis 9: The designation of just two or three clusters as official 
aerospace clusters will allow to reach the critical mass of firms needed to sustain the 
growth and learning in the aerospace sector in Mexico, as weil as to better 
implementation and use of the infrastructure and institutional setting dedicated to the 
industry. 
Research question 1: What are the main reasons for aerospace firms for migrating to 
Mexico, and how they overcome the limitations of the local environment, which has 
an important industrial infrastructure but lacks a specifie one for aerospace? 
Hypothesis 1: Given the stringent quality and safety standards required for 
aerospace activities, including manufacturing, jirms are likely to require 
external technical assistance at one point. Due to the limitations of the 
lvJexican system, the more likely source of this jirm-external knowledge would 
be located abroad. 
Hypothesis la: Even though manufacturing is the more likely activity to be 
transferred, some sort of innovation will certainly be introduced at the jirm 
and country level, thanks to those external sources of knowledge and to the 
75 We support the idea that a national-owned firm is important for the development of the aerospace 
sector in Mexico. This ownership could be either public or private (or a mix). Arguments in favour of a 
private ownership are that Mexico is not pursuing military endeavours; another Latin American 
country like Brazil has a local-private fion like Embraer; and in general Mexico is favouring private 
o~nership. However, we think that given the scanty experience of Mexican entrepreneurs in 
aerospace, there will be few of them interested in investing huge sums of money in a business they do 
not know, also, let's remember that Embraer started too as a state-owned company. Therefore, we 
beJjeve public-ownership would be more pertinent at least in the first stages of the development of 
such a firm, mainly because of the money. 
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previous industrial experience of the country,. Innovation at the world level 
will be almost nonexistent in the short and medium run. 
Research question 2: What are the centripetal forces at work in Mexican aerospace 
clusters? Are there firms that can be considered anchor tenants? 
Hypothesis 2: attraction forces are related wilh low cost operations and the 
manufacturing capability of the country. Since no substantial R&D activity is 
expected, il is unlikely to find an anchor tenant firm. 
Research question 3: Are there elements that can be considered part of a nascent 
aerospace system of production (and irmovation) in Mexico? 
Hypothesis 3: The lack of a sectoral program specifie to aerospace and the 
underdevelopment ofthe overal! innovation system in Mexico cal! for a rather 
limiled production system. 
PART II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
 
CHAPTER IV
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
 
4.1. Questionnaire for the survey 
The "Global outsourcing and R&D best practices In the aerospace industry 
Questionnaire,,76 (see Annex 1) is the main information source of this research. This 
is tool designed to gather information directly from aerospace firms in Mexico. 1 
collaborated with Professor Jorge Niosi (research director), Professor Majlinda Zhegu 
(committee member) and in the elaboration of the questionnaire. The ample 
experience in the aerospace sector of Professors Niosi and Zhegu was of great help in 
identifying the cluster issues which firms in this sector face. The questionnaire and 
the research itself is part of an ampler research project that seeks to compare the 
development of the aerospace industry in different developing countries. Part 1 of the 
QuestiolU1aire asks for general information about the size, ownership, markets and 
products of the firms. Section Il.l is about the firms' ilU10vation and the sources of 
ideas for those ilU10vations. Additionally, Section II.2 asks for the incentives that 
firms have received to locate in the places where they are currently located. Part III is 
about the role of the firm in the industry, and aspects of communication. 
As we explained, the first step to characterize an aerospace cluster is to know the type 
of firms that make up the cluster as weil as the interaction between the firms. 
Question 1 of the Questionnaire asks for the age, while Questions 4 and 5 are 
76 The Spanish version that was actually used is called "Cuestionario acerca de las prâcticas de 
subcontrataci6n e investigaci6n y desarrollo de la industria aeroespacial en México", see Annex 2. 
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indicators of size. Questions 7, Il, 13, 14, 15 and Question 23 indicate the kind of 
product and activities carried on at firms. How the firm relates with external parties in 
terms of inputs and outputs is captured in Questions 7, 8, 9, and 10. The relationship 
with third parties in terms of technological knowledge leading to innovation is treated 
in Question 16. Other communication and control patterns are explored in Section 
11.2. The exploration of agglomeration forces and the incentives firms face for 
locating in those Mexican locations is treated in detail in Questions 17 and 18. 
Questions contained in Section II.! will also be useful in evaluating firms' innovation 
activity and its sources 
Other primary data sources incIude four semi-structured interviews with the four 
regional development offices in charge of promoting the aerospace industry in the 
four selected Mexican states -Baja California, Querétaro, Nuevo Leon, and 
Chihuahua-. In those interviews three open questions were asked: 1) what has been 
the support given to aerospace companies, 2) what measures are taken to attract 
aerospace companies; and 3) what are knowledge producing organizations that may 
support the aerospace sector. Secondary data sources include aerospace publications 
of the Mexican Ministry of Economy and coverage of the subject in specialized 
magazllles. 
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4.2. Locations and sample 
Prior to the field application of the Questionnaire that was carried on from May 25 th 
to June 28th of 2009 at 30 aerospace firms in five cities located in four states; the 
Ministry of Economy had identified 161 companies distributed in 15 Mexican states. 
Attempting to cover aH the localities and companies was neither necessary nor 
practical. Since the focus of this research is on the agglomeration forces and 
characteristics of aerospace clusters, the approach taken here was to concentrate the 
study on localities that exhibit sorne features that qualified them as potential clusters. 
As was explained in Section 1.1, the analytical dimensions for this study are: 1) 
firms' technological characteristics 2) agglomeration forces and 3) knowledge 
creation, diffusion and adoption dynamics. Based on those dimensions, three criteria 
were used to select the locations for the field research. The first step in analyzing the 
structure of a cluster is the mere existence of such a structure. Given that firms are the 
most important organizations in aerospace clusters, the 1) total number ofaerospace 
firms that a location hosts is the first criterion. As explained in section 1.2.2, the 
aerospace industry is organized in layers or tiers in which final assemblers are at the 
top and as we go down we find tiers of system integrators, sub-system integrators, 
and numerous specialized suppliers. As we climb the layers, the firms are supposed to 
be more knowledge intensive. That knowledge generation serves as an attractor to 
other firms, and as such it becomes an agglomeration force. A systemintegrator firm 
is characterized for being a knowledge-intensive organization. This system integrator 
firm can have several facilities scattered around the world. It is important to note that 
the technological content of the activities carried on in those different facilities can 
vary broadly. However, a priori we are going to take the company's place in the 
aerospace pyramid as a signal of its technological level. 77 Therefore 2) the place in 
77It seems unlikely to expect the subsidiary of a leading firm to do actlvltles with the same 
technological complexity as the parent company. We make the assumption that a subsidiary of a top 
150 
the aerospace pyramid of the parent firm in the location is the second criterion. In 
other parts of this text it was explained that the aerospace sector requires a strong 
commitment from government. Since it is a high technology sector, it requires 
support at the financial, infrastructural and educational levels. Thus, 3) the 
institutional support in terms of policy, infrastructure, and education, that 
characterize the location in general and the aerospace industry in particular, is the 
third criterion. 
Regarding the number of firms, table 4.1 shows the distribution of the aerospace 
firms in 15 Mexican states prior to the field work in June 2009. 
tier company will have more chances to do activities with more technological content than a subsidiary 
From a low tier company. Although this assumption is not granted, it was a reasonable guide since 
information prior to the field study was scanty. Also, since Mexico is a newcomer in terms of aircraft 
manufacturing, we assumed national-owned firms would not be much developed in terms of 
technological complexity and thus we did not take them as a selection criterion. Agam, this assumption 
is not granted, but it was practical at the time. Therefore, we decided to identify final assemblers' 
subsidiaries and tier 1 subsidiaries. If a cluster had presence of this type of firms it meant it was in a 
better position than other clusters. 
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Table 4.1
 
Distribution of aerospace firms in Mexico (prior"to the field study, May 2009)
 
STATE TOTAL 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 49 
SONORA 26 
NUEVO LEON 19 
CHIHUAHUA 14 
TAMAULIPAS 10 
QUERETARO 8 
COAHUILA 6 
MEXICO CITY 6 
SAN LUIS POTOSI 6 
JALISCO 5 
STATE OF MEXICO 5 
AGUASCALIENTES 2 
PUEBLA 2 
YUCATAN 2 
GUERRERO 1 
TOTAL 161 
..Source: Promexlco (2009) PowerPomt presentatIon wlth data from the Mmlstry of Economy 
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As it was explained before, not all organizations listed here are private productive 
firms. There was no unique criterion to set apart the states which (by their number of 
firms) could eventually be identified as an aerospace cluster. However, it seemed 
intuitive to set the lower threshold by including either Tamaulipas or Querétaro (ten 
and eight firms respectively). Given the attention Querétaro was receiving at that 
moment we decided to set the lower limit to include Querétaro. Therefore, initially 
we selected Baja California, Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and 
Querétaro. 
In terms of the place in the aerospace pyramid of the aerospace firms we listed all the 
firms that were either final assemblers or Tier 1 subsidiaries. Baja California stood 
first with the presence of companies like Honeywell Aerospace (Tier 1 firm in 
avionics and turbines), Gulfstream (final assembler of business jets), Lockheed 
Martin Aeronautics (final assembler of military aircraft), and Rockwell Collins (Tier 
1 firm in video systems). In a second group, the states of Querétaro and Chihuahua 
counted with firms like Bombardier (Final assembler of regional jets), Messier 
Services (Tier 1 in landing gears) in the former, and Honeywell Aerospace, and 
Cessna (final assembler of business jets) in the latter. Following the list, the states of 
Sonora and Nuevo Leon had within their borders companies like Goodrich (Tier 1 
firm in landing gears) in the former, and MD Helicopters (final assembler of 
helicopters). At the time of this evaluation there was little information about the state 
of Tamaulipas, but recent accounts reveals only one medium profile company like 
Chromalloy. This information leaded us to left out Tamaulipas and to continue with 
the exploration about the institutional environment prevailing in the states of Baja 
California, Querétaro, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Nuevo Leon. 
By means of their web pages, regional development offices In Baja California, 
Querétaro, and Nuevo Leon were the ones that stood up with more information about 
the firms, institutions and activities related to the aerospace sector. The three regional 
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development offices of these states were promoting three specific aspects of their 
respective clusters: 1) existence of a business chamber grouping aerospace firms, 2) 
the setup of education and training programs targeted to the sector in universities and 
technical schools, and 3) the support of state government in attending and promoting 
the sector. Information about Chihuahua and Sonora was scanty. 
With just the preliminary information mentioned so far, Baja California and 
Querétaro were the states that had the highest potential for developing an aerospace 
cluster. Accordingly, those two states were automatically selected to be included in 
the field work. Even if there was scanty information regarding the institutional 
support and promotion of the regional development office in Chihuahua, we decided 
to keep it for the research because of the firms established there, and because of the 
weight of the state in the national economy in general. If the contribution of 
Chihuahua to the national economy is important, the Nuevo Leon contribution is even 
greater; also, the educational institutions in that state are considered among the best in 
the country. Therefore we included Nuevo Leon in spite of the lack of big names 
located there. The few high profile firms in the stateof Sonora, plus the scanty 
evidence about the infrastructure targeted to support the sector were factors for not 
including it in the research. 
Once the four states were selected, the second step was to select the cities. In Baja 
California two cities accounted for the majority of firms, Mexicali (the state capital) 
and Tijuana (which, together with Ciudad Juarez is the most important border city in 
terms of manufacturing). In the state of Querétaro, sorne firms were scattered around 
the capital state city of Querétaro while others were within. Thus, choosing the city 
was not a problem. The metropolitan area of Monterrey that is comprised of several 
counties is where the aerospace activity takes place in Nuevo Leon. Although no firm 
is located in the city of Monterrey, which is the capital of the Nuevo Leon state, ail of 
them are accessible by car from Monterrey City. The state of Chihuahua has two 
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main cities and industrial centers, Chihuahua (the state capital) and Ciudad Juarez. 
Although preliminary information showed that Ciudad Juarez had sorne aerospace 
activity, it turned out that sorne firms were mislabeUed as aerospace and the others 
were only partiaUy involved in aerospace. The city of Chihuahua is both the host of 
important aerospace firms, and the target of state government support. AU firms in the 
city of Chihuahua were located within the city. 
Once the cities of Mexicali, Tijuana, Querétaro, Monterrey, and Chihuahua were 
chosen, the next step was to choose the firms. For Mexicali and Tijuana, the 
information that the regional development office provided regarding the firms was 
very complete. The interest of the research is centered on big firms with a substantial 
activity in aerospace. For that reason we targeted firms with more than 100 
employees and with a major involvement in aerospace activity. AU firms with those 
characteristics contained in a report of the Baja California government were asked to 
participate in the research. In the end, fifteen firms agreed to respond to the 
questionnaire; eight from Mexicali and seven from Tijuana. The process was similar 
for Monterrey, in which 4 firms took part in the study. It turned out that most of the 
firms in Monterrey were Mexican-owned firms that supply metaUic parts. For 
Querétaro, the process was similar and five firms agreed to respond the questionnaire. 
FinaUy, thanks to the guidance of the regional development office of the state of 
Chihuahua we contacted six important firms that were not initiaUy contemplated. 
After our arrivaI the regional development offices of the four states were cooperative 
and provided guidance about which firms were worth to be included. Thanks to that 
information, sorne smaUer firms with a very high involvement in the industry were 
also included. In the end, thirty firms distributed in five cities answered the 
questionnaire in a face-to-face interview (see map below in figure 4.1). From those 
thirty firms, seven are Mexican owned- and controUed, one is a joint-venture of 
mixed domestic and foreign capital, and the rest twenty-two are subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations. 
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Figure 4.1 
Five selected cities in four Mexican states. 
BAJACALlFORNIA 
Tijuana Mexicali 
\ *._. 1 \ ~~~ 
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4.3. Statistical treatment 
Since most of the questions included in the Questionnaire represent categorical 
statistical variables, descriptive statistical tools are used to illustrate the clusters 
characteristics. Almost all hypotheses raised in this work claim that aerospace firms 
in Mexico will be similar in several aspects. In statistical parlance, it is expected that 
firms exhibit the same value for a determined variable. For instance, for the variable 
"level of innovation", Hypothesis 2 claims that the most frequent value for that 
variable will be "new to the country processes and products" as opposed to other 
values like "new to the world processes and products" or new to the firm. 
When using likert scale questions, 1 corresponds to not important and 5 to very 
important. When firms declared that that particular characteristic did not apply for 
them, the value was O. When using cross tabulation, the chi-square test for 
independence of two variables78 is presented. Given the size of the sample, in sorne 
cases the expected count in sorne cells is lower than the recommended (usually five 
counts). For this reason, the Yates correction for continuity statistic79, a non­
parametric test, is also shown. This non-parametric test returns a p-value using a 
Monte Carlo simulation (Verzani, 2005). Below is a list that summarizes how the 
research questions are going to be addressed 
78 The statistical software used to obtain this statistic was SPSS.
 
79 The statistical software used to obtain this statistic was PSPP and verified with the R program (both
 
free programs).
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Table 4.2
 
List of questions, variables and information sources
 
Research question Variables Information source 
1. How manufacturing firms • Type of activities: • Reports from 
from a high technology manufacturing, R&D, Promexico and 
industry overcome the orMRO. Femia. 
limitations of the local • Innovation: process or • Questionnaire 
medium, which has an product, and at firm, (section II.1 and 
important industrial country or national III.!) 
infrastructure but lacks a level. 
specifie one for aerospace? • Sources of knowledge: 
firm's departments, 
location of and type of 
external organizations 
2.	 What are the centripetal • Advantages provided • QuestiOIUlai re 
forces at work in Mexican by being ln specifie (section 1.1 and 
aerospace clusters? Are clusters in Mexico II.2) 
there firms that can be • Business interaction 
considered anchor tenants? among firms: input and 
output links 
•	 Differences between 
different clusters ln 
Mexico 
3.	 Are there elements that can • Existence of • Interviews with 
be considered part of a knowledge-producing regional 
nascent aerospace system organizations promotion offices 
of production (and. Policy measures and • QuestiOlUlaire 
innovation) in Mexico governrnent support (section II.3) 
•	 General vision for the • Report from the 
sector	 Ministry of 
Economy 
CHAPTER V
 
RESULTS
 
5.1 Type of activities, innovation and sources of knowledgè 
As we saw in previous chapters, the majority of the aerospace firms 10cated in 
Mexico are devoted to manufacturing. The sample selected for the survey is also 
composed by a majority of manufacturing firms. In this section we want to illustrate 
if these firms achieve sorne level of innovation in their activities as well as the 
internai and externa1 sources of knowledge that in sorne way helped to develop that 
novelty. 
Table 5.1 
Novelty degree of new products 
Degree of the novelty introduced Counts 0/0 
None 1 3.33% 
Firm 21 70.00% 
Country 2 6.67% 
World 6 20.00% 
Table 5.1 shows that almost all firms produced at least one new product in the last 
three years. It is important to clarify that manufacturing a new product does not 
automatically imply that the firm designed the product. In fact, none of these firms 
were the designers of the new products they manufactured. Nevertheless, it is 
impo11ant to stress the manufacturing of new products because they represent 
adjustments to existing practices and as such it is a 1earning process that otherwise 
will not take place. Only 20% of the firms declared that the new product they 
manufactured was a world novelty. Again, this does not mean that these firms 
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designed the product. The participation in the world novelty of these firms was due to 
either creating a nove1 process to manufacture a product designed (and even 
manufactured) elsewhere, or by manufacturing it for the first time. According to sorne 
personal communications with interviewees, this is the result of optimization 
strategies followed by foreign firms, in which the subsidiary is in charge of not just 
manufacturing, but also of the design of the process, while the parent company gets 
more concentrated in designing, testing and prototyping the product. We have to wait 
to know if this trend consolidates or not. It is important to note that the design of the 
manufacturing process requires certain advanced ski Ils. 
Table 5.2
 
Internai sources of knowledge that had an impact in the new products and processes
 
introduced
 
Firm's department Average contribution 
Research and Development 0.97 
Marketing 0.62 
Engineering 4.79 
Management 4.17 
Table 5.2 shows which part of the firms were the most important to tackle the 
obstacles that new products represent. In a scale of 1 to 5, firms were asked to 
evaluate the importance of these four firms' departments in their contribution to 
undertaking new products. The Engineering and Management departments were 
considered by almost of firms as very important. This is consistent with the idea that 
most of these firms have to tack1e engineering problems to manufacturing processes 
for products made elsewhere. It is important to note that the low values of R&D and 
Marketing are due in great part to the fact that a lot of firms gave a value of zero to 
that question. If we take the average value for only the firms that gave a value 
between 1 and 5 the results are 3.5 and 3 respectively, stilliess than 4.79 and 4.17 for 
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Engineering and Management in table S.2. Most of these firms were Mexican-owned 
firms. Thus, it can be argued that subsidiaries, by being part of the manufacturing 
department of a bigger firm, do not need to develop in-house R&D or marketing, 
whereas Mexican firms have to do it to a certain extent. That extent is limited though, 
as it is shown in the average values, in which even for national-owned firms values 
for Engineering and Management are bigger in their contribution to new products and 
processes. 
Even if internaI sources of knowledge are important, the ability to obtain sources of 
knowledge external to the firm is crucial in this high technology sector. Table S.3 
shows the different sources of knowledge external to the firm according to the 
location of those sources. It is completely clear that headquarters are the main sources 
of novel ideas for the aerospace firms in Mexico with 70% of the firms declaring that 
to be their main knowledge provider. The second most cited source of ideas are 
clients located outside the country with 66.67%. Global suppliers were mentioned by 
20% of the firms. The only relatively important local source of knowledge was local 
research institutes with 20%. Ali other factors received a response of less than 20%. 
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Table 5.3
 
Sources of knowledge external to the firm that had an impact in the new products
 
introduced
 
External source Counts % 
Local research institute 6 20.00% 
Local university 1 3.33% 
Local consultant 1 3.33% 
Local firms 0 0.00% 
Local suppliers 3 10.00% 
Country research institute 1 3.33% 
Country clients 1 3.33% 
Global headquarters 21 70.00% 
Global clients 14 46.67% 
Global research institute 0 0.00% 
Global university 1 3.33% 
Global consultant 3 10.00% 
Global competitors 4 13.33% 
Global firms 1 3.33% 
Global suppliers 6 20.00% 
Practically all foreign-owned firms declared they received valuable information and 
training from their headquarters in order to put in place their manufacturing 
processes. Also, sorne firms (among them foreign subsidiaries but not only) declared 
that clients located elsewhere were important contributors of ideas. That usually 
implied that clients made the trip to Mexico to advise the firms about their products' 
requirements and the best way to meet them. Global suppliers were also mentioned 
by 20% of the firms as important sources of knowledge. Thus we have a situation in 
which knowledge external to the firm cornes from agents located outside the clusters, 
or for that matter outside the country. The only local sources of knowledge with sorne 
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relevance were the local research institutes. However, it should be mentioned that the 
questionnaire asked for external sources of relevant knowledge and also to evaluate 
the importance of it on a scale from 1 to 5, being 1 low importance and 5 of high 
importance. In this case, although six firms declared being helped in sorne way by a 
local research institute, the average value they assigned to that help was 2.7. On the 
contrary, the average value firms assigned to knowledge coming from headquarters, 
global clients and global suppliers were 5.0, 4.2 and 4.2 respectively. 
Although, as we explain before, in aerospace it is expected to exist a close 
relationship between the subsidiaries (or independent firms) and their headquarters 
(or system integrators), and as such, knowledge external to the c1uster should be 
expected, in the Mexican case, the technological level of complementary-knowledge 
organizations such as research institutes, universities, and specialized suppliers seem 
low to represent an important source of innovative ideas for Mexican aerospace firms. 
In fact, the lack of specialized suppliers was a common complaint among 
interviewees. 
5.2 Mexican clusters' advantages, interaction among firms, and differences between 
c1usters 
There are two pieces of information in the survey that are relevant to answer research 
question 2 of this thesis about the centripetal forces of aerospace clusters in Mexico. 
First, there is a question that lists possible local advantages, and asks firms if they 
benefit from those advantages or not. Second, there is an open question about why the 
firm chose that specifie c1uster ta establish in the first place, and then the diverse 
reasons given by the respondents were compared and grouped. 
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Table 5.4 
Local advantages 
Advantages Answer Counts Column % 
No 4 13.30% 
Labour 
Yes 26 86.70% 
No 5 16.70% 
Industrial Areas 
Yes 25 83.30% 
No 29 96.70% 
Suppliers 
Yes 1 3.30% 
No 28 93.30% 
Clients 
Yes 2 6.70% 
No Il 36.70% 
Policy 
Yes 19 63.30% 
No 15 50.00% 
Co-location 
Yes 15 50.00% 
No 2 6.70% 
Infrastructure 
Yes 28 93.30% 
Universities and Research No 7 23.30% 
Centres Yes 23 76.70% 
No 28 93.30% 
Financial advantages 
Yes 2 6.70% 
No 19 63.30% 
Incentives 
Yes Il 36.70% 
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Table 5.4 captures the local advantages that firms consider they have by being located 
in a Mexican aerospace cluster. From the ten local advantages listed, six were 
identified as such by more than 50% of the firms. The local advantage most cited 
with 93.3% of positive answers is the infrastructure. This means that almost aU 
surveyed firms considered that the infrastructure of the locality provided an 
advantage. By infrastructure the questionnaire makes reference to the transportation 
and telecommunications infrastructure. The existence and quality of industrial areas 
was considered by 83.3% of the firms as an advantage. The third most cited 
advantage was the labour force with 86.7%. Respondents usuaUy complemented their 
answer by adding that the workers were skiUed and accustomed to the factory 
envirorunent. The fact that the locality host universities and research centers was the 
fourth most cited advantage with 76.7%. It is important to mention that almost aU the 
affirmative answers to this question did so because of the university and not because 
of the research centres. The fifth advantage was the existence of policy measuresso 
with 63.3%. VirtuaUy aU the respondents, who answered positively, added that the 
policy measure they were referring to was the maquiladora program. This policy 
measure can be considered as a horizontal policy because is not specifically targeted 
to any sector in particular. The sixth most cited advantage was to be co-location with 
other aerospace firms. Half of the firms answered yes while the other half said they 
did not find any advantage by being close to other aerospace firms. 
The items that received less positive answers were incentives, clients, financial aid, 
and suppliers. Particularly the last three items have a negligible percentage of positive 
answers, while incentives, as we are going to see in table 5.7 later, have an important 
role when the sample is divided. By policy measures we mean the broad vision 
80 In the questionnaire, the difference between Policy and Incentives is the following: by Policy we 
mean the broad and systematic government measures towards certain economic objective; by 
Incentives we mean single measures that are not necessarily under the framework of a broad policy. 
Although we are conscious that the two sometimes overlap, in the interviews respondents associated 
the word poJicy with the maquiladora policy. 
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behind government systematic actions, while by incentives we refer to specifie 
instruments to accomplish that vision. In this sense, 63.3% ofthese firms (as others in 
other sectors) have a positive image associated with the maquiladora policy which is 
basically an export promotion policy aimed, but not exclusively, to foreign firms. It is 
important to note that positive answers were related to the maquiladora policy but not 
to a policy targeted specifically to aerospace. Nonetheless, although few, there are 
sorne positive opinions on which could represent sorne incentives that may be 
identified as belonging to a policy targeted to aerospace as table 5.7 shows. 
Regarding clients and suppliers, it is clear that these are not located in Mexico and as 
such they do not represent any advantage. By financial aid, the questionnaire makes 
reference to the possibility to tap banks or other financial entities to obtain resources. 
One problem of the Mexican financial system is precisely the mismatch between 
bank institutions and productive demands, and the results confirm that situation. In 
fact, in the last part of the questionnaire when asked about the sources of financial 
resources for new investments, 100% aIl firms declared that they come from 
corporate or own resources, and only two firms declared using credit (one from a 
development bank and one from a private bank) in addition to those sources. 
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Table 5.5 
Former attraction factors 
Attraction factors Answer Counts Column % 
No 15 50.00% 
US proximity 
Yes 15 50.00% 
No 23 76.70% 
Low labour costs 
Yes 7 23.30% 
No 24 80.00% 
Low operation costs 
Yes 6 20.00% 
No 24 80.00% 
Owner's region origin 
Yes 6 20.00% 
No 22 73.30% 
Experience in industrial sectors 
Yes 8 26.70% 
167 
Another important plece of information is table 5.5, which shows the original 
attraction factors that firms took in account before establishing in Mexico. This was 
an open question in which similar answers were grouped (This may explain the lower 
percentages compared to table 5.4). From the several answers given to this question 
we are going to present the five most prevalent. Of all surveyed firms, 50% declared 
that proximity to the United States was among the reasons for establishing in Mexico. 
This is the attraction factor with major prevalence in aerospace firms in Mexico. The 
previous manufacturing experience of the Mexican localities was the second most 
cited reason with 26.67%. It is important to note that this experience is not 
necessarily related with aerospace. The low cost of the labour force was the third 
most cited attraction factor with 23.33%. Low operation costs and owners original 
location follow with 20% each. 
The fact that proximity to the US stood up as an important factor for former attraction 
deserves sorne discussion. First, US subsidiaries and national firms that primarily sell 
their products to the US, are a big part of the sample, thus, the result may simply 
imply savings on transportation costs (whether for inputs or outputs). However, most 
of these interviewees declared that they work very closely with their parent firms in 
the other side of the border. In sorne cases, personnel from both sides visited each 
other on a weekly basis. Although, it is tempting to think that the manufacturing 
processes transferred from the parent company are completely codified and thus, they 
do not need too much supervision, it seems that indeed, tight coordination is needed. 
As we are going to see later, this means that those manufacturing processes are 
relatively complex, and involve both tacit and codified knowledge. Also, theoretically 
this may reinforce the notion put forward by Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) that says 
that aerospace activities are not completely codified, thus they should be coordinated. 
Even though this coordination can be enforced over long distances, it seems that 
geographical closeness coupIed with sharing the same time zone has sorne 
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advantages. Nevertheless this is only a tentative explanation that deserves further 
inquiry. 
The appearing of answers like low labour costs, low operation costs and experience in 
industrial sectors reinforce what we already saw in table 5.4. 1t should be explained 
that labour and industrial experience are not necessarily related with specifie 
aerospace abilities as it would be hardly ·the case in a country that does not have an 
important previous experience in the sector. However, the experience in 
manufacturing activities related with automotive and auto-parts industries may indeed 
be important assets. This seems to be the case for harnesses, in which Mexico has an 
important experience regarding automotive. Apparently, these electronic-related skills 
can be of good use in the case of aerospace. This case may be also true for others 
activities. 
As Hypothesis 2 suggests, the centripetal forces that Mexico's aerospace clusters 
exhibit, are related to manufacturing advantages. Specifically, the advantages more 
valued by aerospace firms are related to the 1) industrial infrastructure, 2) the skilled 
1. labor force, and 3) the low operation costs. Regarding the first aspect, it is clear that 
the transport and telecommunication infrastructure [table 5.4, 93.3%], and the 
presence of industrial areas [table 5.4, 83.3%], procure firms the facilities needed to 
carry on manufacturing activities, and gives the overall impression that Mexican 
localities have a relevant experience in manufacturing [table 5.5, 26.7%]. On the 
second aspect, the presence of a labor pool that in addition to be cheap [table 5.5, 
23.3%] is it considered skilled [table 5.4, 86.7%], makes possible the undertaking of 
manufacturing processes that sometimes demand technological sophistication. The 
presence of universities in these localities adds to this capacity [table 5.4, 76.7%]. In 
addition to the two mentioned aspects, the presence of the maquiladora policy [table 
5.4,63.3%] keeps operation costs on low levels. 
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There is also information about the inputs and outputs flows of the firms, which will 
be very useful to explore their degree of connectedness to the local environment. 
Figure 5.1
 
Mexico's aerospace firms' inputs origin and sales destinations (year 2008)
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Regarding the input-output links, there is a clear pattern that can be seen in figure 
5.1 81 . When asked about the origin country of their critical inputs, it can be seen that 
more than 80% of the firms declared that the US was one of their sources of 
specialized inputs. If we take Europe as a whole the percentage was only 15%. The 
next source of specialized inputs is Canada with 10% of the firms. Finally, few firms 
sourced inputs from Asia and Latin America. In the same token, a very similar pattern 
81 This figure shows the countries to which Mexican firms send their exports or source their inputs. 
Sorne firms sourced 100% of their inputs or sold their exports to just one country, while other firms 
mentioned more than one country. Mexico is included in Latin America. 
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in terms of geographical importance can be seen when looking at the destination of 
Mexico's aerospace firms' outputs. One difference is that in this case the percentages 
were higher. This means that the number of countries to which firms send their 
outputs is bigger than the number of countries from which they receive their inputs. 
This also seems to suggest that the US continues to be a leading source of specialized 
inputs. 
Since innovation to the world in the strict sense82 is almost completely absent in 
Mexican aerospace firms, since no major system integrator has located in Mexico to 
produce entire planes, and most inputs are imported, it is difficult to claim that a firm 
can act as an anchor tenant. Moreover, the perspectives of one national anchor being 
developed are not very bright. As we have seen, the majority of the subsidiaries do 
not carry on R&D activities. These firms are concentrated in manufacturing and in 
fact it seems they have a good performance in that area. AIso, in an informai question 
about possible venues for the plants, a lot of managers answered that the plans are to 
strength and wide the current manufacturing capacities. In the case of the national­
owned firms the existing R&D effol1s are limited, and moreover, they are .conducted 
to tailor manufacturing processes to meet the standards of their clients. 
Perhaps a first step to consolidate an anchor tenant firm will be precisely to 
strengthen the manufacturing capacity. However, the fact that some firms may 
eventually excel in manufacturing capacities does not automatically lead to the 
developing of R&D capacities83 . In this sense it should be very clear that policy 
measures should be taken to build a technological infrastructure (not simply a 
transportation and communication one) and to deliver a set of incentives able to 
encourage firms (both domestically and foreign owned) to carry on R&D activities. 
82 This is if we consider innovation as the whole uncertain and serendipitous process that begins with
 
the conception of a new product or technology, goes through R&D, continues to manufacturing and
 
ends in successful introduction on the market.
 
83 The historical example of the automotive industry is very revealing in this sense.
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Contrary to well-known aerospace clusters, in Mexico there are no anchor tenant 
firms. This is consistent with what we saw in Question 1 in which centripetal forces 
were related with manufacturing advantages and not with Marshallian externalities. 
The majority of firms' links whether for knowledge or for business, are made with 
cluster-external agents, therefore, it can be argued that Mexican aerospace clusters are 
in a very embryonic state. 
An important point in this study has to do with the differences among clusters. For 
this analysis the firms were divided into two groups, inland clusters and border 
clusters, each one, coincidentally with 50% of the observations. Mexicali and Tijuana 
were considered border clusters, while Querétaro, Monterrey and Chihuahua were 
labelled inland clusters. There are two reasons for this partitioning. The first one is 
that Mexicali and Tijuana are literally border cities whose dynamics are extremely 
linked with their US counterparts. Although Chihuahua and Monterrey are located in 
states that border with the US, their distance from the border prevents these localities 
to exhibit the amount of links usually found in border cities. The second reason has to 
do with the experience in the maquiladora program. Although that program is now 
extensive to the whole country, initially it was implemented in the border. For this 
reason, the border localities have a longer tradition in the maquiladora program 
compared to inland cities. 
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Table 5.6
 
Differences between border and inland clusters regarding local advantages
 
Locality Chi-square p- Yates correction for 
Advantages Answer Border % Inland % value continuity p-value 
No 20.00% 6.70% 
Labour 
Yes 80.00% 93.30% 0.283" 0.S9 
No 26.70% 6.70% 
Industrial Areas 
Yes 73.30% 93.30% 0.142" 0.33 
No 93.30% 100.00% 
Suppliers 
Yes 6.70% 0.00% 0.309"·b 1.00 
Clients 
No 
Yes 
100.00% 
0.00% 
86.70% 
13.30% 0.143 
a
•
b 0.46 
No 33.30% 40.00% 
Policy 
Yes 66.70% 60.00% 0.70S 1.000 
No 80.00% 20.00% 
Co-location 
Yes 20.00% 80.00% 0.001* 0.00 
No 13.30% 0.00% 
Infrastructure 
Yes 86.70% 100.00% 
0.143"·b 0.46 
Universities and Research No 40.00% 6.70% 
Centers Yes 60.00% 93.30% 0.031'" 0.08 
No 100.00% 86.70% 
Financial advantages 
Yes 0.00% 13.30% 
0.143"·b 0.46 
No 86.70% 40.00% 
Incentives 
Yes 13.30% 60.00% 0.008* 0.02 
a. More than 20% of cells have an expected count less than S. Chi-square results may not be 
valid. 
b. Minimal expected count is inferior ta one. Chi-square results may not be val id. 
*. Chi-square is significant at O.OS. 
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Applying a standard test of independence of variables reveals differences between 
inland and border firms regarding sorne of the variables related with advantages 
obtained by being in a cluster. Table 5.6 shows that those variables are co-location, 
universities and research centers, and incentives. This means that firms in inland 
clusters value the fact of being co-Iocated with other aerospace firrns, while firms in 
border clusters usually do not consider that to be an advantage. Both valued the 
existence of universities, but inland firms showed a higher acceptance. Again, inland 
clusters valued more the incentives provided by governments than their border 
counterparts. 
Although more information is needed, it seems that hypothesis 4 is confirmed. Two 
factors might explain the notorious difference in the values observed for Co-location 
and Incentives. One is that indeed more policy measures have been implemented in 
inland cities (see below table 5.7), and the other factor might be that the institutional 
environment in terms of the presence of research institutes and skilled labour is richer 
in these cities compared to border cities. Therefore, even if in general the Mexican 
innovation system is underdeveloped, regions show different conditions. Another 
important piece of information that may have sorne influence in this situation is the 
firms' age that on average is of 19.3 years for border firms while it is of 5.6 years for 
inland firms. A tentative interpretation is that inland firms were indeed attracted to 
Mexico at the time in which promotion of the aerospace sector started to be 
noticeable, and as such these firms were more informed about the possible incentives 
offered by Mexican programs. Also, our sample of inland firms contain more 
European and Mexican firrns, and as a result lesser US firms cornpared to our sample 
of border firms, which may explain why these firms are not much interested to be 
specifically in the border (although being in Mexico in general, which is a bordering 
country to the US, seems to be an important factor anyway). 
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5.3 Knowledge complementary organizations, policy measures and government 
VISIOn 
Table 5.7 shows the specifie incentives aerospace firms declared having been 
received. For the overall sample, the most mentioned incentives were labour training 
support and R&D fund support with 56.7% and 43.3% respectively. As it was later 
corroborated with regional promotion offices, the labour training support consists on 
paying the salary of new employees for the first months, covering the expenses of 
specifie training programs and travel when this training took place elsewhere 
(sometimes in the country of origin of the firm). In some cases the firms obtained 
only one of those supports listed. When it comes to R&D fund support, a word of 
caution is needed. Although we do not have the detailed information about the 
projects aided under that program, according to the interviews with the firms and to 
the type of innovation these firms declared (see table 5.1), most of these projects were 
mainly technology transfer projects or projects related with novel manufacturing 
processes. In terms of promotion and subsidies, few firms declared being aided in that 
way, 10% and 20% respectively. Promotion was related with international aerospace 
fairs, and subsidies consisted on considerable savings on land and energy. Inland 
firms feel more supported by being in a cluster than border firms; table 5.7 shows that 
indeed the former firms receive more R&D fund supports and more labour training 
support. 
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Table 5.7
 
Differences between border and inland clusters regarding incentives received
 
Locality Chi-square Yates correction for 
Incentives Answer Border % Inland % Total p-value continuity p-value 
R&D fund 
support 
No 
Yes 
73.3% 
26.7% 
40.0% 
60.0% 
56.7% 
43.3% 
0.06S",b 0.14 
Labour training 
support 
No 
Yes 
66.7% 
33.3% 
20.0% 
80.0% 
43,3% 
56.7% 
O.OIO·,b,· 0.03 
No 86.7% 93.3% 90.0% 
Promotion 0.S43",b 1.00 
Yes 13.3% 6.7% 10.0% 
No 93.3% 66.7% 80.0% 
Subsidies 0.068a.b 0.17 
Yes 6.7% 33.% 20.0% 
a. More than 20% of ce\ls have an expected count less than 5. Chi-square results may not be 
valid. 
b. Minimal expected count is inferior ta one. Chi-square results may not be valid. 
*. Chi-square statistic is significant at 0.05. 
Interviews with regional governments and a report from the Ministry of Economy 
will allow us to have good insights about the policy measures taken to support the 
aerospace sector and thus be able to answer research question 3. The four states 
selected for our study claim to have a cluster approach to support the aerospace 
sector. Their definitions about what is an aerospace cluster are not quite extensive (at 
least in an explicit form). In the case of Querétaro, they claim to base their efforts in 
successful models seen in places like Toulouse, Wichita, Montreal, and Seattle84 . In 
the case of the Monterrey Aerocluster (as it is called) the organization model includes 
the triple helix: industry, academia and government working in an interactive way85. 
Baja California government is relaxed in geographical terms, because it takes the two 
cities of Mexicali and Tijuana as being part of the state aerospace cluster, although it 
is fair to say that the two cities are 176 kilometres apart and the driving distance is 
84 Interview with the Secretariat of Sustainable Development of the State of Querétaro, and an 
unpublished document of the Secretariat (The Aerospace Industry in Mexico: p. 3). 
85 Interview with the Secretariat ofEconomic Development of the State of Nuevo Le6n, and a 
promotional brochure of the Monterrey Aerocluster. 
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about two hours, which still makes feasible repeated contacts among people located 
in those cities. However, this state is more specifie in their "Aerospace Cluster 
Strategy" which includes: investment attraction, support sector integration, human 
resources, regulations and certifications, technology development, and education 
institutions linkages86. The state of Chihuahua prefers the Spanish word 
agrupamienlo87 instead of cluster, but no state publication or presentation makes a 
definition of the aerospace agrupamiento. 88 In terms of vision, Mexican policy 
recognizes the importance of firms as the main carriers of technologies, but it also 
recognizes the need to involve more actors. However, the overall vision falls short 
because it does not stress the processes that should be pursued (e.g. irmovation, R&D 
and system integration) and instead stresses the different actors as if the presence of 
an üEM will imply automatically the undertaking of high knowledge-content 
activities. Ev_en if in sorne instances, the policy does mention that irmovation should 
be achieved in the future, the steps and measures needed to achieve it are not 
explained. 
While their definition of an aerospace cluster is quite short, what seems to be true for 
the four clusters (if we take Mexicali and TUuana as one cluster) -in sorne way 
inspired by the triple helix, as the Monterrey Aerocluster suggests- is indeed the 
recognition of industry, academia and government as key players. Here we want to 
stress the actions taken by regional governments to foster the industry and academic 
players. Regarding industry, what governments do is participating in prom~tion and 
providing sorne incentives. As was mentioned in section 2.4, state governments 
actively participate in international aerospace fairs as part of the Mexican stand. In 
86 Interview with the Secretariat of Economie Development of the State of Baja California, and a
 
document entitled "Development of the Aeronautics Industry Cluster in Baja Califomia" elaborated by
 
PRODUCEN.
 
87 This word can be taken as a literai translation of c1uster.
 
88 Interview with the Secretariat ofIndustrial Development of the State of Chihuahua, and sorne
 
PowerPoint presentations of the Secretariat.
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terms of incentives, these regional promotion offices help these firms to apply for 
R&D support funds upon CONACYT (The National Council for Science and 
Technology). The support of regional goverrunents is mainly concentrated in helping 
firms to meet financial needs related with labour training, certifications, and 
promotion issues. They also orient firms in logistic and legal issues. 89 In terms of the 
academia, the four clusters have worked with local universities to open four-year 
engineering programs in aeronautics. The public State University of Baja Califomia 
in its campus of Mexicali has already opened such a program. In Chihuahua, the 
Autonomous University of Chihuahua located in Chihuahua City has an aeronautics 
program. In the case of Monterrey, the Autonomous University of Nuevo Le6n in its 
Monterrey campus was one of the first to introduce the program. When it cornes to 
Querétaro the supports has been stronger. A completely new, dedicated aeronautics 
university has been created with the expressed purpose to support the sector in the 
formation of human resources. It provides engineering and technical degrees. In 
addition, the well-known private higher education institution, Instituto Tecnol6gico 
de Monterrey provides a specialization in aeronautics for sorne of its engineering 
programs at its Querétaro campus. Thus, so far government support has been stronger 
in the Querétaro cluster, because in addition to the new dedicated aerospace 
university, an aerospace industrial park was built adjacent to the city's airport. In 
terms of creating an institutional environment akin to the aerospace sector, those have 
been the biggest efforts. In a way, these represent an advance in terms of the 
technological infrastructure. However, what is still lacking is the creation of research 
centres with a clear mandate and equipment to support the industry. So far, the only 
research centre with sorne impact is the CIATQ located also in Querétaro, which 
assisted General Electric to create its aerospace division in Mexico. As we saw in 
table 5.3, in general, firms do not find present-day research centres very helpful. 
89 Although it is not official, when firms with big investment plans come to the country, the state in 
question together with the national government usually offer land. 
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The report called "Plan de Vuelo Nacional,,9o (National Flight Plan) made by the 
Ministry of Economy does mention sorne issues of technological specialization and 
cluster targeting. Specifically, the report identifies the clusters of Baja California and 
Querétaro as Strategic Poles of Innovation. According to the report, these two clusters 
are under the area of influence of the aerospace corridor of western US (Washington 
state and California) and the aerospace corridor of eastern Canada and US (Montreal, 
Washington D.C. Area, Georgia, Texas, Kansas) respectively. As the report itself 
says, this designation is based more on the potential than the CUlTent state of 
techno10gical capabilities. As was mentioned above, for sorne reason, Querétaro has 
become the de facto recipient of federal aid. The designation of Baja California seems 
to be due to the number of firms, that one may add, established there more because of 
US proximity than because of government aid. It should be acknowledged that there 
is indeed sorne sort of selection present in the Mexican policy by designating only 
two places as "strategic", although it seems that Querétaro has received the largest 
share of that support. Nevertheless, the report does not mention which special 
treatment and policy measures these two clusters will receive as a result of that 
designation. 
Regarding specialization III a specific aeronautical technology area, the report 
mentions the following specializations for the clusters: Baja California, Electrical­
Electronics; Chihuahua, Electrical-Electronics and engine components; Querétaro, 
Engine components and sub-assembly, and heat and superficial treatment; Nuevo 
Leon, overhaul and maintenance. These profiles seem to be based on the type of 
products currently manufactured by the more important firms in the respective 
clusters. However, apparently there are not signs that a technological platform (like 
dedicated research laboratories, or the attraction of specialized suppliers) is in place 
to support those specializations. 
90 See in references: Plan de Vuelo Nacional. 
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Regarding ownership, there are sorne Mexican-owned firms, and their irnpoltance 
cannot be downplayed. However, at least for the Mexican firms surveyed, none of 
them carries on system or subsystern integration. The report also mentions FDI 
attraction as a way to gather a critical rnass of firms. Thus, presurnably the creation or 
the strengthening of Mexican-owned firrns is not in the governrnent priorities. 
Other crucial e1ement in the policy that seerns to be lacking are financial schemes 
(beyond R&D support) able to provide sufficient funds to carry on important 
investment in these firms. Given the huge sums involved, this kind of support should 
come from the National government, but so far there is no indication that sorne sort of 
this support will be ready soon. 
CHAPTER VI
 
BACK TOTHEORY
 
Throughout the thesis we have tried to analyze the present developments and propose 
future venues for the Mexican aerospace sector with the aid of three main theoretical 
bodies within an evolutionary and innovation systems approach, including clusters 
theory, modularity and the PLC-ILC perspective. It is important to note that 
originally, none of those approaches were developed with the aerospace sector in 
mind; a sector which as we have seen, has several peculiarities that differentiates it 
from others. For that reason we have presented a debate with the theoretical 
foundations of those approaches, plus several contributions of different scholars using 
these and other approaches in order to understand the dynamics of industrial 
aerospace activity. Our theoretical value added is to put together these different 
perspectives within the evolutionary approach. Next, we summarize the main points 
stressed. 
The ILC-PLC theory predicts that once the product (industry) stabilizes in its 
technical dimensions a dominant design emerges and innovation shifts from product 
innovation to process innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Process 
innovations usually favours scale economies (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000), which 
leads to the shakeout of the industry or in other words, to the concentration of 
production in just sorne firms (Klepper, 1996). Complete standardization in the 
maturity stage of this cycle opens the door to delocalization of activities to other 
countries (Vernon, 1966). Sorne have argued (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985) that the 
ILC-PLC theory may not be that pertinent in the case of the aerospace industry, 
among other aspects, because even if there is a dominant design, innovation in 
product is still important (Niosi and Zhegu, 2008), and because activity is still mainly 
concentrated in the traditional leading countries. Niosi and Zhegu (2008) have 
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pointed out that those divergences between what the ILC-PLC theory predicts and 
what is aetually happening can be explained by the innovation system approach. 
Particularly, they have stressed that leading countries in the aircraft industry possess a 
rich environment in terms of R&D infrastructure and government support, while 
other potential countries lacked those conditions, thus reinforcing the leadership of 
these traditional countries and preventing the diffusion of aircraft production activity 
to other places. In this sense, the ILC-PLC theory is still useful if we add the notion 
of innovation systems. Even in the original terms of the ILC-PLC, new players are 
emerging and represent an important part of the aircraft activity. Moreover, contrary 
to the cases of Brazil and China, in which there are important local firms, we argue 
that the case of Mexico in which the main actors are foreign subsidiaries, represents 
the original Vernon (1966) concern about the best-efficient production location (from 
the point of view of the original producer in the developed country) according to the 
cycle stage of the product. However, in order to understand how the ILC-PLC can 
help us to understand delocalization strategies, in addition to an Innovation System 
perspective, we think that the recognition that the aircraft is not a simple product but 
instead a complex product made up of different modules is important too. 
Although the model proposed by Abernathy and Utterback (1978) is very useful, the 
characteristics of the aircraft.as a modulaI' product make it difficult to consider it just 
a single product in terms of the dynamics of product and process innovation. The 
insight of Murmann and Frenken (2006) is very useful in the sense that different 
modules of a complex product may follow different life cycles of their own. 
Therefore, although the dominant design for subsonic civil aircraft has not changed in 
fundamental ways since the 1960s (Kehayas, 2007, Niosi and Zhegu, 2008), this has 
not prevented intense (even radical) change at the module or sub-system levels 
(Frigant and Talbot, 2005; Benzler and Wink, 2010; McGuire et al 2010). Those 
modules with the most intense techno10gical change have acquired more prominence 
over others. The ever increasing costs of aircraft development, coupled with the ever 
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increasing types of technologies applied to aerospace, favour the allocation of more 
responsibilities to sub-system integrators, the arrivai of a handful of new sub-system 
integrators (which also increase competition) and specialized suppliers (Benzler and 
Wink, 2010) and, to a celiain extent, the division of R&D and manufacturing 
activities (Ehret and Cooke, 2010). This trend reinforces the already modular 
architecture of the aircraft, in which different firms can take charge of different 
modules. Moreover, it seems that there is also sorne level of modularity at the sub­
system or module level. This implies that a subsystem integrator can outsource to a 
third party sorne manufacturing work. Later, the integrator receives all the parts 
(sorne of which it produces in subsidiaries in low-cost nations) and integrates them. 
For an industry with tough quality and safety standards this is a huge achievement. lt 
is important to note, that the knowledge and skil1s needed for the integration is what 
set apart these system and sub-system integrator firms from the rest (included sorne 
specialized suppliers). 
Even ifnew teclmologies have been recently incorporated into new generation planes, 
there is a good deal of codified knowledge at the aircraft's teclmology knowledge 
base. This is the result of the industry's history and the existence of a dominant 
design, which is reflected in the reinforcement of the modularity trend. Therefore, on 
one hand, there are important teclmological changes within sorne modules, which 
work in favour of tacitness; one the other hand, there is a degree of maturity, which 
favours codification. According to the ILC-PLC, it is this maturity in terms of the 
product and process (Vernon, 1966) and the consolidation of leader firms (Klepper, 
1996) that open the door for the delocalization of activities. Current leading firms are 
eager to find international partners either to share development and financial 
responsibilities, to seek complementary teclmologies, to access markets, or to lower 
costs (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2007; McGuire et al 2010). 
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Again, there are two facts that at first sight seem to contradict the ILC-PLC theory 
when it cornes to describe delocalization of activities towards low-cost locations. The 
first is that sometimes delocalization of activity does not have to do much with low­
cost but with market and/or teclmology access. This is explained by purposeful 
attempts by governments to foster a local aircraft industry. These governments create 
a series of measures (like offset agreements) and policy supports to encourage the 
setting up of manufacturing and R&D facilities from leading firms sometimes in the 
form of joint ventures with local firms. Of course, most countries willing to create an 
aircraft industry have not been successful. The proposition here is that sorne modules 
and activities of aircraft production are relatively easy to transfer to other locations 
due to the combination of two factors related with two of the approaches seen in the 
thesis: 1) modularity and 2) innovation systems: the first has to do with the degree of 
codification of sorne modules which makes feasible the technology transfer. In this 
sense, it is revealing how Chinese firms are developing the capacity to design and 
assembly their own planes (a capability that was developed by being in joint ventures 
with leader firms that did whole assembly in China), while the most technological 
dynamic modules like engines and avionics for those planes have to be bought from 
the traditional leader firms in those areas. The second element is the continued 
development of capabilities in the host country thanks to a steadily government 
support that among other things provides financial backing. 
The second fact that somehow contradicts PLC-ILC delocalization has to do with a 
temporal dimension. As Niosi and Zhegu (2010) have pointed out, the aircraft 
industry in leading countries have experienced a consolidation of leading firms with 
few exceptions of new entrants like Embraer. According to internationalization 
theories, when firms consolidate their leadership in an oligopolistic structure (like the 
one predicted and confirmed by the ILC-PLC in the case of the aircraft industry), it is 
because they have developed an important advantage that few or none have. Then, 
according to theories like the specific-assets (Caves, 1971) firms will be willing to 
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exploit those assets in other markets. As we saw in the above paragraph this has been 
one of the causes in delocalization of activity towards countries like China. However, 
sometimes the deloca1ization of activities does not seek to exploit new markets but 
simply to lower costs. As we saw throughout the thesis, this has been the main driver 
in the case of Mexico. Thus, the delocalization of activity from leading countries to 
low-cost countries should follow the original pattern predicted by Vernon (1966). The 
proposition in this thesis is that conditions to migrate to Mexico were already in place 
weil before 2005, the year when the trend took force. We propose this because the 
supposed1y advantages that· were promoted to attract aerospace firms were the 
experience in the automobile, electronics and auto parts; sectors which have been in 
the country weil positioned at least since the late 1980s. The existence of a handful 
aerospace manufacturing facilities in Mexicali since the 1960s-1970s reinforce this 
vision. We propose that the delocalization of aerospace activity for reasons of low­
costs locations (like Mexico) experienced a lag in time not predicted by the ILC-PLC 
theory. The reasons for this lag in time can be explained in terms of evolutionary 
economics concepts. Contrary to the vision of rational agents with perfect 
information that can make cost-efficient location decisions with just second hand 
information, Knickerbocker (1973) explains that firms usually are reluctant to do 
activities in places in which they do not have experience. This implies that rationality 
is bounded by the experience of the firm, and that this firm learns on1y as it gets 
familiar with other settings. Since aerospace manufacturing requires stringent 
standards in quality and safety, the reluctance to move such activities is even bigger91 . 
Thus, uncertainty about meeting those standards is the main retarder in the case of 
Mexico with respect to aerospace activity from foreign firms. This idea is reinforced 
by the fact that several foreign firms from other sectors had already facilities in 
9l It is interesting to note that General Electric research facility in Querétaro would be a 
counterexample of the uncertainty argument presented, however, the company as a corporate had 
alreadya good deal of experience in Mexico weIl before the opening of the turbine research facility. 
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Mexico for low-cost reasons (in which the market played a marginal or no role at ail). 
Thus, when the Mexican goverrunent and Bombardier announced the opening of a 
plant in Querétaro, other firms might have fol1owed by two reasons: first, the 
involvement of the goverrunent lowered in sorne way the uncertainty factor; and two, 
as Knickerbocker (1973) proposes, firms cannot afford to lose the advantages that 
first-moving competitors may be gaining by going to other locations. Of course, once 
the firms are in place, they gain valuable knowledge and start to accumulate 
capabilities which reduce their initial uncertainty. These firms may even start to do 
more complex activities as they learn how to develop their resources in the host 
country (Ronstadt, 1978)92 
As we stressed in this thesis, aerospace activity usual1y takes place on clusters. 
Sometimes the word cluster evokes images associated with the industrial districts and 
often recal1s Michael Porter's concept of clusters. Nevertheless, while it is true that 
sorne firms gain advantages by being located in clusters, the reasons behind those 
advantages vary greatly depending on the knowledge base underlying the activities of 
those firms. In this sense, the industrial district and Porter' s cluster are not weil suited 
to explain the realities of aerospace clusters. For instance, the image of a collection of 
complementary firms working in a loosely hierarchical relationship towards the same 
or at least similar productive goals -image that pervades the industrial district 
approach- does not correspond to the fact that different aircraft subsystems can be 
produced in different parts of the world and latter assembled by a final assembler in 
yet another part of the world (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Frigant and Talbot, 2005). For 
this same reason, rivalry within the cluster as proposed by Porter, is not a force in the 
dynamism of the region, since rivais may or may not be located in the same cluster; 
but more important, even if they are, their clients and main suppliers are located ail 
92To continue with the example of GE, it recently announced an extension of its research facilities in 
Querétaro. Milenio online. 20 Il. "GE inviel1e 24 mdd en industria aérea", Milenio online, February 
18. Retrieved from: <http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8913976> 
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over the world. This last argument also diminishes the argument of sophisticated 
demand of final customers within the cluster (as stated by Porter) as an important 
element in the dynamism of the cluster. 
Works on aerospace clusters have revealed that sometimes the mere presence of 
aerospace firms attracts specialized suppliers, thus the location becomes a growth 
pole in the sense of Perroux, because it means that it serves as an attractor of related 
industries. The more developed aerospace clusters usua11y have the presence of an 
anchor tenant firm that besides attracting specialized suppliers, helps to create a 
ski11ed labour pool that eventua11y attract other aerospace firms. These suppliers and 
aerospace firms may not necessarily have a direct business (or knowledge) link with 
the anchor tenant, yet they can instead profit from the technical and institutional 
infrastructure developed thanks to the anchor tenant presence in the region. In fact, a 
good deal of knowledge spi110vers takes place through links between firms located in 
different clusters (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). This anchor tenant is usua11y a final 
assembler or the system integrator of an important module. However, for a system 
integrator to act as an anchor tenant it should be engaged in substantial R&D activity 
(Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003; Niosi and Zhegu, 2010). However, for an aerospace 
cluster to become also an innovation system, other institutional agents like 
governments and education centres are usua11y heavily involved in the support of the 
industry by providing financial aid and by setting up research facilities and training 
programs. 
The above description is not to say that ail aerospace clusters are alike (even in 
developed countries), but to stress the elements that potential clusters should pursue 
in order to become a magnet for aerospace firms and for high technology activities. 
As the mere idea of a life cycle suggests, aerospace clusters may start as potential and 
productive clusters and later become consolidated clusters including sophisticated 
R&D activities. However, even consolidated c1usters suffer changes and it seems that 
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the steady technical change in the industry and the emergence of new countries, are 
critical elements to understand the opportunities and limitations of potential c1usters. 
Although there is not a unique way for newcomer countries to enter the industry, 
sorne strategie steps seem compulsory to be followed. In a first stage, production 
technology has to come from leading firms. For countries without sorne historie 
capability in the sector this is the only feasible option, and they have to rely 
completely on this option. This technology transfer may come in the form of 
manufacturing facilities. To encourage leading firms to transfer more R&D intensive 
activities, it is crucial to invest in developing a technological infrastructure able to 
provide inputs (highly skilled labour, R&D infrastructure such as wind tunnels, or 
public R&D in advanced materials) to those innovative activities. For these 
investments to be efficient, governments need to be involved and to consider two 
issues: the first are clusters, and the second is the type of technology to develop. 
Regarding c1usters, it is unlikely that Mexico, with its limited financial resources, can 
develop many c1usters of aerospace activity. Thus, it should choose among only 
certain localities to concentrate aIl the support on them. In the case oftechnology, the 
increasing importance of sorne aircraft sub-systems and the technology involved in 
them makes almost mandatory to concentrate precisely in just one or few of them. In 
a later moment of the strategy, the creation of a domestically-owned firm should be 
envisaged. As it was stated, this national firm may not be in the final aircraft 
assembly business, but it should certainly target to be a sub-system integrator able to 
carry on R&D intensive activities, or a niche within aireraft production (i.e. tiltrotors, 
skycars). The developing country may also consider the possibility of attracting a 
foreign system integrator in order to leam manufacturing processes, as China has 
done by attracting Embraer from Brazil to produce regional jets in that country. 
· -------------------
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CONCLUSIONS 
Overall conclusions 
The setting up of manufacturing facilities in Mexico by leading aerospace firms took 
notoriety in the press around mid 2000s. Given the still underdeveloped innovation 
system in Mexico, apparently there was a mismatch between the needs of the 
aerospace industry and what the country could provide. This phenomenon attracted 
our attention and raised several questions: How many firms were already there? What 
type of activities are they doing? In which places are they located? Why is it that until 
these years they start to benefit from the industrial infrastructure of Mexico, when 
other industries were well acquainted with it? What have been the incentives given by 
Mexican authorities? 
In this thesis we concentrated on type of activities of aerospace firms (which are 
mainly subsidiaries), attraction forces of Mexican aerospace clusters, and policy 
measures taken by the Mexican government. 
As it was explained, we thought the concepts of modularity, ILC-PLC, and clusters 
would be pertinent to answer those questions. The modularity concept, from the 
management literature, is used to stress that products made up of different parts or 
modules require different knowledge management strategies compared to simpler 
products. The revision of the concept showed that the aircraft is not only modulaI', but 
also a complex product that requires highly specifie knowledge and huge financial 
surus to achieve its design and production. Regarding the ILC-PLC theory, we 
showed how the consolidation of main world players in the aerospace industry plus 
the maturity of sorne parts of the aircraft as a product, allowed us to expect 
delocalization of production to other places. Given that in developed countries 
aerospace activity tends to cluster, the assumption is that location has to sorne extent 
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an influence in the type of activities that firms perform. We showed how sorne world 
aerospace clusters act as growth poles, have anchor tenant firms and institutional 
support for innovation activities. 
With the aid of these three concepts we put forward the hypotheses that the more 
likely aerospace activities to be transferred to a developing country like Mexico 
would be manufacturing activities pertaining to the more mature parts of aircraft 
modules and not R&D or cutting edge activities, and for that reason, the attraction 
factors of Mexican localities should be more related with manufacturing advantages. 
In addition, we did not expect to find a solid institutional support in terms of 
complementary knowledge-producing organizations and/or government financial 
incentives dedicated to the sector. The sources of information of this thesis are a 
survey applied to 30 aerospace firms in Mexico, interviews with four state economic 
development offices, and secondary information like documents with information of 
the Ministry of Economy, specialized aerospace magazines and journals. The results 
of this thesis largely support the hypotheses put forward, although sorne of them 
require further analysis. Sorne unexpected results were also seen. 
Regarding the type of activities, it is clear that almost ail firms were devoted to 
manufacturing, with few firms in MRO (maintenance repair and overhaul) and few 
cases of R&D. To have an idea of the complexity of the manufacturing activities, we 
asked about innovative activities. Almost ail firms in the survey declared to have 
introduced new products at the level of the firm, but innovation at world level was 
almost absent. With few exceptions, innovation at the level of the firm meant that the 
product was designed elsewhere and then the firm was in charge of its production. 
This is not new, and apparently, the aerospace industry may follow the steps of other 
foreign firms-dominated industries like the automotive, in which Mexico plays the 
role of manufacturer, though a good one. A methodological note is raised regarding 
this issue. We followed the Oslo manua1 convention when asking about innovation 
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and then classify it according to three levels: firm, country, and world level. Although 
it is true that firms make an important effort by producing new products, the effort 
should be qualitatively different when the firm designed it than when it did not. 
However, there are two issues that may differentiate the future path of this 
manufacturing activity compared to other industries like the automotive. On one 
hand, it is worth mentioning that innovation at the process level is present in most of 
the firms. This by itself is not surprising since it has been the case in other industries. 
What may be different is that sorne of the processes (and even products) are carried 
on for the very first time in Mexican firms at a world level. It seems that scale 
economies may prevent the duplicity of activities and machinery among head quarters 
and their subsidiaries. Although more time and evidence is needed, it appears that the 
high costs involved in aerospace activity that initially postponed internationalization 
compared to other sectors, may be also the circumstance that accelerates this same 
internationalization. On the other hand, most of the processes and products we are 
referring to are parts and not complete subsystems. In other words, ail the work done 
in Mexican aerospace firms (with perhaps one or two exceptions) are parts that will 
be integrated later in a module elsewhere. This is contrary with what happens in the 
automotive industry in which complete systems are integrated in the country 
(although the original innovation cornes from abroad). 
The point we want to stress is that the particular characteristics of the aircraft as a 
product, which we illustrated with the aid of the modularity concept, will make 
different the transfer of activities compared to other industries. Since the inauguration 
of the Bombardier plant, Mexican authorities have mentioned a future day in which a 
complete plane will be made and assembled in the country. This discourse seems ta 
believe that the logical forward step of manufacturing sorne parts is to manufacture 
ail parts and integrate them. The proposition in this thesis is that this is not an 
automatic effect, because that posture downsides both the technological and market 
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requirements of aircraft. Regarding the former, there are many modules, and 
mastering the technology just to manufacture and integrate one of them requires 
1earning time, huge investments, and governrnent backing. On the market perspective, 
we should bear in mind that assembling an aircraft in one location usually is done at 
the expense of other locations in the world. Countries with growing big civilian 
markets (and in some instances military markets provided by governments) like 
China, can afford to lure leading firms to assembly whole planes in their soils (and 
learn how to do it themselves thereafter). However, a relatively captive market like 
Mexico seems to provide no incentive to assembly locally. Therefore, local assembly 
would be feasible only in the medium run if Mexico is able to develop a cost-efficient 
aerospace manufacturing infrastructure. 
By public information as weil as the information we gathered in the survey, we know 
there are some examples of design and R&D activities that were initially not expected 
(for confidentiality reasons we are not too specifie). Interestingly, the more advanced 
cases do not seem to have followed the linear logic in which the firm first do 
manufacturing activities and then design and R&D facilities follow. Indeed, those 
facilities seem not to be related to manufacturing activities in the country, instead 
they are part of the overall design and R&D efforts of the corporate. There are other 
cases in which there are design labs that help firms' efforts, but those labs stick to 
secondary design. Although these cases are seanty, and require further research, they 
seem to support the idea that leading aerospace companies will transfer several 
manufacturing activities inc1uding R&D, although these activities will hardly 
represent complete sub-systems or modules, and in the case of R&D this will be 
complementary to activity done elsewhere in the corporate (as the absence of patents 
granted for those R&D facilities suggests). Thus, the ability to developed and produee 
a complete module will be absent in firms located in Mexico unless strategie 
measures are taken. 
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The geographical distribution of aerospace firms m Mexico revealed that the 
tendency to agglomerate is present in the country. The fact is that from the 32 
Mexican states, only sixteen have at least one aerospace firm, and from those sixteen, 
five states host 75% of the firms. The cities of Tijuana and Mexicali in the Baja 
California state, Querétaro in the Querétaro state, Monterrey in the Nuevo Leon state, 
and Chihuahua in the Chihuahua state were selected to do the empirical research. For 
the survey, 30 firms distributed in those cities participated in the study. National and 
regional development offices promote those localities as aerospace clusters. As it was 
shown in this thesis, Mexican clusters fall short of elements present in other weil 
known world aerospace clusters. Regarding the growth pole concept, it is clear that in 
Mexico the activity of aerospace companies has very little driving effect on the 
regions they establish since an overwhelming majority of their links are done with 
agents outside the cluster. This is true for both, business links and knowledge links. 
In other words, ideas, systemic physical inputs and final products are treated with 
agents located abroad. In terms of the anchor tenant concept, since the activities 
carried on by aerospace firms in Mexico's aerospace clusters are more related with 
manufacturing and very little to R&D, it is very unlikely that a firm will be playing 
the role of anchor tenant. Therefore, it can be said that Mexican aerospace 
agglomerations do not fit the concepts just mentioned. Instead, the agglomeration 
forces found in Mexican aerospace clusters are related to manufacturing advantages, 
specifically, 1) the presence of an industrial infrastructure, 2) skilled industriallabour 
force, not necessarily in aerospace, and 3) the other low operation costs (provided in 
part by the maquiladora program). 
One factor that may change the nature of agglomeration force number two in the 
medium or long run is the opening of technical training centres and advanced 
engmeerIng degree programs in aeronautics. Thus, the experience that employees 
currently working in aerospace firms plus the generation of new technicians and 
engineers specialized in aeronautics may give rise to a stronger agglomeration force 
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but without being as compelling as the one observed in consolidated aerospace 
C!usters. In this sense, the word aerospace clusters could be misleading in the case of 
Mexico, if we compare with other world examples. Nevertheless, the fact is that firms 
gather in specific locations. We do not have a definitive answer to that phenornenon, 
since there are other cities in Mexico that couId provide the advantages seen above. 
Tentatively, it appears that in the case of Tijuana and Mexicali, it was a spontaneous 
gathering that was due mainly to their closeness with California. In the case of 
Querétaro and Chihuahua, it seems that the strong promotion of state governments 
gave sorne trust to the firms, especially in the former city. In the case of Monterrey 
the story is different because although there are sorne foreign aerospace firms, most 
are national-owned firms that are suppliers (for confidentiality reasons we do not give 
more details). In any case, ail the cities mentioned, together with sorne in Sonora (that 
was left out of this study), seem to have gained an initial advantage as attractor 
locations. 
Sorne conceptual notes are pertinent regarding the clustering observed in Mexican 
aerospace firms. It is important to note that even if the growth pole logic was behind 
the development of established aerospace clusters in leading countries, the reality of 
Mexico and CUITent circumstances of the aerospace industry make this not be an 
appropriate model to expect or follow. The growth pole logic assumes a partnership 
between a big firm and the government to develop a region. However, in the case of 
Mexico, the country does not have a local big firm able to exert a driving effect, 
neither the specialized supplier base that is supposed to relocate to the 
underdeveloped region. In this sense, in developing countries like Mexico, the 
localities that host aerospace manufacturing activities should be localities with an 
important infrastructure and not localities that are to be developed. Regarding the 
anchor tenant idea of a firm that does most of the activities needed to develop its 
products (including R&D), its applicability is also a debatable issue. Since we do not 
have sufficient evidence, we are only going to put forward a tentative hypothesis 
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based on the apparent division of R&D and production in aircraft development. We 
found a handful of firms that were doing either complex manufacturing or R&D 
activities. The firms in the former case did complex manufacturing without the 
assistance of R&D units in site. Also, as it was pointed out, there were R&D units 
completely detached from manufacturing activities in the country. Therefore, 
tentatively, the support towards manufacturing activities, although useful, is not an 
automatic step towards more knowledge-content activities. In order to do so, an 
ambitious and strategie innovation policy should be developed to encourage 
aerospace firms to carry on more complex activities like integration of systems and 
subsystems and/or R&D. The set-up of a world-class public research infrastructure 
seems mandatory to this end (Benzler and Wink, 2010) given the inclusion of new 
technologies in new plane models. Actually, achieving proficient levels in 
manufacturing requires also this sort of policies given the stringent quality and safety 
standard. However, as we are going to see next, institutiona1 eff011s have been 
stronger regarding labour force formation, but limited when it cornes to develop 
knowledge-producing organizations. 
In terms of the institutional support given to the sector, we found this has been 
concentrated in three main areas: 1) the development of a labour force, 2) 
infrastructure support, and 3) support for high techno1ogy activities. Regarding the 
first, it is notorious that at least four universities located in four of the cities we 
studied, opened engineering degrees in aeronautics, standing out the brand new 
aeronautics university opened in Querétaro expressly to support the industry. In the 
same line, a training centre in the city of Chihuahua (Cenaltec) was established 
expressly to train technicians for aerospace companies. In addition to these education 
and training centres, regional development offices offer funds to help firms in the 
hiring and training process. In terms of infrastructure, the aerospace park in the city 
of Querétaro was made with the purpose to attract Bombardier and other firms to 
establish there. It is important to mention that in general, firms do not have problems 
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finding industriallocations as the results of this research suggests. Perhaps this aspect 
of physical infrastructure is not much relevant, but we wanted to highlight it because 
it has received much promotion. Regarding the incentives for firms to carry on high 
technology activities, the new program of the Conacyt has provided 5.3 USD million 
for 25 projects. It is soon to know the impact of the projects, but it is true that the 
amount of funds should grow in the future if the program wants to rea[ ly support high 
impact projects. In terms of complementary knowledge-producing organizations, the 
most salient is the CIATQ located in Querétaro, a government research lab that has 
experience helping out firms in aerospace, although it supports other industries as 
weIl. There are also plans to set up a new brand research centre completely devoted to 
aeronautics in Monterrey. With these few examples, it is clear that the support should 
really be expanded in this area; otherwise it would be really difficult to lure aerospace 
firms to carry on innovative activities in Mexico. 
An interesting point is that the Ministry of Economy has identified Querétaro and 
Baja Califomia as potential Strategic poles of innovation. Nevertheless, the reasons 
behind that identification are not well explained. As it was shown, border cities host 
more firms within them, but these firms do not get much support from being in a 
cluster. Thus, even if Baja California has been designated as a strategic cluster, firms 
do not feel much enthusiasm about it, as the results of co-location show (see table 
5.6). The contrary is in the case of Querétaro. Whether these particular states should 
be the chosen ones or not, requires a more thorough evaluation. Particularly, one of 
the criteria should be the capacity of the location to develop an effective 
technological platform, and not just the number of firms in the case of Baja 
California, or the allegedly existence of an anchor tenant in the case of Querétaro, 
which as we have seen, according to the definition there are not such firms in Mexico. 
In any case, even for those states that have been designated, policy measures have 
been modest. More important, that designation does not contain a set of incentives 
that will encourage firms to only establish in those places. This issue is critical in the 
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sense that a technological infrastructure dedicated to the aerospace sector will require 
huge amounts of financial resources, and the best way to use them will be 
concentrating such facilities in just two or at most three places. Given the financial 
limitations of the Mexican government, this concentration of resources seems 
mandatory. 
AIso, the policy should take in account possible venues regarding aeronautic 
specialization in sorne important modules of the aircraft. The profiles of the different 
c1usters given so far, seems insufficient as a technological guide; they are the result of 
what firms are doing in this moment, and not the result of a technological 
prospective. Regarding the creation and/or support of a Mexican-owned firm 
(whether public or private ownership) active in the integration of an important aircraft 
module, it seems that it is not a priority in the policy so far. 
Finally, even though advantages not related with innovation may explain the presence 
of firms in Mexico's aerospace clusters, these advantages should not be minimized 
given the tough quality standards of the aerospace industry, and if properly managed 
they may form the base for future development. 
Limitations and further research 
As it was mentioned before, one limitation of the study is the way in which 
innovation is measured. This is particularly challenging when dealing with 
subsidiaries, because even though the managers knew whether the product was 
produced for the very first time in the their facilities or not, their assessment about the 
degree of involvement of both the subsidiary and other part (or parts) of the 
corporation was not much c1ear in sorne cases. Therefore, in this case, knowing the 
qualities of the product, does not give a precise capability assessment about the 
people that did it. On the one hand this situation overestimates capabilities in cases of 
almost pure technology transfer, and on the other hand, it underestimates capabilities 
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in cases in which firms in Mexico even rectified designs due to errors committed in 
the corporate design department. Knowing the frequency of these two situations is 
difficult. 
The previous point is an inherent difficulty when dealing with subsidiaries, but a 
point that could have been improved upon is related with system integration. Thanks 
to the conceptual revision about modularity and to interviews with notable managers 
in Mexico, we figured out that an interesting issue that may explain differences in 
aerospace compared to other industries is the ability of a firm to integrate systems. By 
this integration we mean the ability to do all the activities and services neces~ary to 
deliver a complete module ready to be installed without further work. The feeling we 
have is that in aerospace this ability is harder to reach compared to other activities 
like automotive. 
In this sense, further research on this integration ability perhaps could throw light 
about the difference on capabilities in different countries. For instance, as we saw in 
the thesis, the number of Mexican aerospace firms (even if adjusted downwards) is 
rather larger compared to a country like Brazil. However, the big difference is that 
Brazil has a firm able to integrate the whole plane and sell it. The proposition here is 
that asking firms about what is lacking in terms of capabilities in order to reach 
system integration ability could point out potential opportunity areas not seen by just 
asking about innovation. 
The few cases of R&D found in Mexico deserve perhaps a deeper study to have a 
better knowledge about their presence in the country. A tentative hypothesis might be 
that the apparent division of manufacturing and R&D in aerospace, makes that sorne 
parts of the corporate R&D may re10cate to lower-cost locations in a fashion similar 
to manufacturing but without being necessari1y related to each other. Having a better 
knowledge of that phenomenon may lead to improve conditions for the migration of 
that type ofR&D activities (and not only to manufacturing). 
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The CUITent policy framework in Mexico to assist firms in high technology activities 
started in 2009, thus, it is relatively new, and more time and evidence is needed to 
assess its results, especially in the case of aerospace firms. Thus, a follow up of this 
policy is mandatory. 
ITP proposaI for Mexico's aerospace sector 
With the evolutionary elements of an innovation and technology policy presented in 
section 1.3 together with the results of this research, we are in a position to sketch the 
general characteristics that an ITP should contain to foster development in the 
Mexican aerospace industry. 
Vision 
The first point has to do with the strategic vision about where the sector is supposed 
to be heading. Acknowledging the impossibility of planning as a substitute for setting 
a strategy, LaU and Teubal (1998: 1379) argue that a clear vision is essential to set the 
priorities for the development path of any industry or economy. For this case, this 
vision requires to acknowledge at least two issues. First, that the initial transferring of 
manufacturing activities by foreign firms is far from being an automatic migration 
process, given the stringent quality standards of the industry. It was just until this 
decade that the number of aerospace companies in Mexico experienced an upward 
shift, while other sectors with less stringent (although complex) manufacturing 
process had already been present in the country since at least three decades ago. 
Therefore, an ITP should recognize that the labour cost differential (between Mexico 
and developed countries) and the already manufacturing capacity are necessary but 
not sufficient factors for an effective transferring of complex aerospace 
manufacturing activities. A lot of measures should be in place to encourage that kind 
of transfer. The second issue has to do with the transfer of R&D activities in a 
subsequent phase. If the transfer of complex manufacturing activities is difficult, the 
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transfer of R&D activities is even more. But more important than that, is the 
recognition that R&D activities should be a fundamental part of the strategy for the 
country to be a relevant player in aerospace. These activities must not be left aside no 
matter how difficult they may seem. This is a very important issue for Mexico. As 
Mexican industrialization history shows, the lack of ambitious goals (whether due to 
conservative approaches, international pressures or for underdeveloped policy 
capabilities) and an excessive reliance on market forces has resulted in limited 
development in terms of technological capabilities and moreover innovation, for once 
taught very dynamic technological sectors like the automobile. 
Summarizing, the policy vision should include 1) the deployment of different 
measures to effectively transfer complex R&D and manufacturing activities of 
foreign firms towards their subsidiaries, and 2) a comprehensive set of policies and 
infrastructure to encourage the undertaking of R&D activities and eventually the 
creation of locally-owned firms (in a first moment state owned, at least partially). 
Horizontal policies 
Given the still underdeveloped state of industrial R&D in the Mexican economy, a 
great deal of horizontal policies needs to be in place. These horizontal policies should 
give incentives to domestic and foreign firms to carry on R&D activities and thus 
initiating a virtuous learning process. To this matter, Teubal (1996: 454, 459) 
differentiates between grants/loans and R&D tax credits. Teubal (1996) argues that 
firms that do not have well developed R&D routines would be better aided by grants 
or loans. Since those firms are just beginning to handle those kinds of projects, they 
have a lot of incertitude as to what the final outcome would be, and as such they need 
to feel supported in order to undertake the project. Moreover, those kinds of aids such 
be heavily promoted upon the firms and not to expect they will approach the 
government agency. This is especially important for small firms and for large firms 
that have not yet developed R&D capabilities. On the contrary, R&D tax credits are a 
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good instrument for firms that have already a good experience in R&D activities, 
such as foreign corporations. 
For the aerospace sector in Mexico the situation is somehow complex. Given that the 
majority of the firms are foreign subsidiaries, it can be argued that those firms know 
for sure that R&D is a crucial activity. However, the subsidiary in particular does not 
carry on R&D activities (the majority of these firms function as manufacturing firms). 
Thus, on the one hand, the firm is aware of the advantages of R&D, but on the other 
hand it does not have the capabilities to do that kind of activities in Mexico. 
Moreover, their mandate in most of the cases is related to manufacturing and 
production, and as such they might be more interested in being efficient at those 
activities, instead of trying to develop more complex capabilities at the risk of losing 
relevance to the eyes of the headquarters. Therefore, offices in charge of 
administering those programs should be in very close relation with firms either to 
show them the importance to set up R&D routines or to back the subsidiaries in their 
attempts to gain more freedom to pursue other activities. 
If, as Teubal (2002) argues, an ITP should move the economy, or for that matter a 
sector, from a low technology to a high technology path development, the question is 
how high high-technology should be. Should an ITP foster technology adoption, 
innovation or both? A reasonable answer is that in a first stage an ITP would be 
centred on improving the knowledge content of the manufacturing activities of the 
subsidiaries, thus measures to facilitate the transfer of advanced manufacturing 
techniques should be adopted. This improvement in the manufacturing activities may 
be conductive to process-innovation, not necessarily new to the world, but new to the 
subsidiary. This would be an important learning process, and it would become more 
relevant as the process-innovation cases multiply and go from new to the subsidiary 
to new to the world (or at least new to the corporation). 
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For practical ends, the last two paragraphs imply that policy measures should include 
both, support for technology transfer activities -from parents to subsidiaries- (like 
training, credits for machinery, legal advice on imports), and for encouraging those 
firms to improve their technological capabilities through policies aimed at the 
adoption of advanced technology. 
Market-building and technology infrastructure policies 
If the ITP path of action is something like the scenario just described, market­
building policies and technology infrastructure policies are important. 
A strong signalling by the government is also crucial. Heavy promotion of the 
benefits that Mexico offers is mandatory. To sorne degree, the inauguration of 
Bombardier's Querétaro plant was an important signal. However, the promotion 
should be accompanied with equally strong steps towards providing an advanced 
technological infrastructure that actually could fulfil those promises. The set-up of 
training and education programs with a technical profile is a central element of this 
infrastructure93 . Given the unlikely event of attracting foreign personnel in important 
numbers, the local environment should provide the majority of skilled workers94 . As 
we saw, Mexican authorities have been active in this sense by setting up different 
education and training programs in aerospace, and providing financial support for 
training needs. Nevertheless it should be kept in mind that much of the experience in 
this industry is acquired in the shop floor. For this reason, the subsidiaries play a 
crucial role in the first stages of an ITP. They are the agents with the main source of 
93 The degree of specialization in aeronautic technology is a matter of some dispute. According to 
some personal information, trying to offer top aeronautic engineering formation may not be a good 
idea at the beginning of the development of the sector. This is because activities that require that kind 
of formation are not expected to be transferred to Mexico in the short and medium run 
94 It seems that the option of attracting foreign workers is not a significant one. Wage differentials and 
the tendency of these kinds of workers to remain in just one place, makes this option not feasible. On 
the contrary, people in managerial positions obey to a different logic, which allows them to be 
transferred with similar wages. 
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knowledge in the whole host-country system. They should participate in the set-up of 
the education and training programs. 
Another important element in the technological infrastructure is to set-up of 
laboratories that could help firms in their technical and management problems. 
According to Justman and Teubal (1995) this kind of infrastructure should be 
oriented in a first stage to provide services that have been proven elsewhere. It will be 
on a later stage that this infrastructure should invest in creating cutting edge 
knowledge. To complement this infrastructure, the existence of specialized suppliers 
is mandatory. In this sector these suppliers are related to heating treatments, precision 
machining, aerodynamic tests, electronic .components and instrumentation, software, 
etc. Nevertheless the whole idea of an advanced infrastructure on aeronautic 
technology entails one problem. Contrary to the relative immobility (from other 
countries towards Mexico) of skilled human resources in this sector, specialized 
infrastructure and services might exhibit sorne kind of mobility besides their apparent 
sticking to sorne locations. In a sector in which quality and precision are crucial, and 
in which transportation costs represent a minor fraction of total costs and in which 
development and production takes longer (when compared to other sectors), firms 
usually seek for the best possible option when it cornes to a specialized service. This 
implies that it is easier for Mexican subsidiaries to seek those services in the US, 
Canada or even Europe. In this sense, the challenge of an ITP in this area is twofold; 
to provide incentives for specialized suppliers to establish in the country and to give 
massive support for the developing of local ones. Tentatively Monterrey could 
become an important location to develop local suppliers since it already has sorne of 
them. In order to be effective in this attempt, a critical mass of aerospace firms should 
be attracted to the country. 
Targeted policies 
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A critical issue that was explained in Chapter 1 is the cluster. As it has been 
explained, a comprehensive ITP towards the aerospace sector requires an enormous 
effort and huge investments. Deployment of those policy measures and funds could 
have better results when applied to only certain clusters. Trying to develop various 
aerospace clusters throughout Mexico does not seem a good idea. Beyond the 
agglomeration economies in terms of human resources and suppliers explained in 
Chapter 1, the huge sums of public and private investment needed to mount the 
required infrastructure (i.e. academic, public laboratories) makes almost mandatory to 
chose only two or maximum three places as designed aerospace clusters. The problem 
in this aspect has to do with the agglomeration forces and actual infrastructure present 
in the potential clusters. Given that this first moment of the internationalization trend 
is based on the low-costs advantages of Mexico coupled with sorne manufacturing 
capacity existing in sorne places of the country, the result is that foreign subsidiaries 
are establishing their subsidiaries in places with those characteristics. The first option 
would be to choose among those places according to the number and importance of 
the firms located. Although surely this is important, the selection of the clusters 
should also take into account the potential of that locality to provide all the 
ingredients of an ITP mentioned so far, if the objective is to have clusters with high 
technology and innovative activity in the near future. 
Another important topic on targeted policies is the eventual development of a 
nationally-owned aerospace firm which in a first time should be government 
property .. Although at this moment is difficult to make assertions about what kind of 
technological activity, alliances, organizational scheme, and supports this firm should 
have, it is certainly important to put it as a medium to long term policy objective. 
After sorne time of the beginning of the ITP, it should be more or less clear in which 
modules or modules of the aircraft, it is more likely to obtain better technological 
results given the learning path of the available human resources. Negotiations with 
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foreign firms to form joint-ventures might be necessary. Searching for available 
niches would also be required. 
Although the Mexican market is not large enough to provide room to immediately 
start with a national-owned firm, it can be certainly used to sorne extent to that end. It 
is important to recall that airline firms in Mexico are privately owned. In principle the 
governrnent cannot enforce local airlines to buy planes with local content. 
Nevertheless, acknowledging that at sorne point the creation of a local-owned firm 
(beyond suppliers) is a crucial step to further the development of the sector, the 
Mexican governrnent must to some degree use two instruments to support such firms, 
namely the use of offset agreements (similar to the ones used by Asian countries), and 
exerting influence in the buying choice of Mexican airline firms 
ANNEXES 
Annex 1 presents the English version of the questionnaire in which the survey upon 
Mexican aerospace firms is based. Annex 2 is the Spanish version of the 
questionnaire. Bath versions were used as requested by the interviewee, being the 
Spanish version the mûst used. 
ANNEXI 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT OFTECHNOLOGY 
CANADA RESEARCH CHAIR ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
 
TECHNOLOGY
 
RESEARCH TEAM:
 
Jorge Niosi, Ph.D. (professor and research director)
 
Majlinda Zhegu, Ph.D. (professor)
 
Javier Martinez Romero (Ph.D student)
 
"GLOBAL OUTSOURCING AND R&D BEST PRACTICES IN THE 
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY IN MEXICO" 
Statement of Confidentiality 
Ali responses to this questionnaire will be kept confidential and secure and will be made 
available onJy to the research team, ail of whom will be bound by this statement of 
confidentially. AU reports of this work will refer only to aggregate statistics and wjll not 
refer to any companies by name, products or people. 
1agree to abide by the above Statement of Confidentiality _ 
Interviewer signature on behalfof the research team 
1have read the above Statement of Confidentiality and find it acceptable _ 
Respondent signature on behalfofhis/her firm 
N.B. The interviewer is free to sign any non-disclosure agreement the respondent finds 
appropriate and the signature ofthe interviewer on such an agreement will bind the entire 
research team to ils terms and conditions. 
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GLOBAL OUTSOURCING AND R&D BEST PRACTICES IN THE AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART 1. Firm's characteristics 
Section 1.1: Respondent 
Name: 
Position: 
Company: 
Location: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
E-mail: 
Web site:
 
Section 1.2: Data on the company
 
• Year founded:
--- ­
• Ownership and control 
Public or; Private
 
_Foreign or; _Domestic
 
•	 Role in the corporate structure 
Headquarter or; _subsidiary (branch) 
• Total sales 2005, 200S_~	 _ 
• Total employees by the end 2005, 200S 
Total number_,_
 
Engineering and technicians_,_
 
Management and administration_,_
 
• Three main products or services 
----------
----------
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• Three main markets 
•	 % of sales 
exported: _ 
• What percent of your establishment's sales are in the following 
markets:
 
Local:
 
Rest of your country: _
 
Other, please specify: _
 
•	 What percent of your establishment's imports come from: 
Local: 
Rest of your country: _ 
Other, please specify: _ 
• R&D expenditures (as percentage of sales) 2005, 2008: 
•	 Other locations where the company has establishments 
-In this country: 
- Abroad: 
PART II R&D 
Section 11.1: R&D Strategy and Innovation 
•	 During the last three years, did your company offer new or 
significantly improved products (goods or services), or introduce new or 
significantly improved manufacturiog processes? 
Yes_,No_ 
•	 Your major innovations are: 
World novelty: 
Novelty in your Country: 
Novelty in your firm: 
• What is the relative importance of your internai sources of 
innovation:
 
(where 1 is less important and 5 is more important)
 
R&D unit (in-house) 1 2345
 
Marketing department 1 2 3 4 5
 
Production engineering staff 1 2 3 4 5
 
Management 1 2 3 4 5
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• Are your sources of innovative ideas: 
(where 1 is less important and 5 is more important) 
Local 
Parent or affiliated companies 12345 
Customers 1 2345 
Governrnental agencies or research institutes 12345 
Consultants (academic or professional) 12345 
Suppliers 1 23 4 5 
Competitors' products 1 23 4 5 
University researchers 12345 
National 
Parent or affiliated companies 1 23 4 5 
Customers 1 23 4 5 
Governrnental agencies or research institutes 12345 
Consultants (academic or professional) 1 23 4 5 
Suppliers 12345 
Competitors' products 12345 
University researchers 12345 
Global 
Parent or affiliated companies 1 2 3 4 5 
Customers 1 2 3 4 5 
Foreign governrnental agencies or research institutes 1 2 3 4 5 
Consultants (academic or professional) 1 23 4 5 
Suppliers 1 23 4 5 
Competitors 1 23 4 5 
University researchers 1 2 3 4 5 
Section II.2: Local ciuster characteristics 
•	 Why do you think your company has chosen this location to establish 
your plant? 
•	 What are the specifie advantages that this location procures to your 
firm? 
_Local labour pool Collocation with other firms in the same industry 
Land facilities _Physical infrastructure (transportation, 
communication) 
_Large suppliers _Specialized research institutions and 
universities 
_Large customers Financial inducements 
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_Government policies/grants Government incentives:
 
_Other (please specify) -policies
 
-grants
 
• In case you need to invest in a new plant, would you locate it in? 
The same region_
 
The same country_
 
Another country
 
Section Il.3: Government support (local and national) 
• In what way does national government poHcy helps YOUf company? 
Tax credits for R&D
 
Other tax credits
 
Direct subsidies
 
_Labour training
 
_Other (please explain)
 
None
 
• In what way does the poHcy of the state/province help the company? 
Tax credits for R&D
 
Other tax credits
 
Direct subsidies
 
_Labour training
 
_Other (please explain)
 
None
 
•	 In what way does the local science, technology, industrial park or city 
government help the company? 
Land
 
_Building construction
 
Direct subsidies
 
_Labour training
 
_Other (please explain)
 
None 
PART III: OUTSOURCING AND R&D INTERNATIONALIZATION 
Section I1L1 Firm's role in the industry 
• Please describe your firm's role in its industry 
a) We are responsible for marketing, sales, and distribution activities 
b) We are responsible for product design or manufacture 
c) We provide a service or tools for firms that are involved in product design or 
manufacture 
d) Other, pleasespecify: -----' _ 
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•	 Ifyou answered b) in Question 10 above, please describe your firm's 
customers 
a) Our customers are firms or individuals outside our industry (i.e. service 
providers or end-users) 
b) Our customers are the final systems integrators within our industry (i.e. the 
firms that sell to firms or final customers) 
c) Our customers are intermediate systems integrators or subsystem suppliers 
within our industry 
•	 Ifyou answered b) in Question 10 above, please describe your firm's 
suppliers 
•	 Our suppliers consist of generic suppliers outside our industry and 
(possibly) a single foundry within our industry (i.e. we are a component supplier) 
•	 Our suppliers consist of multiple specialized component suppliers within 
our industry (i.e. we are a subsystem supplier) 
•	 Our suppliers consist of multiple component and subsystem suppliers 
within our industry (i.e. we are a systems integrator) 
• Other, please specif)': 
Section 111.2 Learning and International Knowledge Spillovers 
•	 By which means do you receive specifications for new products? 
(please, order them by importance) 
Internet/intranet/e-mail
 
Jhone
 
Jostal mail/delivery service
 
Jersonal contact
 
_other, please specify: _
 
•	 How do you receive specifications for new products? 
(please order them by importance) 
Jhysical piece or prototype
 
_drawings
 
_computer drawings
 
_other, please specify: _
 
• Describe your implication in the development of new products 
You receive a complete set of technical specifications and:
 
-just follow them_
 
-propose improvements_
 
•	 Did one or more of your employees have to take special training for a 
specifie new product development project? 
Yes ; No_ 
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• Did you have to ask your customer for further information regarding 
sorne technical specification?
 
Yes ; No_
 
• Did you or your clients have to visit each other in order to solve 
technical problems regarding new products?
 
Yes ; No_
 
• Did you have to communicate periodicaHy the advances to your 
customer as part of an information system (supply management)?
 
Yes ; No_
 
•	 Regarding the price for the new products or services? 
_there was a fixed price established from the begil1l1ing, or 
_it was negotiated throughout the development process 
• How do you finance the new products? 
• How do you protect your novelty? 
Section III.3 R&D International management practices 
•	 What part ofyour R&D activity is conducted abroad? (% of R&D 
budget) _ 
• Has the share of international R&D activity grown since the year 
2005? 
Why? _ 
•	 What type of international R&D activity are you involved in: 
_Formai collaborative research projects 
_Participation in research consortia 
_Licensing or adoption ofprivate or public inventions 
Collaboration with research laboratories or universities. 
•	 Please give an example of one of your successful international R&D 
management practice? 
•	 Please give an example of one of your unsuccessful international R&D 
management practice? 
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• What primary benefits do you derive from these relationships? 
_Leveraging R&D expenditures Lower R&D costs 
_Access to technical expertise Government incentives 
_Source of new product ideas _Problem solving capacities 
_Access to equipment, material, research infrastructure 
• What are the risks from your international R&D activity? 
_Quality of local R&D practices 
Transactions cost 
_Intellectual property protection 
_The presence of other international competitors 
_The formation of local competitors 
•	 How do you protect your core competences while developing your 
R&D aetivity globally? 
•	 Has your global R&D activity affected firm's relationships within 
your domestic location? 
•	 What will be the major trends ofyour international R&D activity in 
the next five (or ten) 
years?	 _ 
---------
ANNEX2 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN SPANISH 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 
CANADA RESEARCH CHAIR ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
RESEARCH TEAM:
 
Jorge Niosi, Ph.D. (professor and research director)
 
Majlinda Zhegu, Ph.D. (professor)
 
Javier Martinez Romero (Ph.D student)
 
"CUESTIONARIO ACERCA DE LAS pRACTICAS DE 
SUBCONTRATACION E INVESTIGACION y DESARROLLO EN LA 
INDUSTRIA AEROESPACIAL EN MÉXICO" 
Clausula de Confidencialidad 
Todas las respuestas a este cuestionario seran manejadas de forma confidencial y 
segura. Solo el equipo de investigaci6n tendra acceso a ellas, y se compromete a 
respetar esta clausula de confidencialidad. Todos los reportes surgidos de este trabajo 
de investigaci6n mostraran estadisticas agregadas y no haran referencia a ninguna 
empresa por su nombre, productos 0 personas. 
Me comprometo a respetar esta clâusula de confidencialidad 
Firma deI entrevistador en nombre de todo el equipo de investigaci6n 
He leido la clausula de confidencialidad y estoy de acuerdo con 
ella
Firma deI entrevistado en nombre de su empresa 
Nota. El entrevistador tiene la facultad de firmar cualquier acuerdo de confidencialidad 
que el entrevistado juzgue pertinente, y la firma deI entrevistador compromete a todo el 
equipo de investigaci6n a respetar los términos y condiciones de dicho acuerdo. 
--------------------------
---------------------------
----
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PRÀCTICAS DE SUBCONTRATACI6N E I&D GLOBAL EN LA INDUSTRIA 
AEROESPACIAL 
CUESTIONARIO 
PARTE 1. C~lracteristicas de la empresa 
Secci6n 1.1: Entrevistado 
Nombre: 
Puesto: 
Compafiia: 
Ubicaci6n:
Teléfono: 
Fax: 
E-mail:

Sitio Web:
 
Secci6n 1.2: Datos generales de la empresa
 
•	 Afio de fundaci6n:
•	 Propiedad y control 
_Publica 0; _Privada 
_Extranjera 0; _Nacional 
•	 Papel que juega en la estructura corporativa 
_Casa matriz (Headquarter) 0; _subsidiaria (branch) 
•	 Ventas totales 2005, 2008 _ 
•	 Empleados totales al final de 2005, 2008 
Total __, __
 
-Ingenieros y técnicos__,__
 
-Gesti6n y administraci6n__, __'
 
•	 Sus tres principales productos 0 servicios 
-------
-------
--------------------------
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• Sus tres principales mercados 
• % de ventas 
exportadas:	 _ 
•	 ;,Qué porcentaje de las ventas de la empresa eshin dirigidas a los 
siguientes mercados?: 
Estado
 
Resto deI pafs _
 
Otro, especifique:
 
• ;,Qué porcentaje de sus insumos vienen de los siguientes lugares?: 
Estado
 
Resto deI pafs _
 
Otro, especifique:
 
• Gasto en I&D (como porcentaje de ventas) 2005, 
2008:	 _ 
• Otros sitios en donde la compafiia tenga establecimientos 
-En
 
México
 
-En el extranjero
 
PARTE II I&D 
Seccion ILl: Estrategia de I&D e Innovacion 
•	 Durante los ultimos tres afios, ;,SU empresa introdujo productos 
nuevos 0 significativamente mejorados (bienes 0 servicios), 0 introdujo 
procesos de manufactura nuevos 0 significativamente mejorados? 
Si ,No_ 
•	 Sus innovaciones mas importantes tienen el caracter de: 
Novedad a nive1 mundial: 
Novedad en el pafs: 
Novedad en la empresa: 
• ;,Cual es la importancia relativa de sus fuentes internas de 
innovacion?:
 
(en donde 1 es menos importante y 5 mas importante)
 
Unidad de I&D (interna) 1 2 3 45
 
Departamento de Mercadotecnia 1 2 3 4 5
 
Personal de ingenierfa y produccion 1 2 3 4 5
 
Gestion 1 2 3 45
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•	 Importancia de sus fuentes externas de innovaci6n: 
(en donde 1 es menos importante y 5 mas importante) 
Local (Estado)_ 
Casa Matriz 0 Empresas deI Corporativo 
Clientes 
Agencias gubernamentales 0 institutos de investigaci6n 
Consultores (académicos 0 profesionales) 
Proveedores 
Productos de competidores 
Investigadores universitarios 
Nacional 
Casa Matriz 0 Empresas deI Corporativo 
Clientes 
Agencias gubernamentales 0 institutos de investigaci6n 
Consultores (académicos 0 profesionales) 
Proveedores 
Productos de competidores 
Investigadores universitarios 
Global 
Casa Matriz 0 Empresas deI Corporativo 
Clientes 
Agencias gubernamentales 0 institutos de investigaci6n 
Consultores (académicos 0 profesionales) 
Proveedores 
Productos de competidores 
Investigadores universitarios 
Secci6n II.2: Caracteristicas deI c1uster local 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1 2 345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1234 5 
12345 
1234 5 
1234 5 
12345 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1 2345 
;,Por qué cree usted que su compafiia escogi6 esta localidad para establecer la 
planta? 
;,Cuales son las ventajas especificas que tiehe su planta al estar ubicada en esta 
localidad? 
Abundante mana de obra _Co-Iocaci6n con otras empresas deI sector 
_Disponibilidad de areas industriales _Infraestructura fisica (transporte, 
comunicaciones) 
_Grandes proveedores _Institutos de investigaci6n 
especializados y universidades 
Grandes clientes _Ventajas financieras 
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_Politicas gubernamentales (leyes, 
reglamentos, etc) _Incentivos gubernamentales: 
_Otras (por favor especifique): -politicas 
-fondos 
En caso de necesitar invertir en una nueva planta, i,en donde se localizaria? 
En la misma regi6n_ 
En el pais_ 
Otro pais 
Seccion II.3: Apoyo gubernamental (Estatal y Nacional) 
• i,En qué forma la politica dei gobierno federal apoya a su empresa? 
_Exenci6n de impuestos para I&D
 
Otros créditos fiscales
 
Subsidios directos
 
_Capacitaci6n laboral
 
_Otro (por favor explique)
 
_De ninguna forma
 
• i,En qué forma la politica dei gobierno estatal apoya a su empresa? 
_Exenci6n de impuestos para I&D
 
Otros créditos fiscales
 
Subsidios directos
 
_Capacitaci6n laboral
 
_Otro (por favor explique)
 
_De ninguna forma
 
• i,En qué forma el entorno local (cientifico y tecnologico, parques 
industriales y el gobierno municipal) ayuda a la empresa?
 
Tierra
 
Construcci6n de edificios
 
Subsidios directos
 
_Capacitaci6n laboral
 
_Otros (Por favor, explique)
 
_De ninguna forma
 
PARTE III: SUBCONTRATACION E I&D INTERNACIONAL 
Seccion IlL! Roi de la empresa en la industria 
• Por favor, indique el roi de su empresa en la industria 
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a) Somos responsables de mercadotecnia, ventas, y actividades de distribuci6n 
b) Somos responsables de disefio de producto 0 manufactura 
c) Proveemos servicios 0 herramientas para empresas que estan involucradas en 
disefio de producto 0 manufactura 
d) Otro, par favor especifique: 
•	 Si contesto b) en la pregunta 23 (arriba), indique el tipo de clientes de 
su empresa: 
a) Nuestros clientes son empresas 0 individuos fuera de nuestra industria 0 giro. 
b) Nuestros clientes son los integradores de sistema dentro de nuestra industria. 
(i.e. empresas que venden a otras empresas 0 a clientes finales)
 
c) Nuestros clientes son integradores de sistema intermedios 0 proveedares de
 
subsistemas dentro de nuestra industria.
 
•	 Si contesto b) en la pregunta 23 (arriba), describa el tipo de 
proveedores de su empresa: 
a) Nuestros proveedores son proveedores genéricos fuera de nuestra industria (i.e.
 
nosotros somos proveedores de componentes)
 
b) Tenemos multiples proveedores de componentes especializados dentro de
 
nuestra industria (i.e. nosotros somos proveedores de subsistema)
 
c) Tenemos multiples proveedores especializados tanto en componentes coma en
 
subsistemas dentro de nuestra industria (i.e. nosotros somos integradores de
 
sistema)
 
d) Otro, par favar especifique:
 
Seccion III.2 Aprendizaje y derramas internacionales de conocimiento 
• i,Por que medios recibe usted las especificaciones para nuevos 
productos (0 servicios)?
 
(favor de ordenar en orden de importancia)
 
Internet/intranet/e-mail 
Teléfono
 
_ColTeo postal/Servicio de paqueteria 0 mensajeria
 
_En persona
 
_Otro, por favor especifique:
 
• i,Como recibe usted las especificaciones para nuevos productos (0 
servicios)?
 
(favor de ordenar en orden de importancia)
 
_Pieza fisica 0 prototipo
 
Pianos
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_Pianos por computadora 
_Otro, por favor especifique: 
•	 Describa su implicacion en el desarrollo de nuevos productos (0 
servicios) 
Recibe una serie de especificaciones técnicas y:
 
-Las reproduce_
 
-Propone mejoras_
 
• i,Alguno(s) de sus empleados tuvo que recibir capacitacion especial 
con motivo de nuevos productos (0 servicios) 0 proyectos?
 
Si ;No_
 
• i,Tuvo usted que solicitar informacion adicional a su cliente 
relacionada con especificaciones técnicas?
 
Si ; No
 
• i,Ya sea usted 0 su cliente, tuvieron que enviar personal para resolver 
problemas técnicos relacionados nuevos productos (0 servicios)?
 
Si ; No
 
• i,Tuvo usted que comunicar periodicamente sus avances a su cliente 
como parte de un sistema de informaci6n (supply management)?
 
Si ; No
 
•	 En cuanto al precio de sus nuevos productos 0 servicios: 
_Tuvo usted un precio fijo desde el principio, 0 
_Fue negociado durante el proceso de desarrollo deI mismo. 
• i,Como financia usted sus nuevos productos? 
• i,Como protege usted sus innovaciones? 
Seccion III.3 Practicas de gestion de la I&D internacional 
•	 i,Qué parte de su actividad de I&D se lleva a cabo en otros paises (% 
de su presupuesto de I&D)? [0 en su caso, su actividad de I&D i,qué parte 
representa de la I&D dei 
corporativo?] _ 
•	 i,EI porcentaje de su actividad internacional de I&D ha crecido desde 
e1200S? [0 en su caso, i,la proporcion de su actividad de I&D con respecto a 
la dei corporativo ha crecido desde el 200S?] 
Si_;No_ 
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Por qué? 
• En qué tipo de I&D internacional esta su empresa involucrada: 
_Proyectos formales de colaboraci6n conjunta 
_Participaci6n en consorcios de investigaci6n 
_Licenciamiento 0 adopci6n de invenciones privadas 0 publicas 
_Colaboraci6n con laboratorios de investigaci6n 0 universidades 
• Por favor, de un ejemplo de alguna prâctica 0 experiencia de gestion 
de I&D internacional en el que su empresa haya participado que haya 
resultado exitosa: 
•	 Por favor, de un ejemplo de alguna practica 0 experiencia de gestion 
de I&D internacional en el que su empresa haya participado que NO haya 
sido exitosa: 
• "Cuales son los principales beneficios que la empresa obtiene de este 
tipo de prâcticas? 
_Optimizaci6n de su gasto en I&D Disminuir costos de I&D 
Acceso a "know how" técnico _Incentivos gubernamentales 
_Fuente de ideas para nuevos productos	 _Capacidades para resolver 
problemas 
_Acceso a equipo, materiales, infraestructura de investigaci6n 
• "Cuales son los riesgos para su empresa de su actividad de I&D 
internacional? 
_Falta de calidad de las practicas locales de I&D 
Costos de transacci6n 
_Falta de protecci6n de la propiedad intelectual 
_La presencia de otros competidores internacionales 
_La generaci6n 0 formaci6n de competidores locales 
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• ;,Como protege usted sus competencias centrales (core competences) 
cuando desarrolla I&D internacionalmente? 
•	 ;,Su actividad global de I&D ha afectado su relacion con su entorno 
local? 
•	 ;,Cuâles son los principales aspectos de la trayectoria de su actividad 
de I&D internacional en los proximos cinco (0 diez) aDos? 
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